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I. INTRODUCTION

Under the federal Constitution, Congress may enact "Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies."' Since the seventeenth century, the subject of
bankruptcy law has been the relationship between insolvent debtors and their
creditors. Recently, however, Congress and the courts have begun to
interpret Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause without regard to
the limitations implied in the words "the subject of Bankruptcies."
First, even though "bankruptcy" connotes insolvency, a debtor need not
be insolvent to begin a bankruptcy case under the Bankruptcy Code.2
Although most proceedings under the Code do involve insolvent debtors,
solvent debtors have filed bankruptcy petitions to take advantage of rules
under the Code, not available outside bankruptcy, that were designed to
assist insolvent debtors and their creditors. For example, solvent debtors
have used bankruptcy proceedings to reject burdensome
contracts that they
3
could not terminate under nonbankruptcy law.
More importantly, if insolvency is not a limitation under the bankruptcy
power, it logically follows that Congress could use the Bankruptcy Clause
to regulate debtors and creditors generally. Although Congress has not
explicitly gone so far, it did rely in part on the Bankruptcy Clause in
making loan sharking a federal crime and imposing federal restrictions on
wage garnishment.4 In addition, one author has suggested that Congress
could rely on the Bankruptcy Clause to enact a federal personal property
security law.5
Second, Congress has been tempted to use bankruptcy law to solve the
problems of third parties who are neither debtors nor creditors to the
detriment of the insolvent debtor and her creditors. For example, Congress

I. Clause 4 of Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution empowers
Congress to "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 4.
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330(1994), enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). This act repealed and replaced the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), the first permanent United States bankruptcy act.
For a description of the earlier bankruptcy acts, see infra part Ill.
3. See infra part V.A.
4. See infra part V.B.

5. See, e.g., David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy: A Call for the
FederalizationofPersonalPropertySecurityLaw, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987,
at 53. "Congress's power to pass bankruptcy legislation would, in itself, surely support the
specific suggestion of this article to federalize personal property security law and integrate
it with the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 57 (emphasis added) ( footnotes omitted). Professor
Phillips' authority for this proposition is Congress's reliance upon the Bankruptcy Clause to
enact the federal restrictions on wage garnishments of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
discussed infra note 380 and accompanying text. The word "surely" in this statement is
surely a tip-off that the author's conclusion is not so sure.
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required a bankrupt railroad to finance an assistance program for employees
who lost their jobs.6 Congress and the courts have also impaired the rights
of third parties to benefit insolvent debtors and their creditors. An example
is the abolition in bankruptcy of the state law rights of a non-debtor cotenant by the entireties.7
The recent expansion of the "subject of Bankruptcies" beyond its
historic domain has occurred almost silently because, over the last 100
years, courts and scholars have given little thought to the metes and bounds
of the Bankruptcy Clause.8 Some have suggested that the 'subject of
bankruptcies is incapable of f'mal definition." 9 On the few occasions when
courts or scholars have addressed the scope of the bankruptcy power, most
have left the impression that the bankruptcy power is like one theory of the
universe: It is constantly expanding.'0 Frank Kennedy has suggested that

6. See infra text accompanying note 399.
7. See infra text accompanying note 435.
8. Bankruptcy was once considered a dismal topic. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 3 (1935): "Bankruptcy is a gloomy and depressing subject.
The law of bankruptcy is a dry and discouraging topic." Recently, bankruptcy law has
generated a lively and rich debate among scholars about its purposes and meaning. See, e.g.,
The Washington University InterdisciplinaryConference on Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Theory, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 797 (1994). See also infra notes 20-21, 46, 388-89, and
accompanying text. The constitutional limits of bankruptcy, however, have not received
comparable attention.
9. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982) (quoting
Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938)). Wrightis discussedinfra
note 316 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 8, at 9-10; COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. NO. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 64 (1973)
[hereinafter BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT]. "There has also been a continuing
expansion of the meaning of the word 'bankruptcies' as used in the Constitution that has
legitimated evolutions in bankruptcy law, such as the introduction of discharge and
arrangement and reorganization provisions, since the time of the adoption of the Constitution." Id. The Bankruptcy Commission was formed in 1970 to make recommendations for
changes in the then Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Its report lead to the enactment of the current
Bankruptcy Code in 1978. As discussed in detail below, this statement by the 1973
Bankruptcy Commission is fundamentally wrong. Discharge and arrangement were important
parts of English and American bankruptcy and insolvency legislation before the Constitution,
and reorganization, a later phenomenon, is a logical extension of the earlier possibilities for
relief.
Justice Brennan, in Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974)
(rejecting claims that the Regional Rail Reorganization Act was unconstitutional as violating
the Fifth Amendment taking prohibition and the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause), quoted an earlier Supreme Court bankruptcy case and noted that the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act "'advances another step in the direction of liberalizing the law on the
subject of bankruptcies."' Id. at 153 (quoting Continental 111.Nat'l Bank. & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 671 (1935)). See infra note 309 and
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Congress has full discretion to define the boundaries of its power under the
Bankruptcy Clause. 1
To be sure, within the confines of the "subject of Bankruptcies"
Congress has complete discretion, subject only to the now weak requirement
for uniformity. 2 It may, subject only to a few other provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Fifth Amendment, 3 impair the contract rights and
the property rights of insolvent debtors and their creditors or impose
additional duties on them. 4 Nevertheless, this discretion within the subject

accompanying text.
11. Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the Constitution,in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY:
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

131, 137-38 (American Law Inst.-American

Bar Ass'n Comm. on Continuing Professional Educ. ed., 1988).
The argument that a focus on the scope of the bankruptcy power is preferable to a
concern with the limitations on its exercise by the amendments [to the Constitution] is
of course a plea for according nearly conclusive effect to Congressional enactments on
the subject of bankruptcy. When the variety of the provisions enacted by Congress and
the frequency and range of attacks on their constitutionality are considered, it must be
concluded that the courts have indeed come close to permitting Congress complete
freedom in formulating and enacting bankruptcy legislation.
Id. The argument to which Professor Kennedy refers was made by James S. Rogers, The
Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization:A Study of the Relationship
Betveen the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973, 1031
(1983).
12. See generallyJudith S. Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 22 (1983)
(criticizing the view that a bankruptcy law is "uniform" if it merely incorporates state law,
such as the state law on what property that individual debtors may exempt from the claims
of creditors in a bankruptcy case). The Supreme Court weakened the application of
geographical uniformity in Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974),
when it upheld as uniform a law that applied only to railroads in the northeast and midwest
United States on the grounds that these railroads were the only railroads in the country
undergoing a certain type of reorganization. Id. at 159-60.
13. This Article focuses only on the "subject of Bankruptcies" without regard to the
limitations imposed by the uniformity requirement, see generally Koffler, supranote 12, or
the Fifth Amendment, see generally Rogers, supra note 11.
14. On policy grounds, Congress considered and rejected the idea of allowing
creditors to petition a debtor involuntarily into a bankruptcy case under chapter 13, which
allows individuals with regular income, pursuant to I1 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1994), to
propose a repayment plan for their creditors and retain their property. H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1978), reprintedin1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6080-81. The House
Report also cited an earlier suggestion that a mandatory Chapter XIII case under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the precursor to Chapter 13, would violate the 13th Amendment
prohibiting involuntary servitude. Id. There is no doubt that a mandatory repayment
obligation would be within the scope of the "subject of bankruptcies." Before and after the
adoption of the Constitution, Delaware's debtor relief statute required mandatory service for
the repayment of debt as a condition of release from imprisonment for debt. See infra note
176 and accompanying text. One of the British insolvency acts similarly provided for
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of bankruptcies does not imply that Congress has complete discretion to
define the boundaries of the "subject of Bankruptcies." Could anyone
believe, for example, that Congress could use the Bankruptcy Clause as the
basis for banning guns from within 1,000 feet of schools? s I think not.
As Congress continues its efforts to revise the Code, 6 this Article
proposes that Congress and the courts reaffirm the constitutional limits of
bankruptcy law. 7 Under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress may only enact

indentured servitude. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1644-48 (1995). Perhaps the
rationale would proceed as follows: If school children cannot carry guns to school, they will
be less likely to buy them; if they are less likely to buy them, gun manufacturers will lose
sales, and some manufacturers will have a greater risk of bankruptcy. This reasoning
suggests another sillier outcome: perhaps Congress should mandate the possession of guns
in school. Compare this reasoning with that of the dissent in Lopez, id. at 1661-62: gun
related violence impedes education, which impedes worker's ability to get better jobs and
hurts communities and businesses, which in turn affects the economic well being of the
nation; therefore, banning guns from school is a regulation of "commerce among the States."
16. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress has created a National
Bankruptcy Review Commission to study the Code and recommend further changes. Pub.
L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). The current Code has been amended several times
by, among others, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); the Leasehold Management Bankruptcy Amendments Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088
(1986); the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102
Stat. 610 (1988); and the Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104
Stat. 4916 (1990).
17. The scope of the Bankruptcy Clause also reveals how Congress and the courts
have so completely transformed the Commerce Clause, which empowers Congress to
"regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It
reminds us that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause to have a much narrower
meaning than current interpretation has given it. Within its proper sphere-adjusting the
relations of insolvent debtors and their creditors-the Bankruptcy Clause is broader than the
Commerce Clause. It allows Congress to affect the rights and liabilities of insolvent debtors
and their creditors within a state as well as among the states. On the other hand, although
broader in its subject matter-commerce-the Commerce Clause limits Congress to regulating
commerce only "among the States."
In the area of commerce, the Supreme Court has abandoned the historical limits on the
Commerce Clause and has allowed regulation of activity that merely affects interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce
Clause empowered Congress to forbid a farmer from raising wheat for consumption on his
own farm by his own family and livestock). Although the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), applied the Commerce Clause limits to
overturn Congress's effort to ban weapons from schools, Lopez was the first such opinion to
do so in over fifty years. Similarly, scholars are beginning to question the breadth of the
Court's interpretation of the clause. See, e.g., Glenn Reynolds, Is DemocracyLike Sex?, 48
VAND. L. REv. 1635, 1648-59 (1995). Nevertheless, the principal dissent in Lopez believed
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legislation that regulates the relationship between an insolvent debtor and
her creditors. This statement contains two components:
1. The debtormust be insolvent in some sense. Insolvency means either
balance sheet insolvency, that is, the debtor's liabilities exceed her assets,
or cash flow insolvency, that is, she is unable generally to pay current debts
as they become due.'" The insolvency of the debtor in this sense is a
jurisdictional requirement for invoking a bankruptcy proceeding. Moreover,
because insolvency is a jurisdictional requirement, the bankruptcy power
does not extend to the general regulation of debtors and creditors. The
bankruptcy power, for example, does not authorize Congress to enact a
federal debt collection statute prescribing how creditors may extend credit
to debtors or how creditors may collect debts from their debtors generally.
2. A bankruptcy law may not create direct entitlements or liabilitiesfor
parties other than debtors and their creditors. A bankruptcy law is for the
benefit of insolvent debtors and creditors.' 9 It should neither benefit third

that the Commerce Clause authorized the law in question. It maintained that preventing
violence in schools enhanced education, and education enhanced the national economy.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). If, however, the Framers truly intended
the Commerce Clause to authorize any legislation that "affected" interstate commerce or that
enhanced the national economic well being, there would have been no need for the
Bankruptcy Clause. Further, the mode of constitutional analysis that has all but consumed
the Commerce Clause has begun to infect the Bankruptcy Clause.
18. A debtor can be solvent in the balance sheet sense and still be insolvent in the
cash flow sense. This typically arises when the debtor has illiquid assets, such as real estate,
that cannot be quickly converted into cash, but insufficient liquid assets, such as cash, to pay
current debts. The Code uses both concepts. For most debtors, the term "insolvent" in the
For
Code means balance sheet insolvency. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A), (B) (1994).
municipalities filing for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 9 of the Code, "insolvent" defines
a form of cash flow insolvency: "generally not paying its debts as they become due unless
such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute or unable to pay its debts as they become
due." Id. § 101(32)(C). As discussed below, cash flow insolvency also appears in II
U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1994). See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
19. Insolvency implies the existence of debts and creditors, and if an entity other than
the debtor is to be a direct beneficiary of bankruptcy it must be a creditor. For purposes of
this Article, I use the term "creditor" as it is defined in the Code. This definition is very
broad. A "creditor" includes any "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the
time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." II U.S.C. § 101(1 0)(A) (1994).
A "claim" includes a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgement,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured." Id. § 101(5)(A). Thus, it includes not only consensual
lenders of money but also parties to contracts, tort claimants, and anyone who has a potential
right to payment as a result of conduct or status of the debtor before the initiation of a
bankruptcy case.
In addition, for purposes of this Article, I bifurcate people according to their roles.
Thus, to the extent that an individual has a pre-petition debt, she is a creditor. If she also
has some other right, such as a right under a lease to enjoy possession of personal property
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parties at the expense of debtors and creditors nor harm third parties for the
benefit of debtors and creditors.
This requirement does not preclude any effects on third parties as byproducts of adjusting the relationship between insolvent debtors and their
creditors. Any provision of a bankruptcy law changing this relationship may
adversely or favorably affect society as a whole or specific third parties.20
For example, a law abrogating the security interest of secured creditors in
bankruptcy would no doubt affect the lending practices and costs of
borrowers and lenders generally.2 Such a law falls within Congress's
bankruptcy power because it would adjust the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and her creditors. The indirect effect on other borrowers
and creditors does not violate the constitutional limitation.
The reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code present another
example. To the extent that they allow an insolvent corporate debtor and
its creditors to adjust their relationship without liquidation and for the
benefit of either the debtor (that is, the equity holders) or the creditor, the
indirect by-product of continuing employment for employees and continuing
business for suppliers is permissible. Congress may not require, however,
that a corporation stay in business to provide continuing employment or
business opportunities for suppliers when reorganization is not possible or
is no longer benefits the corporate debtor or its creditors. Congress may
not, in effect, require the assets otherwise available to pay the creditors to
be consumed in wages for the employees and continued business for the
suppliers. This type of requirement would be an impermissible benefit for
third parties to the detriment of the creditors and the insolvent debtor.
Both of the two elements discussed above are important for the
principled construction of the Constitution. If some form of insolvency is
not required, then the Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress to regulate all
debtor-creditor relations without regard to their relation to interstate
commerce.2 2 To be sure, whether and when a debtor becomes insolvent in
either sense may present difficult factual and conceptual questions. But that
is true for any legal rule that sets a limit. Notwithstanding these difficulties,
insolvency in the balance sheet sense or in the cash flow sense marked the
boundary of the subject of bankruptcy at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.2 3 Bankruptcy connotes insolvency. Difficulties in drawing

leased to her, she in not a creditor in this capacity, even if the lease also makes her a creditor
with respect to obligations owed to her by the debtor/lessor.
20. See Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social
Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv.I, 12.
21. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Caseforthe Priority
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); Rasmussen, supra note 20, at
12-13.
22. See infra part V.
23. One could make the case that as a matter of policy bankruptcy law should address
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a line required by the Constitution should not allow us to ignore that line or
to suggest that the line really does not exist.
The second element precludes using a bankruptcy proceeding as a
pretext for providing direct benefits or harms to third parties who are not
debtors and their creditors, such as a law requiring a bankrupt debtor to
provide a one year severance package for employees. Unfortunately,
Congress and courts have occasionally crossed this line, and members of
Congress have exhibited a desire to use the Bankruptcy Code to further the
interests of third parties. 4 If furthering these interests is desirable,
Congress should do so under its appropriate constitutional authority, or leave
such legislation for the states if no Congressional authority exists.
Finally, ignoring both elements would enable Congress to legislate on
anything it deems desirable. Without both limitations, there really is no
limit to the Bankruptcy Clause.
The limits I discuss derive from the original intention of the Framers of
the Constitution. They spring from the rich and varied efforts of eighteenth
century English and American legislatures to resolve the problems of
insolvency of individuals. Except for the need to adjust these efforts to the
development of the modem corporation and other artificial entities engaged
in business activity that permit limited liability for individual investors,
practically all of the essential elements of the current Bankruptcy Code
reflect ideas that appeared in one form or another in English or early
American bankruptcy or insolvency legislation, as well as the concerns
underlying that legislation. The limits I discuss are also consistent with the
leading cases on the constitutionality of particular bankruptcy acts. Only
recently, because of a creeping loss of our constitutional memory, have
Congress and the courts slipped beyond the boundaries of the "subject of
Bankruptcies. ' 25

the debtor who is experiencing financial difficulty but who is not yet insolvent. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any principled way to capture this limitation. Despite its
difficulties, "insolvency" is a principle upon which we can rely to make a distinction between
bankruptcy law and general debtor-creditor law.
24. See infra part VI.
25. See infra parts V. and VI. Professor Kennedy suggests that the history of the
construction of the bankruptcy clause is a paradigm of the departure from the "original
intent" of the Constitution. Kennedy, supra note 11,at 137. 1 disagree. Unlike more
controversial provisions of the Constitution (e.g., the Commerce Clause, the Fourth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment) the Bankruptcy Clause has not undergone a
dramatic transformation from one interpretation to another. In my view, as discussed below
in part IV, all of the presumed "expansions" of Congress's bankruptcy acts adjudicated by
the Supreme Court fall well within the original intent of the Bankruptcy Clause. Perhaps
because they have become accustomed to the extensive exercise a federal power limited only
by the Bill of Rights, Congress (except in one instance discussed infra in part VI. B.) and the
courts are not so much misinterpreting the Bankruptcy Clause as they are ignoring it. In my
view, the Bankruptcy Clause falls outside the debate over originalism and non-originalism
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This Article discusses these points as follows. To provide the context
for the analysis that follows, part II briefly describes the essential elements
of the Bankruptcy Code for those readers not familiar with the Code. Part
III examines the English and American efforts before the adoption of the
Constitution to address the problem of insolvent debtors. Part IV reviews
the development of the subsequent American bankruptcy acts and the
challenges to their constitutionality in light of the earlier English and
American experience.
Part V examines the limitation of the bankruptcy power to debtors who
are insolvent in a balance sheet or cash flow sense. Part VI examines the
prohibition against bankruptcy laws that create entitlements for third parties,
that is, those who are neither debtors nor creditors, at the expense of
insolvent debtors and their creditors or that harm third parties for the benefit
of the insolvent debtor or its creditors. It also explores the issue of how to
treat those who may have claims against an insolvent debtor, such as claims
for latent injuries from pre-bankruptcy conduct, that will not become known
until long after a bankruptcy proceeding.26
UI. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
This part briefly describes the essential elements of the Bankruptcy Code
to provide a context for the discussion that follows. Bankruptcy laws have
traditionally been procedural statutes providing a means by which a debtor
and all her creditors may readjust their relationship when the debtor became
insolvent.2 7 Under the present Bankruptcy Code, as in every earlier

in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Symposium: Originalism, Democracy, and the
Constitution, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 237 (1996).

26. The "creditor" with extremely contingent rights to payment, such as an
unmanifested injury from exposure to hazardous substances that may not develop for 20
years, has troubled courts. See infrapart VI.C. Including these potential victims as creditors
no doubt stretches the Bankruptcy Clause about as far as it can go. Nevertheless, to the
extent that nonbankruptcy law recognizes extremely contingent claims, the holders of these
claims may be subject to the bankruptcy power. If they are not creditors, however,
bankruptcy law may not directly affect them.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5971 (footnotes omitted):
The present purposes of the Bankruptcy Act [of 1898] are twofold: either to
rehabilitate financially a distressed debtor or to assemble and liquidate his assets for
distribution to creditors.
In either kind of proceeding, the nature of bankruptcy is to sort out all of the debtor's
legal relationships with others, and to apply the principles and rules of the bankruptcy laws

to those relationships. Bankruptcy is mainly a procedural device, prescribing the method
of accomplishing rehabilitation or liquidation, but generally leaving undisturbed legal
relationships that existed before bankruptcy. To this end, the Bankruptcy Act incorporates
State and general Federal law in many important areas.
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bankruptcy statute, a bankruptcy case begins with a simple petition. With
a few exceptions, 8 any individual or entity may commence a "voluntary"
case,29 for which generally there is no requirement of insolvency in any
sense.3" In addition, three or more holders of claims of more than $10,000
can begin an involuntary case against most individuals or entities under
Chapters 7 or 11.31 The debtor may have an involuntary case dismissed
if it can show that it is solvent in a liquidity or cash flow sense."
The distinction between a "voluntary" and an "involuntary" case is less
than the words suggest.33 As has long been recognized, a debtor usually
commences a voluntary case only when it is forced to do so because of
some manifestation of insolvency.34 This could include a creditor seizing

28. Domestic and foreign (if engaged in business in the United States) insurance
companies, banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, savings and loan associations, building
and loan associations, homestead associations, credit unions, and domestic licensed small
business investment companies, industrial banks, and similar institutions which are insured
banks as defined in the Federal Insurance Act may not be debtors under the Code. II
U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (d). Railroads may only file a petition for reorganization under Chapter
I I of the Code, id. § 109(b)(1 ), (d), and stock brokers and commodity brokers may only file
a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code, id. § 109(b), (d).
29. Id. § 301.
30. Municipalities may file a petition under Chapter 9 if they meet certain
requirements, including a requirement that they be insolvent in a cash flow sense. Id.
§§ 109(c), 101 (32)(C). See supranote 18. Farmers and wage earners may also file petitions
for special proceeding under Chapters 12 and 13, respectively. Id. § 109(e), (f).
31. Id. § 303. For a holder of a claim to be eligible to file a petition, the claims of
the holder may not be contingent as to liability or subject to a bona fide dispute.
Id. § 303(b). If there are fewer than 12 such holders, one or two holders of claims
aggregating $10,000 may commence an involuntary case. Id. § 303(b)(2). Creditors may
not, however, begin an involuntary case against a person that is a "farmer, family farmer, or
a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation." Id. § 303(a).
32. Id. § 303(h)(I): "[A]fter trial, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an
involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed, only if- (I) the debtor
is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are
the subject of a bona fide dispute."
33. Although the English bankruptcy acts were nominally limited to "involuntary"
proceedings, insolvent debtors frequently initiated such proceedings by inducing a friendly
creditor to begin a proceeding. See infra text accompanying notes 116-26.
34. See Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 7 (1940)
(remarking that the difference between involuntary and voluntary proceedings "does not affect
the nature of bankruptcy. Every form of enforcement of a debt is 'involuntary' as far as the
debtor is concerned"); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 89 (2d ed. 1990); Douglas G. Baird, The
Reorganizationof Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913,
926-27 (1994) [hereinafter, Baird, Closely Held Firms]; Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right
About BankruptcyLaw and Wrong About Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 835 (1994);
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
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the debtor's personal property, 35 a real estate lender beginning foreclosure
proceedings against the debtor's real estate,3 6 the commencement of
massive tort litigation against the debtor," or the entry of judgments
against the debtor.38
There are two basic types of bankruptcy case. In a case under
Chapter 7, the debtor or its creditors seek a liquidation of the debtor's assets
and liabilities. An appointed trustee gathers the assets of the debtor and
liquidates them to pay off the creditors. An individual debtor may retain
certain exempt property 39 and will receive a discharge of most debts4" so
that she can obtain a "fresh start" unburdened by those debts.
In a case under Chapter 11, the debtor (usually against the wishes of the
creditors) hopes to avoid liquidation and seeks to reorganize its affairs and
stay in business. 4 The debtor may retain control of its affairs, may
continue to operate its business as the "debtor-in-possession," and may
exercise most of the powers of a trustee.42 The debtor-in-possession has
the exclusive right for the first 120. days to propose a plan of reorganization. 43 After ihat time (and any extensions granted to the debtor-inpossession), creditors may propose plans of reorganization or may seek
liquidation.
A Chapter 11 reorganization plan can take several forms. It may' call
for selling the business as a going concern and using the proceeds of the
sale to pay the creditors. Alternatively, it may provide that the unsecured
creditors trade their claims for stock in a reorganized entity that will
continue in business. Or, the plan may simply change the way the entity
conducts business so that existing creditors can be repaid. The theory
behind reorganization is that keeping the business alive is better for creditors

Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 100, 115 (1983) (reporting that 38 of the 48
Chapter 11 filings in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri during the
first year after the effective date of the Code, October 1, 1979-September 30 1980, were a
direct response to legal action by a creditor that would have seized the debtor's property or
closed the debtor's business within two weeks, and concluding, "While [most of the debtors']
petitions are designated as 'voluntary' in a very real sense they were not.")
35. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
36. E.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
37. E.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (15,500
lawsuits pending against the debtor at the time of the filing of the petition).
38. E.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555 (Bankr. E.D. Va 1988) (the debtor had
settled about 9,000 tort claims for $530 million).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994).
40. Id. §§ 727, 523, 524.
41. Chapters 9, 12, and 13 also provide for reorganization of municipal governments,
family farmers with regular annual income and individuals with regular income.
42. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107, 1108 (1994).
43. Id. §§ 1121(a),(b).
44. Id. §§ I12(b), 1121(c).
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because doing so is a more efficient use of assets than liquidation. 4' There
is some doubt about the validity of these assumptions.4 6 There is little
doubt, however, that reorganizations produce more short term benefits for
non-creditor beneficiaries, such as managers, other employees, and local
taxing authorities (and accountants and lawyers), than do liquidations.
Ineither a liquidation or a rehabilitation, the Code establishes a simple
procedure for determining the existing liabilities of the debtor. The creditor
(or the debtor) can file a proof of claim.47 If no party in interest objects,
the claim will be allowed.48 If any party in interest objects to the proof of
claim, the bankruptcy court must determine the amount of the claim and
allow that amount.4 9 If someone has a claim against the debtor and that
claim arose before the order for relief, she must participate in the bankruptcy case, or she will receive nothing from the liquidation or reorganization
of the debtor.50
Filing a petition creates an estate. The estate consists primarily of "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."'" In addition, the trustee (including the debtor-inpossession in Chapter 11 cases)52 has certain powers to enhance the
bankruptcy estate of the debtor by avoiding certain pre-petition transfers of
property or pre-petition obligations.53 The trustee may take additional

45. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1978), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
46. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
439 (1992); James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistributionor Dissipation:The Evidence
for Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955 (1994); James W.
Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the
ElementaryEconomics of Loss Distribution,26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991); Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenzweig, The UntenableCaseforChapter11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) (based
on an empirical analysis). Bradley & Rosenzweig's analysis has been criticized. See Donald
H. Korobkin, The UnwarrantedCaseAgainst CorporateReorganization:A Reply to Bradley
and Rosenzweig, 78 IowA L. REV. 669 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a
Strange World. A Reply to ProfessorsBradleyand Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79 (1992);
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable CaseforRepeal of Chapter11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992).
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 1111(a) (1994).
48. Id. § 502(a).
49. Id. § 502(b).
50. This rule is implemented primarily through the Code's use of the defined term
"creditor," which means an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time
of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." Id. § 101(10).
51. Id.§ 541(a)(1) (1994).
52. The "debtor in possession" means the debtor unless a separate trustee has been
appointed. Id. § 1101(1). The debtor in possession has most of the powers of a trustee
under the Code. Id. § 1107. In Chapter 11, the debtor as a debtor in possession-existing
management, in the case of a corporation-retains significant control of the bankruptcy case.
53. These include the power to avoid preferential transfers to creditors on account of
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actions to benefit the estate, such as assume or reject executory contracts
between the debtor and third parties, 4 use or dispose of property of the
estate,"5 and borrow money secured by property of the estate. 56 The
filing of a petition also automatically stays all actions by creditors to collect
their debts.5 7
Finally, the Code recognizes the property interests that persons, such as
secured creditors, have in the debtor's property," prescribes the priorities
for distribution of the assets of the debtor among creditors in the case of
liquidations,5 9 requires meetings of creditors, and prescribes the procedures
for devising and implementing a plan of reorganization in Chapter 11.60
III. THE SUBJECT OF BANKRUPTCIES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION
As I discuss in parts IV and V below, some courts and scholars have.
taken the view that the Framers intended the Bankruptcy Clause to authorize
a bankruptcy system reflecting the English bankruptcy acts of the eighteenth
century. Indeed, the first American bankruptcy act, passed in 1801, was a
virtual copy of the existing English statutes. Later acts gradually expanded
the scope of the bankruptcy laws. From this development, courts and
scholars have concluded that the boundaries of the Bankruptcy Clause are
constantly expanding to meet the new demands and forms of commercial
and business development. 6'
Modem American bankruptcy is different from the system under the
eighteenth century English bankruptcy acts. Modem American bankruptcy
allows voluntary proceedings for practically all entities. The eighteenth
century English bankruptcy system permitted ostensibly involuntary proceed-

antecedent debts made within 90 days of the filing of a petition, id. § 547, to avoid transfers
of the debtor's property that actually or constructive defraud its creditors, id. § 548, to avoid
certain transfers of property or the creation of certain obligations that a hypothetical lien
creditor or, in the case of real property, a bona fide purchaser of real property could have
avoided, id. § 544, and to require persons who have property of the debtor to return it to the
trustee, id. §§ 542, 543.
54. Id. § 365.
55. Id. § 363 (1994).
56. Id. § 364.
57. Filing apetition automatically stays any acts to begin or continue any proceedings
against the debtor; to enforce or collect anyjudgment or claim against the debtor, its property
or property of the estate; to exercise control over property of the estate; to create, perfect or
enforce any lien against property of the estate or the debtor's property; or to set off any debt
owed to the debtor. Id. § 362.
58. Id. § 725.
59. Id. § 726 (1994).
60. Id. §§ 1101-1114, 1121-1129, 1141-1146.
61. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text and infra notes 309, 320, 329, and
accompanying text.
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mgs by creditors only against merchants and traders. Relying on these
differences, however, to conclude that the subject of bankruptcy has been
constantly expanding is both superficial and myopic. Such reliance is
superficial because both systems address essentially the same problem-resolving the relationship between insolvent debtors and their
creditors. In this context the differences shrink to matters of detail. Such
reliance is myopic because it ignores the role of the English insolvency acts
and the multifaceted approaches of the American acts passed before the
Constitution in addressing that relationship. The details of how the
insolvent debtor-creditor relationship should be adjusted varied over time
and among jurisdictions, but the essential problems posed by this relationship did not. From an analysis of these laws, we see that the "subject of
Bankruptcies" has remained stable, even as the means of addressing the
subject of bankruptcies have changed.
A. The English Bankruptcy Acts
As has been well documented, the English Parliament first passed
bankruptcy acts for the benefit of creditors, not for the protection of
debtors.62 They initially represented one effort to fill the void in the law
for dealing with debtors who refused to repay their creditors by providing
a collective creditors' remedy.63 In the first bankruptcy act, enacted in
1542 during the reign of King Henry VIII, only creditors could initiate a
bankruptcy proceeding against persons who committed certain fraudulent
acts.'
Under the second bankruptcy act, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,
which was enacted in 1570 during the reign of Queen Elizabeth 165 and
which remained in effect for the next 250 years,66 they could do so only
against "merchants" who committed certain "acts of bankruptcy." Debtors
in bankruptcy did not receive a discharge from debts until 1705,67 and
Parliament the following year conditioned a discharge on the consent of
80% of the creditors in both number and value of the debts.6 8
Aside from the restrictions on discharge and the limiting of bankruptcy
to involuntary petitions against merchant debtors, the essential elements of

62.

Charles J. Tabb, The History of the BankruptcyLaws in the UnitedStates, 3 AM.

BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 6-12 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History]; Charles J. Tabb, The
HistoricalEvolutionof the BankruptcyDischarge,65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 329-331 (1991)

[hereinafter Tabb, Discharge].
63. Tabb, Discharge,supra note 62, at 328.
64. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.); see infra note 76.
65. 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570) (Eng.).
66. It was repealed by 5 Geo. 4, ch. 98, § 1 (1824) (Eng.).
67. 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 7 (1705) (Eng.); see infra note 93 and accompanying text.
68. 5 Anne, ch. 22, §§ 2, 7 (1706) (Eng.) (requiring the consent of 80% in terms of
number and value of the creditors holding debts); see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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the English bankruptcy acts 69 bear a remarkable resemblance to a modem
liquidation case under Chapter 7 of the Code. Under the English bankruptcy
acts, upon a petition of creditors, the Lord Chancellor would issue against
the debtor a "Commission of Bankrupt" naming several commissioners to
conduct the proceedings.70 The commissioners examined the debtor about
his or her property and dealings, and the debtor was obligated to transfer all
property to the commissioners.7 1 The commissioners conducted meetings
of creditors. At such meetings, the creditors appointed assignees to liquidate
the debtor's property.72 The commissioners also received proofs of
creditors' claims.7 Creditors who proved their claims received a pro rata
dividend from the liquidation of the debtor's property after the payment of
expenses.74

69. By the 1732 Statute of 5 George 2, 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 1 (1732) (Eng.), the
English bankruptcy acts had become fairly stable. The 1732 Statute of 5 George 2, entitled
"An Act to prevent the Committing of Frauds by Bankrupts," revised and expanded without
significant change several earlier bankruptcy acts that had expired, principally, 4 Anne, ch.
17 (1705) (Eng.), as amended by 5 Anne, ch. 22 (1706) (Eng.). See infra notes 93-97 and
accompanying text. The Statute of 4 Anne was to expire after several years, but it was
extended periodically by Parliament until several years before the enactment of the 1732 Act.
See Tabb, Discharge, supra note 62, at 340 n.96. This act, along with the 1570 Statute of
13 Elizabeth, as amended, see infra notes 119-20, constituted the form of the English
bankruptcy law in effect at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1787. Tabb,
History,supra note 62, at 12; Tabb, Discharge,supra note 62, at 340, 344. The 1732 Act
remained in effect until the end of the session of Parliament ending after June 1735. It was
further continued by 9 Geo. 2, ch. 18 (1736) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 2, ch. 27 (1743) (Eng.); 24
Geo. 2, ch. 57, § 8 (1751) (Eng.); 31 Geo. 2, ch. 35 (1757) (Eng.); 4 Geo. 3, ch. 36, § 1
(1764) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 47 (1772) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 29 (1781) (Eng.); 28 Geo. 3,
ch. 24 (1788) (Eng.); 34 Geo. 3, ch. 57 (1794) (Eng.); and 37 Geo. 3, ch. 124 (1796) (Eng.),
when it was made perpetual. The 1732 Statute of 5 George 2, along with the 1542 Statute
of 34 & 35 Henry VII, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.), the 1570 Statute of 13
Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570) (Eng.), and other miscellaneous bankruptcy acts, was
repealed by 5 Geo. 4, ch. 98, § I (1824) (Eng.), which modernized the English bankruptcy
system.
70. 13 Eliz. ch. 7, § 2 (1570) (Eng.).
71. 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 1 (1732) (Eng.), requiring delivery of
all such Part of his, her or their the said Banki-upts Goods, Wares, Merchandizes,
Money, Estate and Effects, and all Books, Papers and Writings relating thereunto, as at
the Time of such Examination shall be in his, her or their Possession, Custody or Power
(his, her or their necessary Wearing Apparel and the necessary Wearing Apparel of the
Wife and Children of such Bankrupt only excepted).
72. Id. §§ 2, 26, 30.
73. Id. §§ 26, 33.
74. Id. § 33:
[A]nd the said Commissioners, or the major Part of them, shall order such Part of the
neat Produce of the said Bankrupt's Estate, as by such Accounts or otherwise shall
appear to be in the Hands of the said Assignees, as they or the major Part of them shall
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The English bankruptcy acts also contained other features that appear in
the Code today." From the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, the
English bankruptcy acts evolved from a statute designed to punish bad
debtors 76 to a statute that recognized the importance of merchants and the
role of credit in the life of England." The earlier bankruptcy acts saw the
bankrupt only as someone who committed fraud." By the end of the

think fit, to be forthwith divided amongst such of the Bankrupt's Creditors, who have
duly proved their Debts under such Commission, in Proportion to their several and
respective Debts.
The 1543 Statute of Henry VIII and the 1750 Statute of 13 Elizabeth also provided
for the gathering and sale of the debtor's property and a pro rata distribution of the
proceeds to creditors to satisfy their claims, although in much less detail.
34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.); 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 2 (1570) (Eng.); see Louis E.
Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1919).
75. The right of set off, recognized in II U.S.C. § 553 (1994), first appeared in the
Statute of 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 1 I (1705) (Eng.), and was continued in 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 28
(1732) (Eng.). The recovery from the transferee of the value of property fraudulent
conveyed, recognized in I I U.S.C. §§ 548(a), 550 (1994), appeared in all the important
English bankruptcy acts. See infra note 467.
Denial of discharge to debtors who engage in fraudulent activity under II
U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(7) (1994) and denial of discharge from certain types of debts under II
U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994) follows the example of excluding gamblers and debtors who made
a marriage gift while insolvent from the benefits of bankruptcy in 4 Anne, ch. 17, §§ 12, 15
(1705) (Eng.) which was continued in 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 12 (1732) (Eng.). Concerns about,
and attempts to solve, excessive or improper expenses of the bankruptcy proceeding also
appeared early. For example, because "Commissions of Bankrupts have been often Executed
with great Expence in Eating and Drinking, at the Meetings of the Commissioners, or some
of them therein Named, to the great Prejudice of the Bankrupts and their Creditors," the
Statute of 4 Anne prohibited the commissioners from charging such expenses to the
bankruptcy estate. 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 20 (1705) (Eng.). This clause was continued in 5 Geo.
2, ch. 30, § 42 (1732) (Eng.).
76. The preamble of the first bankruptcy act stated:
Where divers and sundry Persons craftily obtaining into their Hands great Substance of
other Mens Goods, do suddenly flee to Parts unknown, or keep their Houses [where they
could avoid service of process], not minding to pay or restore to any their Creditors,
their Debts and Duties, but at their own Wills and Pleasures consume the Substance
obtained by Credit of other Men, for their own Pleasure and delicate Living, against all
Reason, Equity and good Conscience ....
34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.) (as reproduced in 2 Statutes at Large 331-35
(London 1770), in which the spelling from the original has been modernized). In this
bankruptcy act, the persons described in the preamble are referred throughout the act as
"offenders." Similarly, the Statute of I James refers to bankrupts as "offenders." I Jam.,
ch. 15, §§ 10, 17 (1604) (Eng.).
77. See generallyRobert Weisberg, CommercialMorality,the Merchant Character,
and the History of the Voidable Preference,39 STAN. L. REv. 3, 5-39 (1986).
78. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.), quoted supra note 76. This act was
entitled "An Act against such Persons as do make Bankrupt." Id. The Statute of 13
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seventeenth century, the view of bankrupts had become more complex. By
then, the purpose of the English bankruptcy acts was no longer just to
provide creditors with remedies against fraudulent debtors; it was to adjust
the relations between insolvent merchants and traders and their creditors.79
This broader notion of the purpose of bankruptcy appeared in English
society before Parliament expressly embraced it. From 1683 to 1703, well
before he turned to writing fiction, Daniel Defoe actively engaged in
business (as well as the politics of the day) and went through two bankruptcy proceedings.80 In 1697 he criticized the bankruptcy law under the 1570
Statute of Elizabeth and the seventeenth century statutes as "a Publick
Grievance to the Nation."'
In this criticism, Defoe described the two
prototypes of all debtors. One was "the Honest Debtor, who fails by visible
Necessity, Losses, Sickness, Decay of Trade, or the like." 2 The other was

Elizabeth stated that "notwithstanding [the earlier Statute of 34 Henry VIIi]... those Kind
of Persons have and do still increase into great and excessive Numbers." 13 Eliz., ch. 7

(1570) (Eng.).
79. A subtle shift in thinking appears in the 1604 Statute of James I. The title, "An
Act for the better Relief of the Creditors against such as shall become Bankrupts," 1 Jam.,
ch. 15 (1604) (Eng.), reveals a conception of bankruptcy as a condition ("become
Bankrupts"), not an act itself as in the earlier Statute of 34 & 35 Henry VIII ("do make
Bankrupt"). Still, the condition of bankruptcy is seen as arising from wilful conduct, as
shown by the preamble that recites "Frauds and Deceits, as new Diseases, daily increase
amongst such as live by buying and selling, to the Hindrance of Traffick and mutual
Commerce, and to the general Hurt of the Realm, by such as wickedly and wilfully become
Bankrupts .
I..."
I Jam., ch. 15, § I (1604) (Eng.); see infra note 119 and accompanying
text.
80. See JOHN R. MOORE, DANIEL DEFOE: CITIZEN OF THE MODERN WORLD 89-103
(1958). Defoe, born in 1660, engaged in different trades from 1683 to 1703. During this
time, he also engaged in politics and political pamphleteering. In 1692, he became a
bankrupt as a result of losses from insuring merchant vessels during England's long war with
France. He, along with 18 other "merchant insurers," was the object of legislation that would
have allowed the insolvent insurers to enter into a composition with two-thirds of each's
creditors that would have been binding on the minority creditors. This bill passed the House
of Commons but was rejected by the House of Lords. Id. at 89-94. Later, he went into
brickmaking and was prosperous for awhile. Unfortunately, his imprisonment in 1703
(ostensibly for publishing a libelous and seditious pamphlet but actually for political reasons)
caused his brickmaking business to fail and he left trade. In 1704, however, he was
pardoned, and from 1704 to 1714 he worked as a reporter, pamphleteer, political agent, and
adviser for the government. He also produced a periodical, the Review, from 1704 to 1713
that appeared at first weekly and then several times a week. He was again subjected to a
bankruptcy proceeding under the 1705 Statute of Anne, 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.), but
was never able to obtain a certificate of discharge. Id. 95-98. Although best known for his
works of fiction, Defoe did not publish his first novel, Robinson Crusoe, until 1719, when
he was 59 years old. Id. at 345-55.
81. DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY UPON PROJECTS 197 (1697).
82. Id. at 206-07.
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the "Knavish, Designing, or Idle, Extravagant Debtor, who fails because
either he has run out of Estate in Excesses, or on purpose to cheat and abuse
his Creditors."8' 3 Defoe complained that the bankruptcy law as then
formulated was inadequate to deal with either type of debtor:
Time and Experience has fumish'd the Debtors with Ways and Means to
evade the Force of this Statute, and to secure their Estate against the reach
of it; which renders it often insignificant, and consequently, the Knave,
against whom the Law was particularly bent, gets off; while he only who
fails of mere Necessity, and whose honest Principle will not permit him to
practice those Methods, is expos'd to the Fury of this Act.84
Defoe then posed a basic question that persists today in all bankruptcy
legislation: how to give due consideration to the unfortunate debtors without
protecting or encouraging dishonest or extravagant debtors.85 Defoe
suggested legislation that, in the words of one scholar, "anticipates a
virtually modem American form of bankruptcy."8 6
In this recommendation, Defoe proposed a completely voluntary
bankruptcy system. The debtor who was "unable to carry on his Business,
by reason of great Losses and Decay of Trade" would file a petition with
a Commission of Enquiry into Bankrupts Estates.87 Upon signing the
' the debtor would
petition, which the commissioners must do "of course,"88
make a full disclosure of all his property, and would turn all property and

83. Id. Defoe also describes the two types of creditors, "the moderate Creditor, who
seeks but his own, but will omit no lawful Means to gain it, and yet will hear reasonable and
just Arguments and Proposals" and "the Rigorous Severe Creditor, that values not whether
the Debtor be honest Man or Knave, Able, or Unable; but will have his Debt, whether it be
to be bad or no; without Mercy, without Compassion, full of Ill Language, Passion, and
Revenge." Id.; see also Weisberg, supra note 77, at 8-9 (quoting Defoe, supra note 81, at
206-07).
84. DEFOE, supranote 81, at 197. Accordingly, he predicted that eventually the laws
would be repealed. Id.
85. Id. at 207-08. Defoe also regarded protecting the reasonable creditor and limiting
the severe creditor as a goal of bankruptcy legislation. Id.; see also Weisberg, supranote 77,
at 8-9 (quoting Defoe, supra note 81, at 206-07).
For a discussion of the difficulties of distinguishing between the "unfortunate" debtor
and the "improvident" or "extravagant" consumer debtor in the recent twentieth century, see
Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical
Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 66-71 (1986). The emphasis
has shifted somewhat from the eighteenth century view of the knavish or lazy extravagant
debtor seeking to avoid debts already incurred to a more recent view of the incompetent or
improvident debtorwho gets into financial trouble partially because aggressivecreditors make
credit too easy to obtain and then use unreasonable efforts to collect those debts. Id.
86. Weisberg, supra note 77, at 9.
87. DEFOE, supra note 81, at 210.
88. Id.at 211.
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books and accounts over to the commissioners for liquidation for the benefit
of the creditors. The creditors would receive a pro rata distribution from the
debtor's property, and the debtor would receive an allowance of 5% of his
estate and a full discharge of his debts.8 9 This proposal represented a
comprehensive and rational way of readjusting the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and his creditors.
Parliament in the eighteenth century was not willing to go as far as
Defoe suggested. 90 Still, the 1705 Statute of Anne acknowledged the two
types of debtors. The preamble recited that "many Persons have and do
daily become Bankrupt, not so much by reason of Losses and Unavoidable
Misfortunes, as to the intent to Defraud and Hinder their Creditors of their
just Debts and Duties to then Due and Owing." 9 Although the debtor who
intentionally cheated his creditors remained a primary legislative concern,
as early as 1705 it was no longer the only concern. 92
Defoe's suggestions and the 1705 Statute of Anne reflect a significant
effort to devise a better systein for resolving the conflicts between creditors
and their debtors who had insufficient assets to repay their debts. The 1705
Statute of Anne modernized the bankruptcy system and introduced the
discharge of the debtor's existing debts. 93 Parliament no doubt did so as

89. Id at 208-24.
90. Daniel Defoe was very active in the passage of the 1705 Statute of Anne, 4 Anne,
ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.). MOORE, supra note 80, at 96.
91. 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 1 (1705) (Eng.).
92. lanP. H. Duffy, English Bankrupts: 1571-1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 286
(1980) [hereinafter Duffy, EnglishBankrupts](citing other contemporary writers recognizing
the honest but unfortunate debtor). Defoe anticipated one of the "fresh start" rationales for
the discharge in his criticism of the bankruptcy law:
The Severities to the Debtor are unreasonable, and if I may so say, a little inhuman, for
it not only strips him of all in a moment, but renders him for ever incapable of helping
himself, or relieving his Family by future Industry.... Nothing is more frequent, than
for men who are reduc'd by Miscarriage in Trade to Compound and Set up again, and
get good Estates; but a Statute, as we call it, for ever shuts up all doors to the Debtor's
Recovery ....
DEFOE, supra note 76, at 192-94.
93. 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 7 (1705) (Eng.). This provision was incorporated in 5 Geo. 2,
ch. 30, §§ 7, 10 (1732) (Eng.). Following Defoe's suggestion, this statute also gave the
cooperating debtor an allowance of 5% of the "Neat Product" of the bankrupt's estate
received or recovered by the commissioners, not to exceed £200, if the creditors received
repayment of at least 40% of the debt owed to them; if the creditors received less than 40%,
the debtor received whatever the commissioner thought appropriate. 4 Anne, ch. 17, §§ 7, 8
(1705) (Eng.). The Statute of 5 George II provided a more elaborate allowance: 5%, not to
exceed £200, if the creditors received 50%; 7'/% not to exceed £250 if the creditors received
62.5%; 10% not to exceed £300 if the creditors received 75%; and only what the
commissioners thought fit, not to exceed 3%, if the creditors received less than 50%. 5 Geo.
2, ch. 30, § 7 (1732) (Eng.).
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a carrot to induce the debtor's cooperation.94 To get the discharge, the
commissioners had to certify that the debtor had cooperated with the
commissioners in locating and turning over all of the debtor's property and
in the proceedings generally.95 The next year, Parliament provided that the
debtor could not receive a discharge unless 80% of the creditors, by number
and by the value of the outstanding debts, consented. 96 Further, the 1705
legislation that brought the discharge of debts to English bankruptcy also
introduced another form of discharge: the fraudulent debtor could receive
the death penalty.9 7
Nevertheless, the introduction of the debtor's discharge from existing
debts in 1705 coincided with and contributed to the transformation of the
view of bankruptcy. From the merchant's perspective, the availability of the
discharge gave the bankrupt merchant a reason to view bankruptcy more
favorably. If the bankrupt cooperated, the bankrupt could receive a
discharge from existing debts. Moreover, the 1732 Statute of 5 George H
also provided that every debtor discharged under the act, as well as every
debtor who had entered into a composition with creditors and had delivered
all of his property to his creditors, and every person who had been
discharged by an act of Parliament for the relief of insolvent persons, was
no longer subject to imprisonment for-his pre-existing debts.98
94. Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra note 92, at 286-87; Tabb, History,supra note
62, at 10-11; Weisberg, supra note 77, at 30 n.95.
95. 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 19 (1705) (Eng.). This provision was incorporated in 5 Geo.
2, ch. 30, § 10 (1732) (Eng.).
96. 5 Anne, ch. 22, § 1 (1706) (Eng.). The preamble noted: "Whereas [the Statute
of 4 Anne, chapter 17]... hath not Answered the good Intent thereof; but on the contrary,
many notorious Frauds and Abuses have been Committed .... " Id. § 1. The consent
requirement, as incorporated in 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 10 (1732) (Eng.), was refined to count
only creditors with debts of £20 or more. These two acts also contained provisions making
void any contract or security given to any creditor to induce the creditor to give consent. 5
Anne, ch. 22, § 3 (1706) (Eng.); 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 11 (1732) (Eng.).
97. 4 Anne, ch. 17, §§ 1, 18 (1705) (Eng.). This provision was incorporated in 5
Geo. 2, ch. 30., § 1 (1732) (Eng.). Defoe had also suggested the death penalty for fraudulent
debtors who absconded with their property to avoid their creditors. DEFOE, supra note 81,
at 222-23.
The penalties were milder under the earlier statutes. In 1604, Parliament provided that
an uncooperative debtor could be imprisoned, and a debtor who committed perjury could
have his ear cut off. 1 Jam., ch. 15, §§ 8, 9 (1604) (Eng.). Parliament later extended the
penalty of loss of an ear to debtors who fraudulently transferred their property to evade the
provisions of the bankruptcy acts or to defraud their creditors. 21 Jam., ch. 19, § 7 (1623)
(Eng.).
98. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. Imprisonment for debt was an
important creditor collection device in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It reflected
a common belief that the refusal to pay debts was willful. The intent was not to punish
debtors, but to provide an incentive for debtors who owned property which could not be
reached by the legal process of the day, such as real estate and certain types of personal
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The transformation of bankruptcy is reflected in the operation of the two
distinguishing elements of the English bankruptcy acts, that bankruptcy
proceedings were available only against merchants and that they were
involuntary proceedings initiated by creditors. The limitation of the
bankruptcy acts to "merchants ' 99 is a reflection of Parliament's efforts to
address one by-product of the growth of the importance of credit in the life
of England-the insolvency of a group of debtors who relied most upon
credit and their creditors. It also reflected the initial discomfort of sixteenth
century English society with middlemen who neither owned land nor
produced tangible goods but who derived their wealth and suffered their
losses because of their reliance on an intangible form of
property---credit. 00 It was not itself, however, an inherent or defining
feature of a bankruptcy system.
Indeed, the limitation of the English bankruptcy acts to merchants
proved to be highly problematic because of the difficulty in defining
"merchant." The English bankruptcy acts as interpreted by the courts never
achieved any doctrinal stability on this issue.'O' In the seventeenth
century, the courts strained to include shoemakers, drapers, graziers, bakers,
dyers, and carpenters but to exclude laborers, husbandmen, tailors, bankers,
brokers, financiers, gentlemen, farmers, ranchers, drovers, and innkeepers.10 2 After the King's Bench found in 1653 that Sir John Wolstenholme,
a knight and a landed gentlemen who had invested in the East India
Company, could be a bankrupt because he received as part of his investment

property, or property that the debtor had moved beyond the jurisdiction or fraudulently
conveyed to others, to liquidate it to pay debts. See generallyPETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY,

1607-1900 passim(1974); Jay Cohen, The HistoryofImprisonmentforDebt and its Relation
to the Development of Dischargein Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 155 (1982).
99. The preamble of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth noted that the Statute of 34 Henry
VIII was insufficient to solve the problem of increasing "bankrupts." 3 Eliz., ch. 7, § I
(1570) (Eng.). The earlier statute, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.), had only
referred in the preamble to certain "Persons" who defrauded their creditors. Thus, the later
statute expressed the necessity "for a plain Declaration to be made and set forth, who is and
ought to be taken and deemed for a Bankrupt." 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 1 (1570) (Eng.). The first
element to being a bankrupt was to be a "Merchant or other Person using or exercising the
Trade of Merchandize by way of Bargaining, Exchange, Rechange, Bartry, Chevisance, or
otherwise, in Gross or by retail .... or seeking his or her Trade of Living by Buying and
Selling." Id.
100. See generallyWeisberg, supra note 77, at 13-21.
101. See generallyDuffy, EnglishBankrupts,supranote 92, at 292-305; Lawrence M.
Friedman & Thadeus F. Niemira, The Concept of the "Trader" in Early Bankruptcy Law, 5
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 223 (1958); Weisberg, supra note 77, at 22-34.
102. Friedman & Niemira, supranote 101, at 226-33; Weisberg, supra note 77, at 2234. Most of the cases were defamation cases, not bankruptcy cases.
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goods that he then sold," 3 Parliament excluded from the definition of
"merchants" subject to bankruptcy those who invested in the East India
Company, the Guiney Company, or the royal fishing trade."°4 The
rationale, according to the preamble, was that "divers Noblemen, Gentlemen,
and Persons of Quality, no ways bred up to Trade or Merchandize" invested
in these enterprises to the great advantage of the country and that the
in
legislation was necessary so that "such Persons may not be discouraged 05
those honorable Endeavors for promoting publick Undertakings.'
Parliament also excluded stockholders in the Bank of England from being
adjudged a bankrupt.0 6 In 1732, however, Parliament added bankers,
brokers, and financiers to the definition of merchants. 0 7
By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the courts by interpretation
expanded the scope of merchants almost to the point that any type of
business activity not closely dependent upon the ownership of land qualified
one to be a merchant. 0 8 This expansion reflected a change in the underlying beliefs. The sixteenth century view was that only merchants had the
ability to contract great debts and that bankruptcy legislation was necessary
to protect society from the fraudulent debtor. The eighteenth century view
was that merchants innocently suffered losses from their trading activities
and were therefore entitled to the benefits of bankruptcy legislation.
The ostensible reason for limiting bankruptcy to merchants was that
non-merchants become insolvent because of extravagant living and a wilful
refusal to pay their creditors.' 0 9 The extent to which this rationale was

103. 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 24, § 5 (1662) (Eng.). In this section, Parliament reversed
the judgment and declared it null and void. See also Weisberg, supra note 77, at 25 & n.77.
104. 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 24, § 3 (1662) (Eng.).
105. 14 Car. 2., ch. 24, §§ 1, 3 (1662) (Eng.).
106. 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 20, § 47 (1697) (Eng.).
107. The 1732 Act provided that, because "Bankers, Brokers and Factors, are
frequently intrusted with great Sums of Money, and with Goods and Effects of very great
Value belonging to other Persons" they were subject to that and the other bankruptcy acts.
5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 39 (1732) (Eng.). The same Act, continuing a provision first appearing
in 5 Anne, ch. 22, § 8 (1706) (Eng.) also declared that "no Farmer, Grazier or Drover of
Cattle, or any Person or Persons, who is or are, or shall be Receiver General of the Taxes
granted by Act of Parliament" is subject to that and the other bankruptcy acts. 5 Geo. 2, ch.
30, § 40 (1732) (Eng.).
108. Cohen, supra note 98, at 160, 162-63; Friedman & Niemira, supra note 10 1, at
233-46; Tabb, Discharge, supra note 62, at 344.
109. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *473-74:
But still [the laws of England] are cautious of encouraging prodigality and extravagance
by this indulgence to debtors [the benefits of the bankruptcy acts]; and therefore they
allow the benefit of the laws of bankruptcy to none but actual traders; since that set of
men are, generally speaking, the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an
inability of paying their debts, without any fault of their own. If persons in other
situations of life run in debt without the power of payment, they must take the
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truly the reason for the different treatment of merchants and non-merchants
or was simply an after-the-fact justification is hard to say. A significant
reason for the limitation was the landed gentry's desire to avoid the
summary proceedings of bankruptcy."
In a bankruptcy proceeding, the
commissioners could sell all of the debtor's property, including real estate
and intangible property, and apply the proceeds for the benefit of the creditors. "' Outside of a bankruptcy proceeding, a creditor could not force an
execution sale of the debtor's lands or negotiable instruments and similar
significant intangible property to obtain money to satisfy the debt." 2

consequences of their own indiscretion, even though they meet with sudden accidents
that may reduce their fortunes: for the law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice for any
person but a trader to encumber himself with debts of any considerable value. If a
gentleman, or one in a liberal profession, at the time of contracting his debts, has a
sufficient fund to pay them, the delay of payment is a species of dishonesty, and a
temporary injustice to his creditor; and if at such time he has no sufficient fund, the
dishonesty and injustice is the greater. He cannot therefore murmur, if he suffers the
punishment which he has voluntarily drawn upon himself. But in mercantile
transactions the case is far otherwise. Trade cannot be carried on without mutual credit
on both sides: the contracting of debts is therefore here not only justifiable, but
necessary. And if by accidental calamities, as, by the loss of a ship in a tempest, the
failure of brother traders, or by the non-payment of persons out of trade, a merchant or
trader becomes incapable of discharging his own debts, it is his misfortune and not his
fault. To the misfortunes, therefore, of debtors, the law has given a compassionate
remedy, but denied it to their faults; since, at the same time that it provides for the
security of commerce, by enacting that every considerable trader may be declared a
bankrupt, for the benefit of his creditors as well as himself, it has also (to discourage
extravagance) declared that no one shall be capable of being made a bankrupt, but only
a trader,nor capable of receiving the full benefit of the statutes, but only an industrious
trader.
See also EDWARD GREEN, THE SPIRIT OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS ii-iii (London, 4th ed. 1780)
(repeating the above almost verbatim without quotes but with attribution); see also Cohen,

supra note 98, at 160-61.
Several authors have noted that the English bankruptcy acts of the eighteenth century were
the only general form of providing limited liability to entrepreneurs, since the use of
corporations to provide limited liability to individuals did not develop until the nineteenth
century. Id. at 161; Friedman & Niemira, supra note 101, at 243.
110. See Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra note 92, at 289.

111. See, e.g., An Act to prevent the Committing of Frauds by Bankrupts, 5 Geo. 2,
ch. 30, § 1 (1732) (Eng.); see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at *285-86.
112. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. See also Cohen, supra note 98, at
154-155; Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra note 92, at 285; Israel Treiman, Acts of
Bankruptcy:A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 189, 195
n.21 (1938) [hereinafter Treiman, Acts]. The intangible property that was not subject to
execution and levy included annuities, bank notes, bonds, book debts, negotiable instruments,

and stocks and shares in public funds. Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra note 92, at 285.
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Furthermore, as I describe below, Parliament recognized in the
insolvency acts" 3 that non-merchants could become insolvent through
misfortune. This recognition casts doubt on the true significance for
members of Parliament of the belief that only merchants could be the
victims of misfortune and therefore only merchants should be subject to the
bankruptcy acts. With the continuing expansion of credit and the economy,
this rationale could not, in hindsight, survive." 4 Because of the difficulty
of capturing the distinction in legislation, the merchant limitation, as Robert
Weisberg put it, "finally died of exhaustion" in the middle nineteenth
century. 15
The second distinguishing feature of the English bankruptcy acts was
that bankruptcy proceedings were nominally involuntary. Only creditors
could initiate proceedings if the debtor committed an "act of bankruptcy.""' 6 Notwithstanding this limitation, one of the complaints about the
operation of the English bankruptcy acts was the apparent ability of debtors
to convince friendly creditors to initiate proceedings.' 7 The ability of
debtors to engineer bankruptcy proceedings increased as the definition of
"act of bankruptcy" evolved from limited acts of fraud" 8 to a longer

13. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
114. In his lengthy 1783 study of insolvency and bankruptcy, James B. Burges sharply
criticized the distinction between merchants who were subject to the bankruptcy acts and nonmerchants: "A Distinction of this nature is contradictory to the great principles of Reason
and Natural Law." JAMES B. BURGES,CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY: WITH
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 319 (London 1783).
115. Weisberg, supra note 77, at 33; see also Duffy, English Bankrupts,supra note
92, at 292-305.
116. Beginning in 1706, creditors could file a petition only if the debts owed to them
reached a certain level: One creditor who was owed at least £100 could file a petition, as
could two creditors owed £150, and three or more owed £200. 5 Anne, ch. 22, § 7 (1706)
(Eng.). These provisions were incorporated in 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 23 (1732) (Eng.).
117. Friedman & Niemira, supranote 101, at 243 n.93, 247 (citing Lord Hardwicke's
complaint about debtors getting creditors to initiate proceedings). GREEN, supra note 109,
at 18 n.d, reports several cases of debtors engineering their own bankruptcy. In one case, a
commission in bankrupt was issued against a heavily indebted government clerk. At the
suggestion of his friends, the debtor engineered his own bankruptcy by buying apple cider
in his home county and selling it in London to his friends and acquaintances so that he could
become a trader and thereby be declared a bankrupt. Id.
In 1697, even before the discharge became available, Defoe complained that, debtors
would "confederate with some particular Creditor to take out a Statute." DEFOE, supra note
81, at 204, quoted in Weisberg, supranote 77, at 6-7. See also BURGES, supra note 114, at
336-37, who remarked in 1793: "When a man finds himself in ruinous circumstances,...
[he] either fabricates a fraudulent Bankruptcy ...or, if he has too much principle suddenly
to become a rogue, he satisfies himself, by prevailing on some relation, or confidential friend,
to take out a Commission against him."
118. Under the Statute of 34 & 35 Henry VIII, the acts were "flee[ing] to Parts
unknown, or keep[ing] their Houses." 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.). The
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enumeration of conditions that a debtor could satisfy either voluntarily or
at least six months after being
in prison for
passively, such as remaining
20
9
detained for unpaid debts," and others.
Provisions in two bankruptcy acts suggest the degree to which debtors
had learned to manipulate the nominally involuntary nature of the bankruptcy proceedings. Complaining that "many Abuses have been committed by
pretended Creditors of Bankrupts," the 1732 Statute of 5 George H declared
that persons falsely swearing to be creditors would be liable for perjury and
also liable to pay for the benefit of the creditors double the value of the
falsely claimed debt. 2 '
Nineteen years later, Parliament addressed another apparent problem:
"many Abuses have been committed by Bankrupts, and Person who, with
their Privity, have attempted to prove fictitious and pretended Debts under

Statute of 13 Elizabeth made the acts of bankruptcy more specific, consisting of the
following:
depart the Realm; or begin to keep his or her House or Houses, or otherwise to absent
him or herself; or take Sanctuary; or suffer him or herself willingly to be arrested for
any Debt or other Thing, not grown or due for Money delivered, Ware sold, or any
other just or lawful Cause, or good Consideration or Purposes,... suffer him or herself
to be outlawed, or yield him or herself to Prison, or depart from his or her Dwellinghouse or Houses, to the Intent or Purpose to defraud or hinder any of his or her
Creditors ... of the just Debt or Duty of such Creditor or Creditors ....
13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 1 (1570) (Eng.) (clause numbering omitted). See generallyTreiman,Acts,
supra note 112, at 193-95.
119. The Statute of I James expanded the list set forth in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.
It added as acts of bankruptcy by the debtor (i) wilfully or fraudulently procuring the debtor's
arrest or the attachment or sequestration of the debtor's goods and (ii) making a fraudulent
grant or conveyance of property. 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 2 (1604) (Eng.). These acts must be
taken with the intent of defrauding creditors. The statute also added the "act" of continuing
to lie in prison for six months after being imprisoned for debt. Id. This "act" need not be
done with the intent of defrauding or hindering creditors. Id.; See Treiman, Acts, supranote
112, at 196. The shift from action to a passive condition is revealed in the title and preamble
to this act. See supra note 79.
120. The Statute of 21 James added as acts of bankruptcy several new acts not limited
to those done with the intent of defrauding or hindering creditors. These included petitioning
the King or the courts to compel any creditor to accept less than full payment of the
creditor's debt or for an extension of time to pay a debt, and lying in prison for more than
2 months after being arrested for payment of a debt. 21 Jam., ch. 19, § 2 (1623) (Eng.).
These provisions remained a feature of bankruptcy law through the eighteenth century. Other
provisions included failing to pay a debt of £100 or more within six months after it was due
and being arrested for the debt; failing to pay a debt of£ 100 or more within six months after
a writ to recover a debt had been issued and served; or escaping from prison after being
arrested for a debt of £100 or more. Id. These latter two acts of bankruptcy were repealed
in 1711. 10 Anne, ch. 15, § I (1711) (Eng.). See generallyWeisberg,supra note 77, at 3637.
121. 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 29 (1732) (Eng.)
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Commissions of Bankruptcy, in order that such Persons might be enabled
to sign their Consent to the Certificates of discharging such Bankrupts from
their Debts."' 2 2 Parliament declared that any such certificates of discharge
would be void. z3
More importantly, debtors induced creditors to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings out of necessity. In 1725, twenty years after the introduction
of the discharge, Defoe remarked on the ability of debtors to arrange for a
bankruptcy proceeding:
A commission of bankrupt is so familiar a thing, that the debtor oftentimes
causes it to be taken out in his favour, that he may the sooner be
effectually delivered from all his creditors at once, the law obliging him
to give a full account of himself upon oath to the commissioners, who,
when they see his integrity, may effectually deliver him from all further
molestation, give him a part even of the creditors' estate; and so he may
push into the world again, and try whether he cannot retrieve his fortunes
by a better management, or with better success for the future.' 24
This was not a complaint. Defoe disagreed that the law, with the possibility
of a discharge, was too favorable to the debtor. The debtor had to
relinquish control over all his property, his discharge was subject to the
discretion of his creditors and the commissioners, and he would be forever
tarnished as a bankrupt.'2 5
Still, Defoe urged merchants in hopeless circumstances to seek
bankruptcy sooner, while they still had property, and not later after they had
used up all their property in a vain attempt to remain in business:
Break then in time, young tradesman. If you see you are going down,
and that the hazard of going on is doubtful, you will certainly be received
by your creditors with compassion, and with a generous treatment; and
whatever happens you will be able to begin the world again with the title
of an honest man; even the same creditors will embark with you again, and
be forward to give you credit as before.' 26
For any trader following this advice, the notion that the bankruptcy petition
must be initiated by the creditors is a formality without substance.
The introduction of the discharge, and the expansion of the scope of
"merchant" and of acts of bankruptcy reflected the transformation in the

122.

24 Geo. 2, ch. 57, § 9 (1751) (Eng.).

125.
126.

Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 54-55. Defoe was subjected to several bankruptcy proceedings before and

after the introduction of the discharge in 1705 and the requirement for consent by 80% of
creditors, which Defoe himself could not get. See MOORE, supra note 80, at 89-103.
127. Parliament allowed voluntary petitions for merchants in 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch.
96 (1844) (Eng.); removed the creditor approval for a discharge in 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., ch.
122, § 39 (1842) (Eng.), which was continued in 12 & 13 Vict., ch. 106, § 200 (1849)
(Eng.); allowed voluntary petitions for merchants and non-merchants in 1861,24 & 25 Vict.,
ch. 134, § 69 (1861) (Eng.); and abolished the distinction between merchants and nonmerchants in 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71 (1869) (Eng.).
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way English society viewed the role of credit, creditors, debtors, and bankruptcy. The bankruptcy acts were one attempt to address the consequences
and tensions created by a system of credit. The restrictions of the
eighteenth century English bankruptcy acts were not essential elements of
a bankruptcy system, but simply one of several approaches that a legislature
might choose in addressing the basic problem of debtors who cannot pay
their debts. English society was not yet ready to go as far as allowing
voluntary bankruptcy and a full discharge of debts in return for the
assignment of all of the debtor's property, as Defoe and others suggested or
as some of the American colonies in fact allowed. Yet the restrictions that
the English bankruptcy acts had erected-only involuntary proceedings
against merchants-were unraveling because they were essentially unworkrecognized these defects in the middle of the
able. Parliament fmally
27
nineteenth century.
B. The English Insolvency Acts
In addition to the English bankruptcy acts, the Parliament responded to
the insolvency of some of its citizens with periodic insolvency acts typically
entitled "An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors" or something very
similar 128 These acts provided the following: Debtors imprisoned for
unpaid debts could be released from prison by assigning all of their real and
personal property (with exemptions for wearing apparel, bedding, and
working tools up to a limited amount) for liquidation in satisfaction of their
debts. The creditors received a pro rata share of the proceeds from the
debtor's property. Debtors could no longer be imprisoned for the preexisting debts. The debts themselves, however, were not discharged, and any

127. Parliament allowed voluntary petitions for merchants in 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch.
96 (1844) (Eng.); removed the creditor approval for a discharge in 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., ch.
122, § 39 (1842) (Eng.), which was continued in 12 & 13 Vict., ch. 106, § 200 (1849)
(Eng.); allowed voluntary petitions for merchants and non-merchants in 1861, 24 & 25 Vict.,
ch. 134, § 69 (1861) (Eng.); and abolished the distinction between merchants and nonmerchants in 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71 (1869) (Eng.).
128. See, e.g., 2 & 3 Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.) ("An Act for the Discharge out of
Prison such Insolvent Debtors" who will serve in the army or navy); 6 Geo., ch. 22 (1719)
(Eng.) (act for "Relief of insolvent Debtors"); II Geo., ch. 21, (1724) (Eng.) (same); 2 Geo.
2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.) (act for "Relief of Insolvent Debtors"); 21 Geo. 2, ch. 31 (1748)
(Eng.) (same); 28 Geo. 2, ch. 13 (1755) (Eng.) (same); 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26 (1769) (Eng.)
(same); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (same); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77 (1774) (Eng.) (same); 16
Geo. 3, ch. 38 (1776) (Eng.) (same); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52 (1778) (Eng.) (same); 21 Geo. 3, ch.
63 (1781) (Eng.) ("An Act for the Discharge of certain Insolvent Debtors"). According to
Charles Tabb, the first of such acts was 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 20 (1670), and later acts
included 2 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 15 (1690); 5 & 6 W. & M., ch. 8 (1694); 7 & 8 Will. 3,
ch. 12 (1696); 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 18 (1697); 1 Anne, stat. 1, ch. 25 (1701); 2 & 3 Anne, ch.
16 (1703). Tabb, History,supra note 62, at 12 n.47.
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future property acquired by the debtor other than exempt property would be
subject to later execution. 2 9
At first, only those with a small amount of debts (£50 or £100) were
eligible for release from prison. 30 Over time, however, more people
became eligible. The maximum amount of allowable debt grew to £1,000£2,000,1'1 and creditors holding debts that exceeded the maximum and
who did not consent to the release of the debtor were required to pay for the
maintenance of the debtor in prison. If they did not pay, the prisoner was
released. 32
'
Many have, as a technical matter, distinguished the English insolvency
acts from the English bankruptcy acts. 33 The reasons are simple. The
English insolvency acts applied to non-merchants as well as to merchants34
not eligible for a commission of bankrupt under the bankruptcy acts.
The debtors, not the creditors, initiated the proceedings by petition. Debtors
did not receive a discharge of their debts. Finally, unlike the bankruptcy

129. See, e.g., 2 & 3 Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.) (summary of provisions); 6 Geo., ch.
22 (1719) (Eng.); 11 Geo., ch. 21, (1724) (Eng.); 2 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.); 21 Geo.
2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same); 28 Geo. 2, ch. 13, §§ 3, 18, 20, 21 (1755) (Eng.); 9 Geo. 3,
ch. 26, §§ 4, 11, 27, 33 (1769) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23, §§ 4, 12, 27, 28, 34 (1772) (Eng.);
14 Geo. 3, ch. 77, §§ 4, 12, 28, 29, 34 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, §§ 4, 14, 33, 34,
41 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52, §§ 4, 14, 33, 34, 41 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63,
§§ 5, 15, 32, 33 (1781) (Eng.).
130. Treiman, Acts, supra note 112, at 195 n.22, cites 2 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 15, § 9
(1690) (Eng.) (limiting the benefits of that insolvency act to debtors with unpaid debts of less
than £100). See also 2 & 3 Anne, ch. 16 (1703) (Eng.) (limiting relief to debtors who did
not owe more than £100 to one person and who agreed to serve or procured another to serve
in the British army or navy); 6 Geo., ch. 22 (1719) (Eng.) (limited to debtors who did not
owe more than £50 to one person); I I Gee., ch. 21, (1724) (Eng.) (debtors owing debts to
the Crown and debts of £100 or more to one person not released).
131. See infranote 132 and accompanying text. The one exception is the Lord's Act,
32 Geo. 2, ch. 28 (1758) (Eng.), which was a general insolvency act for debtors owing less
than £100. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., 2 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (1729) (Eng.) (no release for debt to the King or debt
of more than £500 to any one creditor, unless the creditor consented; creditors who did not
consent to release to pay a sum for the maintenance of the prisoner; if the sum were not paid,
then the prisoner was released); 21 Gee. 2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same as preceding act); 28
Geo. 2, ch. 13, § 31 (1755) (Eng.) (same); 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26, § 40 (1769) (Eng.) (same,
except debt limit raised to £1,000); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23, § 42 (1772) (Eng.) (same); 14 Geo.
3, ch. 77, § 42 (1774) (Eng.) (same, except debt limit raised to £2,000 and release for debt
to King allowed if Privy Council agrees); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, §§ 49, 50 (1776) (Eng.) (same,
except no release for debt to King, and debt limit of £ 1,000 to any one person); 18 Geo. 3,
ch. 52, §§ 50, 51 (1778) (Eng.) (same); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63, §§ 3 (1781) (Eng.) (debt limit
£500 but not released for debts to Crown).
133. See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 109, at *484; Treiman, Acts, supranote 112,
at 195 n.22.
134. See generally acts supra note 128.
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acts, these insolvency acts, with one exception discussed below,' did not
operate prospectively. They released only those debtors in prison as of a
date certain.'36
These insolvency acts nevertheless undermined the rationale for limiting
bankruptcy to merchants. Like many of the eighteenth century insolvency
acts, the preamble to the 1769 insolvency act of 9 George Ii states:
Whereas many Persons, by Losses and other Misfortunes, are rendered
incapable of paying their whole Debts; and though they are willing to
make the utmost Satisfaction they can, and many of them are able to serve
His Majesty by Sea or Land, yet are detained in Prison by their Creditors,
or have been forced to go into Foreign Parts out of this Realm: And
whereas such unhappy Debtors have always been deemed the proper
Objects of publick Compassion. .

...

'

Apparently it was not just merchants who could become insolvent through
losses and misfortunes.'
It is also telling that the Parliament saw that
these objects of public compassion could be "forced" to flee the Realm.
The act of fleeing 39
the Realm was one of the first acts of bankruptcy of the
fraudulent debtor.

Moreover, that Parliament restricted relief under the insolvency acts to
release from prison is less important than it looks. In eighteenth century
England, the creditor's remedies were limited to the writ of fieri facias
which authorized the sheriff to seize the goods of the debtor and sell enough
of them to pay the debt; 4° the writ of levarifaciasenabling the sheriff to

135.

See infra text accompanying note 145.

136. See, e.g., 6 Geo., ch. 22 (1719) (Eng.) (releasing debtors in prison on June 24,
1719, for existing debts); 11 Geo., ch. 21, (1724) (Eng.) (September 29, 1724); 2 Geo. 2, ch.
20 (1729) (Eng.) (September 29, 1728); 21 Geo. 2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (January 1, 1747);
28 Geo. 2, ch. 13 (1755) (Eng.) (January 1, 1755); 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26 (1769) (Eng.)

(September 29, 1768); 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (January 1, 1772); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77
(1774) (Eng.) (April 28, 1774); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38 (1776) (Eng.) (January 22, 1776); 18 Geo.
3, ch. 52 (1778) (Eng.) (January 28, 1778); 21 Geo. 3, ch. 63 (1781) (Eng.) (persons in
prison on January 1, 1781; also persons who had escaped during disturbances in June 2
through June 8, 1780 that destroyed several jails and who surrendered or offered to surrender
by September 1, 1780).
137. 9 Geo. 3, ch. 26 (1769) (Eng.). See 12 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (almost
identical language); 14 Geo. 3, ch. 77 (1774) (Eng.) (same); 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38 (1776) (Eng.)
(same, except for spelling changes); 18 Geo. 3, ch. 52 (1778) (Eng.) (same); see also 21 Geo.
2, ch. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same, except without the reference to persons willing to serve in the
army or navy and the reference to going into "Foreign Parts"); 28 Geo. 2, ch. 13 (1755)
(Eng.) (same).
138. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
139.

See supra note 76.

140. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at *417. In Blackstone's scheme, chattels and
goods meant only certain rights that derived from the land (chattels real) and tangible
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seize the personal property of the debtor and the rents from the debtor's real
property to satisfy the debt;' 4 ' the Writ of elegit allowing delivery of the
goods to the creditor at an appraised value in satisfaction Of the debt and,
if there remained a deficiency, giving the creditor possession of one half of
the debtor's lands until the debt were repaid; 4 ' or the writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum by which the debtor was imprisoned until the debt was
paid. 43 A debtor could not, however, permanently lose either his lands
or negotiable instruments and certain other intangible property at the
instance of a creditor.' 44 Accordingly, although all future goods were
subject to execution for the satisfaction of the preexisting debts, the creditor
could no longer use the threat of imprisonment to induce the released debtor
to sell after-acquired lands or intangible property to satisfy the preexisting
debts. The perpetual release from prison effected for many a virtual
discharge of the debts themselves.
Finally, the English bankruptcy acts and the English insolvency acts
began to converge in the 1758 Statute of 28 George H1." 4 1 This act, a
general insolvency act for debtors in prison for sums of less than £100,146
provided a new remedy to creditors against debtors not eligible for a
commission of bankrupt. Upon notice to the debtor and other creditors by
whose action the debtor was imprisoned, the creditor could compel a debtor
who did not seek release from debtor's prison to give an account of his or
her property and to assign the property for the benefit of the petitioning
creditor and other consenting creditors. 47 If the debtor refused, he would
be transported to a colony in America for indentured service for seven
years. 148

property that was movable. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at *384-88.
141. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at *417-18. This writ did not give the creditor
the right to possess or cause the sale of the debtor's lands.
142. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at *418-19. Under this writ, the creditor could
not force the sale of the debtor's lands.
143. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at *414. Debtors of substance sometimes
preferred this writ because once the body of the person was taken in execution on the writ,
no other writ could be issued against his or her goods or lands. Id.
144. See Cohen, supra note 98, at 154-55; Duffy, English Bankrupts,supra note 92,
at 285; Treiman, Acts, supra note 112, at 195 n.21. The intangible property that was not
subject to execution and levy included annuities, bank notes, bonds, book debts, negotiable
instruments, and stocks and shares in public funds. Duffy, EnglishBankrupts,supra note 92,
at 285.
145. 32 Geo. 2, ch. 28 (1758) (Eng.).
146. This act provided for the assignment of the debtor's property to creditors and
release from prison. If the creditors did not consent to the release, they were required to pay
fees for continuation in jail. If they failed, the debtor was released from prison. Id. §§ 13,
14.
147. Id. § 17.
148. Id.
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517

In 1783, James Bland Burges, a barrister and bankruptcy commissioner
and later a member of Parliament,1 49 proposed a reformed system for all
insolvent debtors.'
In particular, he strongly criticized the distinction
between merchants and non-merchants and urged that it be abolished. 5'
He suggested that a simple requirement of debtor insolvency should replace
52
"acts of bankruptcy" as a jurisdictional requirement for a proceeding.
He also recommended that creditors no longer have control over whether a
debtor's debts were to be discharged, but that the commissioners should
only discharge those debts if they were paid in full or the debtor showed
that his15 insolvency
was the product of "unavoidable accidents and misfor3
tunes."'
The convergence of the English bankruptcy acts and the English
insolvency acts accelerated in the first half of nineteenth century and was
complete by the 1860s. 5 4 Thus, although in the later half of the eighteenth century Parliament chose to use two separate systems to regulate the
relations between insolvent debtors and their.creditors, that choice does not
obliterate the common nature of the underlying problem identified by Daniel
Defoe at the end of the seventeenth century: How to devise a system that
would (a) provide a reasonable accommodation for the honest but unfortunate debtor, (b) discourage the growth of deadbeats who could manipulate
the system to the unfair advantage of their creditors, (c) maximize the return
to creditors and (d) discourage overreaching and unproductive harshness by
creditors. 155

149. IAN P.H. DUFFY, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY IN LONDON DURING THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 44 n.133 (1985) [hereinafter, DUFFY, BANKRUPTCY AND
INSOLVENCY].

150. BURGES, supra note 114, at 315-91. Burges's proposals are also discussed in
Bauer, supra note 199, at 85-86; Duffy, English Bankrupts,supra note 92, at 290 & n.44;
DUFFY, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY, supra note 149, at 44-45, 84-85.
151. BURGES, supra note 114, at 318-23, 342-45, 348-53.
152. "Generally, then, every one who is indebted to another, and who neglects or
refuses to pay what he justly owes, shall be liable to a Commission of Insolvency." Id. at
350.
153. Id. at 387-89.
154. Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra note 92, at 290-92; see also note 127 and
accompanying text; see generally DUFFY, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY, supra note 149.
155. Burges also echoed Defoe's earlier sentiments about the aims of bankruptcy law.
At one point, he stated, "[A] distinction ought constantly to be made between those who
become Bankrupts by unavoidable accidents and misfortunes, and those who bring insolvency
upon themselves by their own improvidence, profusion, or dishonesty." BURGES, supranote
114, at 337. In this regard, he noted that, because of the requirement for the consent of 80%
of the creditors (by number and the value of the outstanding debts) for a certificate of
discharge,
The obstinacy or the malevolence of a single Creditor frequently renders it impossible
for an honest man to obtain a Certificate ....
On the other hand, a fraudulent Bankrupt,
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C. The American Experience
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the American colonies and
states responded to the insolvency of debtors and creditors in many different
ways. The problems faced by the Americans were similar to those of the
English. However, the merchant class, though important, was not as
predominant in America as in England, and the Americans were not laboring
under the legislative legacy of the earlier English bankruptcy acts of Henry
VIII, Elizabeth I, and James 1.156
In all of the American jurisdictions,'5 7 creditors could imprison debtors
who could not or would not pay their debts, as well as execute against
goods. In most jurisdictions, creditors could execute against real property
as well. "8 As in England, imprisonment was an important creditor
collection device. The threat and actuality of imprisonment, it was believed,
gave debtors a strong incentive to repay their debts. Imprisonment also
immobilized the debtor when the creditor could not find property on which
to execute. Nevertheless, it was less than an ideal remedy. Imprisonment
usually impaired the debtor's ability to repay creditors. It did not distinguish between debtors who were insolvent in a balance sheet senseinsufficient assets to meet their liabilities-and debtors who were insolvent
in a cash flow sense-sufficient net worth in illiquid assets but insufficient
liquid assets to pay their current debts. The latter, like a land-rich, cashpoor debtor, would prefer imprisonment over the unwise liquidation of a
long-term capital asset on which his or her future well-being and survival
rested. Finally, imprisonment imposed burdens on government to maintain
the prisoners and to support the dependents of the poorer imprisoned
debtors.
Different jurisdictions developed different approaches toward debtors.' 9 In addition, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
such as we have described, finds no difficulty to procure one. It is in his own power
to create the prescribed majority, and to render the prevention of it impossible to his
bona-fide Creditors.
BURGES, supra note 114, at 336.
156. The English bankruptcy acts, as well as the English insolvency acts, were not
considered part of the common law incorporated into the American law.
157. By this term, I mean both the colonies before the American revolution and the
states formed as a result of the revolution.
158. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 98; Cohen, supra note 98; Stefan A.
Riesenfeld, Enforcementof Money Judgments in Early American History,71 MICH. L. REv.
691 (1973).
159. Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 CoM. J.L. 160,
163 (1991), states that the 1570 Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which he calls the "Statute of
Bankrupts," "was the bankruptcy law as used in America." As discussed below, this is not
accurate. Rhett cites ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 22 (2d ed.
1989), which states that English bankruptcy acts were "the bankruptcy law during the colonial
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individual jurisdictions would also experiment with different approaches.
In some jurisdictions, acting on the petitions of specific individuals, the
legislatures passed acts relieving these debtors from prison upon surrender
of their property. 6 These jurisdictions also crafted individualized relief
packages, such as moratoria from imprisonment for one to ten years, and
imposing a majority creditor agreement with the debtor on dissenting
minority creditors.' 6 ' A62 few legislatures even discharged individual

debtors from their debts.

Most jurisdictions enacted general relief laws allowing the release of
debtors from prison upon the debtor's petition if the debtor surrendered all
of his or her property (with certain standard exemptions, such as wearing
apparel, tools, and in some cases weapons). Some official or a designee of
the creditors would then liquidate the property and distribute the proceeds
pro rata to the creditors. The debtor's after-acquired non-exempt property
would remain subject to the unpaid balance of the debts, but the creditor
generally could no longer execute on the body of the debtor.'6 3

period in America." This is a more ambiguous statement, which is repeated in the third
edition of their casebook. The English bankruptcy acts were the law of England during the
colonial period, but they were not the law used in America.
Frimet also cites HOWARD L. OLECK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 93 (1949),
which erroneously states "In America the colonies generally followed the English Law on the
subject [of bankruptcy]." HOWARD L. OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW (1953) also gives a
misleading picture of early american law. Following a brief two paragraph discussion of the
English bankruptcy acts, Oleck states, "In the American colonies, of course, English law was
followed generally." Id. at 177. For this proposition, Oleck cites F. REGIS NOEL, A
HISTORY OF THE BANKRuPTCY LAW

36 (1919), which merely cites Story's brief discussion

of the pre-Constitutional American insolvency statutes quoted infra in the text at note 262.
HOWARD L. OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 177 n.8.
160. Connecticut, 1765-1818, COLEMAN, supranote 98, at 79-83; Maryland, 17151774, id. at 165-68; New Hampshire, 1745-1765, id. at 55-56; New York 1771-1775, 17761786, id. at 113-15; Pennsylvania, 1731, 1760-1793, id. at 145, 147; Rhode Island,
intermittently, id. at 88-89; Vermont, 1785, id. at 69.
161. Connecticut, 1765-1800 (granting a stay from arrest to a debtor who became
insolvent in 1774 because of a loss of his ship and who entered into an agreement with a
majority of creditors allowing the debtor to continue in business for a ten years without arrest
after a minority of the creditors refused to agree and threatened imprisonment, and granting
a stay of arrest and full discharge of debts to two insolvent partners who entered into a
composition agreement with a majority of their creditors to pay 50% of their debts in rum
if the debtors performed their agreement), id. at 79-81; Maryland, 1715-1723, id. at 165-66;
Pennsylvania, 1760-1776 (forcing minority creditors to accept compositions), id. at 145;
Vermont, 1785-1821, id. at 69-71.
162. Connecticut, 1765-1818, id. at 79-81; Maryland, 1715-1723, id. at 165-66; Rhode
Island, 1756-1828 (petitions granted on the basis of a general law enacted in 1756 that
relieved all debtors insolvent as of June 1, 1756), id. at 92-93, 95-97; Pennsylvania, 17601776 (one petition), id. at 145; Vermont, 1786, id.at 69-71.
163. Connecticut, 1765-1767 (this law dissolved pre-existing liens), id. at 79;
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A few jurisdictions provided for release from prison in exchange for a
period of service by the debtor as well as a property assignment.' 64 A
very few jurisdictions during the later part of the seventeenth century and
beginning of the eighteenth century, and Pennsylvania in 1785, enacted
legislation styled on the English bankruptcy acts, in which the creditors
initiated proceedings against merchants.165 Massachusetts also adopted a
Delaware, 1734-1740 (for limited groups of debtors), 1740-1751 (married and middle age
debtors; creditors not accepting property assignment required to pay jail fees and to support
debtor's dependents), 1751-1808 (same, except only deserving married and middle age
debtors), id. at 208-10; Georgia, 1766-1770 (all debtors except those who could carry on their
trade in prison; no releasee if creditor paidjail fees), id. at 234; Maryland, 1708-1711, 17251727, 1733, 1774-1787, 1788-1817, id. at 164-65; see also infra note 177 and accompanying
text; Massachusetts, 1698-1725, periodically during 1727-1787, permanently thereafter
(excluding debtors owing more than £500 to any one debtor), COLEMAN, supra note 98, at
40-42; New Hampshire, 1767-1776, 1782-1791 (all allowing creditors to keep debtors in
prison if the creditors paid the jail fees), id. at 56-57; New Jersey, periodically from 1686,
1730-1771, 1774-1783, id. at 132-135; New York, 1730, 1732-1734, 1743, 1747, 1750, 1751,
1756 (all allowing creditors to keep debtors in prison if the creditors paid the jail fees), 1786,
1787, id. at 107, 115-16; North Carolina, 1749-1773 (debtors worth £2 or more; creditor
paying jail fees could prevent release of debtor), 1773-1793 (all debtors) id. at 218, 220-22;
Pennsylvania, 1730 (creditors could keep debtors in prison if the creditors paid the jail fees),
1770, 1784-1793, id. at 143-45, 147; Rhode Island, 1745 (this act required a guaranty to
repay the debt within five years), id. at 91; Vermont, 1782-1797 (creditors could keep debtors
in prison if the creditors paid the jail fees), id. at 66-67; Virginia, periodically beginning in
1705, id. at 195-96.
164. Connecticut, 1763-1764 (service for up to seven years if debtor could not repay
three-fourths of debts), id. at 78-79; Delaware, 1734-1740 (unmarried debtors under forty
years, indentured up to seven years), 1741-1915 (indentured servitude for various groups;
debtor discharged from debt if the creditors refused service), id. at 208-10; Maryland, 17251727, 1733, id. at 164-65; see also infra note 177 and accompanying text; Massachusetts,
1698-1737, COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 40-42; New Jersey, 1761 (allowing debtor to sell
services to anyone willing to pay the debt), id. at 133; New York, 1732 (debtors owing less
than £2 indentured for five or seven months a year), id. at 107; Pennsylvania, 1706-1730
(married male debtors indentured up to five years, and single debtors under fifty-three years
of age up to seven years; if the creditor refused service, debtor released from prison), 17311767 (releasee from prison of debtor under forty years of age owing less than £20 in
exchange for service and a property assignment), 1767 (same provision extended to debtors
owing less than £150), id. at 141-42, 144.
165. Massachusetts, 1714-1717 (modeled on the 1705 Statute of 4 Anne; debtor
received discharge of debts and could receive allowance of up to 5% not to exceed £50), id.
at 45; New Hampshire, 1715-1718 (modeled on the Massachusetts statute), id. at 54-55;
Pennsylvania, 1785-1793 (modeled on the cumulative English bankruptcy acts, beginning
with 5 Geo. ch. 30 (1732) (Eng.), applicable to merchants and related occupations who
committed certain acts of bankruptcy), ch. 683, 1785 Pa. Stat.found in 12 THE STATUTES
AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 70 (Clarence M. Bush, St. printer,
1896) [hereinafter, PA. STAT. 1682-1801 ]; see also COLEMAN, supranote 98, at 151-52; and
Rhode Island, 1678 (modeled on the earlier English bankruptcy statutes), COLEMAN, supra
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law in 1757-disapproved a year later by the British authorities-limited to
merchants in which either the creditors or the debtor could petition for
of debts if a majority in
relief.166 The debtor could receive a 1discharge
67
number and value of creditors agreed.
Finally, a few jurisdictions enacted legislation providing for the
discharge of the debts as well as release from prison upon assignment of the
debtor's non-exempt property. Some of these laws required the consent of
some or all of the creditors. 6 1 Other 69laws did not require creditor
consent, but these tended to be shortlived. 1
note 98, at 91 n.l1.
166. COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 45-46. Massachusetts then enacted a more limited
act in 1765 allowing creditors to initiate proceedings against absconding and concealing
debtors. This three-year statute was limited in effect because of the political turmoil within
the state and with the British authorities. Id. at 46-48.
167. Id. at 45-46.
168. New Jersey, 1771-1775 (requiring joint petition and two-thirds creditor consent),
1783-1786 (requiring 50% creditor consent), 1786-1787 (same, but if no consent, creditors
to pay jail fees), id. at 134-35; see also infra note 172; New York, 1755-1770 (conditioning
discharge on consent by three-fourths of the creditors by value; proceedings initiated by
creditors, but act applied only if the debtors were willing to give up property), 1771-1772
(release from prison, but exempting all after-acquired property from execution), 1784-1819
(proceedings initiated by debtor or creditor; requiring three-fourths creditor consent to a
discharge of debts), COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 109, 113, 123; see also infra text
accompanying note 190; South Carolina, 1745-1751 (discharging debts only of creditors who
accepted a dividend from assignment of debtor's property), 1751-1759 (discharging debts
only if three-fourths of creditors by number and value agreed and if creditors received 50%
of their debts), 1759 and thereafter (permanent statute discharging debts only of creditors who
accepted a dividend from assignment of debtor's property and only if all creditors agreed),
see infra note 197 and accompanying text; COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 182.
169. Connecticut, 1765-1767, id. at 79; Maryland, 1787-1788, id. at 171;seealso infra
note 178 and accompanying text; New Jersey, COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 134; see also
infra note 172; North Carolina, 1749-1773 (for debtors worth less than £2), COLEMAN, supra
note 98, at 218-19; Rhode Island, 1756 (relieving all debtors insolvent as of June 1, 1756),
1771-1772 (a general law repealed 9 months later), id. at 92-93; South Carolina, 1721-1744,
id. at 181-82; Virginia, 1762-1763, id. at 196-97. The Virginia law, enacted at the November
1762 session of the Virginia General Assembly, and entitled "An Act for the relief of
insolvent debtors, for the effectual discovery and more equal distribution of their estates,"
copied several provisions of the 1732 English bankruptcy act of 5 George II, 5 Geo. 2, ch.
30. Although it was not restricted to merchant debtors, and it allowed the debtors to initiate
proceedings, it provided that fraudulent debtors would receive the death penalty, it provided
for a certificate of discharge, and it authorized an allowance to the cooperating debtor that
according to the same formula in the 1732 act, that is, 5% for a 50% return to creditors, 71/2% for a 62.5% return, and 10% for a 75% return, and other items. Ch. 8, Nov. Sess.,
1762 Va. Laws, §§ 1, 18,found in 7 LAWS OF VIRGINIA 549-63 (William W. Hening ed.,
1820). The following session, declaring that this act "has been thought injurious to the credit
of this colony, and may be of evil consequence to the trade thereof," the Virginia General
Assembly repealed it. Ch. 2, May Sess., 1763 Va. Laws,found in 7 LAWS OF VIRGINIA 643
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On the eve of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution, the
thirteen states used different approaches to insolvent debtors. Georgia
provided no relief of debtors from either debts or imprisonment for debt.
Four states-Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia-had general laws allowing prisoners to be released from prison if they
assigned all of their non-exempt property to be liquidated to satisfy their
debts. Pennsylvania enacted legislation in 1785, styled on the English
bankruptcy 70acts, in which the creditors initiated proceedings against
merchants.
In 1783, New Jersey replaced its system of releasing debtors from
prison'17 with a system of discharging debts with the consent of 50% of
the creditors. 172 The legislature abolished this system in 1787.173 Acting on the petitions of individual debtors to the legislature, Connecticut and
prison, stayed future arrests of debtors
Rhode Island released debtors from
174
for a time, or discharged debts.
Delaware had a more complicated system for relieving debtors willing
to make a property assignment. Unless the creditor were willing to continue
paying jail fees, Delaware allowed the release from prison of deserving
debtors over the age of forty or in charge of small children, and of insolvent
debtors with small debts (E2 or less) willing to be indentured servants for
up to six months. It also allowed debtors aged forty or under who were not
in charge of small children and who owed more than forty shillings (f2) to
be released in exchange for indentured service of up to seven years; if the

(William W. Hening ed., 1820).
170. Ch. 683, 1785 Pa. Stat.,foundin 12 PA. STAT. 1682-1801, supranote 165, at 70;
see also COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 151-52.
171. See supra note 163.
172. See Ch. 370, 1783 N.J. LAWS, found in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY 339 (John D. Cushing, ed. 1981). This act simply revived the act enacted in New
Jersey in 1771, entitled "An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors," 1771 N.J. LAwS,found
in 5 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY 1770-1775, at 81-86 (Bernard Bush ed.,
1986), with minor modifications. The 1783 act reduced the percentage for creditor consent
to discharge from two-thirds to 50%. The 1771 act, which was to expire in 1776, required
two-thirds of the creditors to join the debtor's petition. 1771 N.J. LAWS, found in 5 LAWS
OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY 1770-1775, at 86 (Bernard Bush ed., 1986). This
act also contained a priority for payment of debts, that is, first the King of England, then the
Colony, then the costs of the imprisonment, then the costs of the proceeding, and the residue
to be divided among the creditors. Id. at 85. The act also provided that single individuals
under the age of 40 were not entitled to any benefits of the act unless they were willing to
serve seven years of servitude to pay off their debts. Id. at 86. In 1775, the requirement that
two-thirds of the creditorsjoin in the petition was removed. Act of February 13, 1775, 1775
N.J. LAWS, found in 5 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY 1770-1775, at 321

(Bernard Bush ed., 1986).
173. COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 134-35.
174. Id. at 79-83, 88-89.
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creditor refused the service the debtor was discharged from the debt as
well. 7 ' The Delaware statute also provided for the disposition of the
debtor's property "in like manner as Assignees of Commissioners of
Bankrupts.' 76
From 1774 to May 1787 and after May 1788, Maryland permitted
debtors owing less than £200 to petition for release from prison in exchange
for a property assignment. 177 On May 25, 1787, the Maryland General
Assembly passed a law authorizing the discharge of all debts.' 78 This law
provided for the appointment of a trustee for the creditors; 79 assignment
and liquidation of the debtor's property; 18 pro rata distribution of the net
proceeds to the creditors;' 8' exemptions for wearing apparel for the debtor
and the family and, "if a mechanic or manufacturer," the debtor's tools, not
to exceed £10 in value;8 2 proof of claims by creditors;8 3 a vague statement voiding preferences by debtors and authorizing the trustee to recover
themi 184 a provision that, notwithstanding the discharge, property inherited
by the debtor after the property assignment would be liable for the payment
85
of the discharged debts; and payment of any surplus to the debtor.'
The law also gave creditors a right of action to declare a debtor owing
more than £300 an insolvent.'8 6 A creditor could petition the chancellor
for an order to require such a debtor alleged to be wasting his assets to give
security for the debt. If the debtor failed, the chancellor could declare the
debtor an insolvent. A creditor of such a debtor who remained in prison
without paying his debts could also petition for a declaration of insolven-

175. Id. at 208-210; see also An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, within this
Government, ch. 76, 1740 Del. Laws, §§ 1, 11, 19-21, amendedby ch. 118, 1751 Del. Laws.
The section on debtors owing 40 shillings or less states merely that the debtor would be
"discharged." Ch. 76, 1740 Del. Laws, § 11. Unlike the provisions for the other debtors,
it is not clear whether this is a release from prison or a discharge from the debts.
176. Ch. 76, 1740 Del. Laws, § 2.
177. An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, ch. 28, Mar. Sess., 1774 Md. Laws.
178. An Act Respecting Insolvent Debtors, ch. 34, Apr. Sess., 1787 Md. Laws.
Debtors owing more than £300 applied to the chancellor. Id. §1. Debtors owing less applied
to, and were discharged by, county courts. Id. § 16.
179. Id. § 3.

180. Id. § 6.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. § 5.

183.

Id. § 9.

184. Id. § 10: "And be it enacted, That if any debtor shall prefer any of his creditors,
except securities, who have bona fide become such before the passing of this act, such
preference shall be void in law and equity, and any money paid, or property given, in
preference, shall be recovered by the trustee or trustees of such debtor." Id.
185. Id. § 12.
186. Id. § 15.
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cy. I7 In either case, if a debtor were declared insolvent, the chancellor
would order the debtor to deliver all of his property to a trustee. These
debtors then became entitled to and subject to the provisions of the act.
Although this act was to expire after one year, reaction to the law apparently
was unfavorable. The General Assembly explicitly repealed it on May 20,
1788-saving 1those
proceedings begun before May 24, 1788-and revived
88
the 1774 law.
By special and general acts, New York released debtors from prison and
discharged debts upon a property assignment. By two acts passed in 1784,
it released from prison and discharged the debts of debtors in prison on the
effective dates of the acts. 18 9 In 1786, it enacted a general relief act
discharging all insolvent debtors if three-fourths in value of all unsecured
creditors joined in the petition.'9 0 This act contained the usual provisions
for gathering, administering and liquidating the debtor's property, proving
the creditors' claims, and a pro rata distribution. It expressly applied to
"insolvent" debtors and not just debtors in prison.' 9' It excluded creditors
secured by the debtor's property unless the creditors relinquished their
security interest,' 92 and it allowed creditors with unmatured debts to
participate, the value of their debts being discounted.' 93
For some reason, this act proved unsatisfactory. In 1788, the legislature
repealed it, declaring that it "has been productive of much mischief, and
there is great reason to suppose that wicked men have in many instances
been guilty of the most fraudulent practices to obtain those benefits which
the legislature intended only for the innocent and unfortunate."'' 94 The
following month it provided for the release of debtors from prison upon the
joint petition of the debtor and three-fourths by value of the creditors.' 95

187. Id.
188. Ch. 10, 1788 Md. Laws. This act also revived the 1774 act releasing debtors
from prison.
189. An Act for Relief of Insolvent Debtors Within This State, ch. 14, 7th Sess., 1784
N.Y. Laws (passed April 17, 1784). Later that year, the legislature revived this act. Act of
Nov. 24, 1784, ch. 14, 8th Sess., 1784 N.Y. Law (also discharging several named individuals
even though not then in prison, if two thirds in value of their creditors agreed). In 1785, it
extended the benefits of the 1784 acts to a large number of named individuals. An Act
Granting Relief to Certain Insolvent Debtors, ch. 87, 8th Sess., 1785 N.Y. Laws (passed April
28, 1985).
190. An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, Ch. 34, 9th Sess., 1786 N.Y. Laws
(passed April 13, 1786).
191. Id. (first unnumbered paragraph).
192. Id. (second unnumbered paragraph).
193. Id. (fifth unnumbered paragraph).
194. Act of Feb. 8, 1788, ch. 29, 11th Sess., 1788 N.Y. Laws.
195. An Act for Giving Relief in Cases of Insolvency, ch. 92, 11 th Sess., 1788 N.Y.
Laws (Mar. 21, 1788).
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In the interim, in 1787, it also released, but did not discharge debts of,
debtors then in prison on account of debts of not more than L15.196
South Carolina's experience was more stable. Since 1759, it had
authorized the discharge of debts upon the petition of an imprisoned debtor.' 97 It only discharged the debts, however, of creditors who198agreed to
accept a dividend from an assignment of the debtor's property.
These legislative approaches represent different responses to the same
concerns: How to ensure the maximum repayment of debt while recognizing
that some debtors inevitably would be unable to pay. Too harsh treatment
of insolvent debtors wasted the abilities and energies of potentially
productive persons and created a burden on state and local governments to
maintain debtors' prisons. Too lenient treatment allowed dishonest debtors
or debtors who were less than fully committed to the ideal of repaying their
debts to avoid their obligations. These tensions arose in the context of a
cumbersome system for the enforcement of claims by individual creditors
in which the first to obtain judgment trumped other creditors who expended
money and effort to realize on a diminishing pool of debtor assets. 99 No
system produced truly satisfactory answers. The only certainty was the lack
of consensus within and across the states about the desirability of a
voluntary system of collective debtor-creditor relief providing the insolvent
debtor with a full discharge of existing debts.

196. An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Persons, with respect to the Imprisonment of
Their Persons, ch. 98, 10th Sess., 1787 N.Y. Laws (Apr. 20, 1787).
197. An Act for the More Effectual Relief of Insolvent Debtors, no. 907, 1759 S.C.

Laws,found in THE

FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, pt. I (John

D. Cushing

ed., 1981).
198. Id. § 1. It contained the usual provisions for the discovery and assignment of the
debtor's property, with exceptions for bedding, clothes, tools, and arms for muster. Id.
199. In 1763, Governor Bernard of Massachusetts specifically complained of the
problem of the race to the courthouse in his message to the London Board of Trade
requesting approval of a law directed against absconding debtors:
As it has
This province has long laboured under the want of a Bankrupt Act ....
been of late, every Insolvency has afforded instances of great partiality and injustice.
The Common Method has been for the Creditors who get the earliest advice of a persons
[sic] becoming insolvent to sue out attachments against the goods and credit of the
insolvent, according to the custom of the Country, and help himself to such thereof as
he pleased. A general scramble ensues, there is no regular audit of the Accounts of the
Creditors; The goods are sold in a hurry at a low value; and great part of the effects of
the debtor are spent in law proceedings and contests between contending attachments.
4 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY
793 (188 1); see also George P. Bauer, The Movement Against Imprisonment for Debt in the
United States app. c (1935) (unpublished dissertation, Harvard University); see also
COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 46-47.
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D. Common Features
The English bankruptcy acts, the English insolvency acts, and the
American statutes differed in several respects. Different debtors were
eligible for relief: merchants, or non-merchants, with different or no debt
minimums or maximums. They provided different types of relief; release
from prison only; full or limited stay from future arrest; enforcement against
dissenting minority creditors of composition agreements with majority creditors; no, partial or full discharge of existing debts. Under some statutes
only creditors could initiate proceedings; under other statutes debtors with
the consent of some creditors could initiate proceedings; still other statutes
allowed debtors alone to initiate proceedings.
Nevertheless, all of these acts had substantial similarities. They all
provided for a collective proceeding between creditors and an insolvent
debtor. Even in those cases where a single creditor could initiate a
proceeding against a debtor or a debtor could begin a proceeding against a
single creditor, the statutes required either a listing of the debtor's liabilities
and creditors or public notice of the proceeding and an opportunity, if not
the requirement, for other creditors to participate. Except in the case of the
imposition of composition agreements on minority dissenting creditors, all
required the debtor to relinquish control over his non-exempt property.
These also provided for the administration and liquidation or assignment of
that property for the benefit of the creditors (and, in the case of a surplus,
the debtor) and for a pro-rata distribution among creditors, with some
provision of priority among creditors.
All also allowed the debtor to retain some exempt property under
different circumstances. Significantly, all governed debtors who demonstrated an inability or, in the case of involuntary proceedings, an unwillingness
to repay their creditors. They did not apply to debtors who repaid their
debts. Moreover, none created rights or liabilities for persons other than
insolvent debtors and their creditors.
As the federal bankruptcy laws following the adoption of the Constitution evolved, many of the specific distinguishing features of the English
bankruptcy acts, the English insolvency acts, and the American statutes
disappeared. The gradual development of the federal bankruptcy laws,
however, did not change the essential elements that all three bodies of
legislation shared.
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IV. THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE
A. Adoption and Intent
The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention shed little light on
what the Framers explicitly intended by adopting the Bankruptcy
Clause.2 O On August 29, 1787, during a discussion of the clause that
became the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina moved to recommit the provision with an addition "[t]o establish
uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages
arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange." The convention
approved this motion.2"' On September 1, 1797, John Rutledge of South
Carolina reported that the Committee of Detail for Pinckney's proposal,
which also included Edmund Randolf of Virginia, Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts, William Johnson of Connecticut, and James Wilson of
Pennsylvania, recommended adding the power "to establish uniform laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies" to the Naturalization Clause in the article on
the legislative department.2" 2
The convention adopted this proposal with little debate on September
3.203 Connecticut alone voted against it.2"4 Roger Sherman of Connecticut feared that this clause would empower Congress to punish bankrupts by
death, as was done in the English bankruptcy acts.205 Gouverneur Morris
of Pennsylvania responded that he saw no danger of abuse by the legislature
of the United States.20 6 The Committee on Style made this clause 4 after
the power to regulate commerce in Section 8 of Article 1.207
.There is no direct evidence whether Pinckney or the Committee on
Detail had only the English bankruptcy acts in mind in proposing this clause
or whether they intended a broader meaning to the words "subject of
Bankruptcies." Kurt Nadelmann has argued that the circumstances of
Pinckney's proposal strongly suggest that he used, and the convention
understood, the words "subject of Bankruptcies" in the larger sense of
insolvencies.20 8 Immediately before Pinckney made his proposal on
200. WARREN, supra note 8, at 4-6; Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the
Bankruptcy Clause, I AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 216-19 (1957).

201.

JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787

546-47 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (reprint of Madison's Notes edited by Charles C. Tabb in
H.R. Doc. 398, 69Th CONG., 1ST SESs., DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FOUNDATION
OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES (1927)).
202. Id. at 569.
203. Id. at 571.

204.

Id.

205.
206.

Id.
Id.

207.

Id. at 620.

208.

Nadelmann, supra note 200.
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August 29, the convention debated a full faith and credit clause reported
earlier in the convention. This version stated: "Full faith shall be given in
each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial
proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every other State."' 20 9 During
debate on this clause, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina stated that he did
not understand the meaning of this version.2 '0 According to James
Madison's notes of the debate, James Wilson of Pennsylvania and William
Johnson of Connecticut "supposed the meaning to be that Judgments in one
State should be the ground of actions in other States, & that acts of the
Legislatures should be included for the sake of Acts of insolvency, etc.'
As Nadelmann has pointed out, that the next entry following these notes is
Pinckney's proposal that Congress enact laws on the subject of bankruptcies
suggests that the "subject of Bankruptcies" included not only the English
bankruptcy acts but the multifarious American approaches to insolvency. 1 2
Sherman's objection about the death penalty2 ' of course shows an
awareness of the English bankruptcy acts. It does not by itself show an
expectation that Congress's powers would be limited by those acts. 2 14 All
of the original thirteen states except Rhode Island participated at the
constitutional convention, and they used a variety of approaches to dealing
with insolvent debtors. Pinckney and Rutledge's state, South Carolina, had
an insolvency statute that discharged debts upon the petition of the debtor
and the consent of creditors willing to accept a dividend from the liquidation
of the debtor's property." 5 Pennsylvania had an English style bankruptcy

209. MADISON, supra note 201, at 394.
210. Id. at 546. It differed from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Articles of
Confederation in that it added the acts of legislatures.
211. Id. (emphasis added). Madison inserted at the ellipses the words "as they
sometimes serve the like purpose as act" but he later struck them at some time in his life.
See Nadelmann, supra note 200, at 219-20.
212. See Nadelmann, supra note 200, at 227.
213. The shortlived Virginia discharge statute of 1763 also included a death penalty.
See infra note 169.
214. Daniel Defoe's Essay on Projects,which included his proposal for a voluntary
bankruptcy system, was known to Benjamin Franklin. Describing the books that he read in
his father's library, Benjamin Franklin wrote: "There was also a book of Defoe's called an
Essay on Projectsand another of Dr. Mather's Essays to do Good, which perhaps gave me
a turn of thinking that had an influence on some of the principal future events of my life."
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

16 (Max Farrand ed.,

1949). Franklin outlined and began writing his autobiography in 1771, when this passage
was presumably written. He stopped when he had described the first 24 years of his. Id. at
xii-xiv. He resumed his autobiography in 1784, when he wrote the second installment, id.
at xxi-xxii, and he wrote the third installment in 1788-1789, just before his death in 1790,
id. at xxiii-xiv.
215. See supra note 197.
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act.216 One of the delegates to the convention, Jared Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, had litigated in Pennsylvania courts the validity of an order of relief
from imprisonment under a New Jersey relief act and a discharge of debts
under the Maryland law.2 17 Connecticut was routinely releasing debtors
and discharging debts upon the petition of individual debtors.2"' New
York and Maryland had each recently adopted and abandoned a discharge
law, New York's law requiring creditor consent" 9 and Maryland's law not
requiring creditor consent.220
An obvious source for determining the Framers' intent is the choice of
the word "Bankruptcies." Although the English bankruptcy acts were
distinct from the English insolvency acts, by the time of the convention the
term "bankruptcy" was not understood as only referring to a proceeding
under the English bankruptcy act. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the
English Language,2 ' first published in 1755, has the following entries for
"bankruptcy" and "bankrupt":
BANKRUPTCY. n.s. [from bankrupt] 1. The state of a man broken, or
bankrupt. 2. The act of declaring one's self bankrupt; as, he silenced the
clamours of his creditors by a sudden bankruptcy.
BANKRUPT. adj. [banqueroute,Fr. bancorupto,Ital.] In debt beyond the
power of payment.
The king's grown bankrupt, like a broken man.
SHAKESP. RICHARD III
Sir, if you spend word for word with me, I shall make your wit bankrupt.
SHAKESP. Two GENT. OF VERONA222

216.

See supra notes 165.

217. Nadelmann, supra note 200, at 224-25.
218. See supra notes 160-62; infra note 231 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
221. The 1775 fourth edition of Johnson's Dictionaryof the English Dictionarywas
apart of Thomas Jefferson's library. 5 CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
133-34 (E. Millicent Sowerby ed., 4th ed. 1959).
222. The quoted sentence is by Thurio. Thurio and Valentine, rivals for the hand of
Silvia, exchange angry words. Silvia comments on these remarks and the exchange
continues:
Sil. A fine volley of words, gentlemen, and quickly shot off.
Val. 'Tis indeed, madam; we thank the giver.
Sil. Who is that, servant?
Val. Yourself, sweet lady; for you gave the fire. Sir Thurio borrows his wit from
your ladyship's looks, and spends what he borrows kindly in your company.
Thu. Sir, if you spend word for word with me, I shall make your wit bankrupt.
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BANKRUPT. n. s. A man in debt beyond the power of payment.223
Johnson's definitions of "bankrupt" and "bankruptcy" are synonymous with
his definitions of "insolvent" and "insolvency," which are respectively
"[u]nable to pay debts contracted" and "[i]nability to pay debts."2'24 The
1773 fifth edition and the 1799 eighth edition of Johnson's Dictionary
contained the same or substantially the same definitions.225
The first american edition of Perry's The Royal Standard English
Dictionary printed in 1794, the 1790 third edition, and the 1796 sixth
edition (which was printed in Philadelphia) of Sheridan's Dictionary of the
English Languagecontains similar definitions for "bankrupt" and "bankruptcy" and their synonyms 22"insolvent"
and "insolvency" or their antonyms
"solvent" or "solvency., 6 The 1933 Oxford English Dictionary notes
that the distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency, abolished by the
United States in221841 and England in 1869, "had long before disappeared
in popular use. 1
Officials in America used the term "bankruptcy" in the same sense as
Samuel Johnson's definition. Nadelmann provides an example from the
records of the Connecticut General Assembly. Elijah Buell, apparently a

Val. I know it well, sir: you have an exchequer of words, and, 1think, no other
treasure to give your followers; for it appears by their bare liveries that they live by
your bare words.
Sil. No more, gentlemen, no more. Here comes my father.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Two GENTLEMEN OF VERONA, act 2, sc. 4, lines 33-49, in
COMPLETE WORKS (W.J. Craig ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (1905).
223. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London 1755)
(unpaginated) (omitting quotations from authors).
224. Id.
225. See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed.
London 1773) (omitting the quotes from Shakespeare for the definition of "bankrupt" that
appeared in the first edition and the eighth edition) (unpaginated); 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (8th ed. London 1799) (unpaginated).
226.

WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed.) (Ist

American ed. Massachusetts 1794) ("Bankrupt.... one who cannot pay his debts";
"Bankruptcy, . . .The state of a bankrupt"; "Solvency .... an ability to pay"; "Solvent, a.
able to pay debts"); I THOMAS SHERIDAN, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed.

London 1790) ("Bankruptcy f. The state of a man broken, or bankrupt; the act of declaring
one's self bankrupt"; "Bankrupt, f. A person incapable of paying his debts; one against whom
a commission of bankruptcy is awarded"; "Bankrupt, a.In debt beyond the power of
payment"; "Insolvent, a.Unable to pay"; "Insolvency, f. Inability to pay debts"); THOMAS
SHERIDAN, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. Philadelphia 1796) ("Bankrupt,

a. In debt beyond the power of payment"; "Bankrupt, f. A man in debt beyond the power of
payment"; "Bankruptcy, f. The state of a man broken, or bankrupt"; "Insolvent, a.Unable to
pay"; "Insolvency, f. Inability to pay debts").
227. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 655-56 (1933).
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blacksmith, petitioned the General Assembly for a discharge from his
debts. 2 The May 1787, October 1787, and May 1788 sessions did not
take final action on the petition and therefore continued it to the next
session, each granting a temporary stay of execution.229 The records of
the first two sessions referred to the petitioner requesting "an Act of
Insolvency."23 The records of the May 1788 session, as well as those of
the January 1789 session, which granted the petition, refer to the petitioner's
23
prayer for "a special Act of Bankruptcy.""
Another example is the 1763 letter of Governor Bernard of Massachusetts to the London Board of Trade requesting approval of a limited
bankruptcy act directed at absconding debtors. Governor Bernard recounted
the problems the colony faced:
This Winter a gentleman, who had acted considerably as a Banker, stop't
payment for £170,000 Sterling. This was like an Earthquake to the Town:
numbers of people were creditors, some for their all: Evry [sic] one
dreaded the consequences; Lesser Merchants began to fail; a stop to all
Credit was expected and a general Bankruptcy was apprehended for a
time. 232
The English statutes themselves did not always draw a clear line
between bankruptcy and insolvency. The preamble for a 1746 statute,
entitled "An Act for amending the Laws relating to Bankrupts" stated:
Whereas many Persons within the Description of, and liable to the Statutes
concerning Bankrupts, frequently commit secret Acts of Bankruptcy unknown to their Creditors and other Persons, with whom, in the Course of
Trade, they have Dealings and Transactions; and after the committing
thereof, continue to appear publickly and carry on their Trade and
Dealings... in the usual Way of Trade, and in the same open and publick
Manner
as if they were solvent Persons, and had not become Bank233
rupts.

This statute created an exception for the avoidance of transactions that were
bona fide and in the ordinary course of trade. 234 Transferees were not
liable to repay moneys received before they knew or had notice that the

228. Nadelmann, supranote 200, at 222 n.29. When the petition was finally granted,
the General Assembly exempted one set of blacksmith tools from the property the petitioner
was to have assigned in exchange for his discharge. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. 4 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUsETTS BAY 793-94 (1881) (emphasis added). See also Bauer, supra note 199, app. C.

233.
234.

19 Geo. 2, ch. 32, § 1 (1746) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
Id.
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debtor had "become a Bankrupt, or that he [was] in insolvent Circumstances."235

Hening's 1820 volume of Virginia law indexes the shortlived Virginia
discharge statute 23 under "Bankrupt" and describes it as "Act for relief of
insolvent debtors, on the principles of the bankrupt law."237 Hening also
indexed the law under "Insolvents. 238
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the popular use of the
term "bankruptcy" meant insolvency; the American jurisdictions addressed
the insolvent debtor and her creditors in a great variety of ways; English
courts had been liberalizing the interpretation of "merchant," and Daniel
Defoe 239 and James Burges 24° had made proposals for a more modem
bankruptcy system. Given this background, would the Framers have used
the terminology "Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" if they had wanted
to limit Congress to enacting laws providing only for an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding brought against an insolvent merchant like those
under the English acts directed against "bankrupts"?24' I think the answer
is no. It is more likely that they actually intended to empower Congress to
pass legislation addressing insolvent debtors and their creditors. More
importantly, whatever the conscious intent of the individual Framers who
were paying attention, given the historical, linguistic, and statutory background, this broader empowerment should be the presumed intent.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. (emphasis added).
Ch. 8, Nov. Sess., 1762 Va. Laws; see supra note 169.
7 LAws OF VIRGINIA 673 (William W. Hening ed., 1820).
Id. at 681.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
Although I, as do others, refer to the English "bankruptcy" acts, the term

241.
"bankruptcy" is little used in these acts.

Instead, the term "bankrupt" or "bankrupts"

dominates. See, e.g., 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.) (entitled "An Act against
such Persons as do make Bankrupt"); 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570) (Eng.) (entitled "An Act touching
Orders for Bankrupts"); I Jam., ch. 15 (1604) (Eng.) (entitled "An Act for the better Relief
of the Creditors against such as shall become Bankrupts"); 21 Jam., ch. 19 (1604) (Eng.)
(entitled "An Act for the further Description of a Bankrupt, and Relief of Creditors against

such as shall become Bankrupts, and for inflicting corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts
in some special Cases"); 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 24 (1662) (Eng.) (entitled "An Act Declaratory
concerning Bankrupts"); 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705) (Eng.) ("An Act to prevent Frauds frequently
committed by Bankrupts"); 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1732) (Eng.) ("An Act to prevent the
Committing of Frauds by Bankrupts"). All of the other bankruptcy acts refer to "Bankrupts."
Only one statute includes "bankruptcy" in its title. 10 Anne, ch. 15 (1711) (entitled "An Act
for repealing a Clause in the Statute made in the twenty-first Year of the Reign of King

James the First, entitled, An Act for the further Descriptionof a Bankrupt, and Relief of
Creditors against such as shall become Bankrupts, and for inflictingcorporalPunishment

upon the Bankrupts in some special Cases, which makes Descriptions of Bankrupts; and for
the Explanation of the Laws relating to Bankruptcy, in case of Partnership") (providing that
a discharge of a debtor does not discharge the debtors partner).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
B. Implementation and Interpretation

The first four Congresses gave very brief consideration to bankruptcy
legislation.242 The Fifth Congress gave the subject more extensive
treatment, 241 and in 1800 the Sixth Congress enacted the first federal
bankruptcy law. 2 " This act followed the English bankruptcy practice.24 5
It was, in fact, a warmed over version of the 1732 Statute of 5 George II as
subsequently extended and amended. Creditors could initiate proceedings
only against a merchant that committed acts of bankruptcy that in essence
signaled the merchants insolvency.2 46 Debtors could not initiate proceedings. An insolvent merchant could receive a discharge if two-thirds of
creditors in number and value agreed.247 A cooperative debtor also
received an allowance similar to that allowed by the English act: 5% (not
to exceed $500) of the value of the debtor's property for a 50% payout to

242. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433, 1143-44 (Joseph Gales ed., 1849) (First Congress,
House of Representatives, committee to prepare a bill on "the subject of bankruptcy"
appointed on June 1, 1789; a motion to appoint a committee to prepare bankruptcy legislation
tabled on February 1, 1790; one of the speakers referred to England's prospering under its
"system of bankruptcy"); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 166, 618, 708, 742 (1849) (Second Congress,
House of Representatives, committee to prepare bankruptcy bill appointed on November 9,
1791; petition from persons from South Carolina urging the passage of a "Bankrupt law"
tabled on December 3, 1791; committee appointed on November 21, 1792; bill to establish
system of bankruptcy reported, read twice and committed on December 10, 1792); 3 ANNALS
OF CONG. 142, 256, 970 (1849) (Third Congress, House of Representatives, committee
appointed on December 13, 1793; bill reported, read twice and committed on January 22,
1794 and on December 9, 1794); 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 149, 240, 1739-40 (1849) (Fourth
Congress, House of Representatives, committee appointed December 1795; bill reported
January 1796; motion to consider in committee as a whole defeated December 1796).
243. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 692, 786-88, 796-97, 970, 2426, 2441, 2465-69, 2489-90,
2552-54, 2556, 2577-83, 2649-77 (1851). After several postponements, the House of
Representatives, on Jan. 14, 1799, engaged in a lengthy debate and defeated a bill
establishing a bankruptcy system by a vote of 47-44. Id. at 2649-77.
244. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). Probably because of the
extensive debate during the preceding Fifth Congress, the bill passed the House of
Representatives on February 21, 1780 with little debate or legislative maneuvering by a
margin of 49-48 (the Speaker breaking a tie), 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 247, 388-89, 507-08, 53334 (1851), and passed the Senate on March 28, 1800, by a margin of 16-12, also without any
amendments or recorded debate, id. at 108-11, 115-16, 124-26.
245. The bill finally enacted, based on the English bankruptcy acts, was similar to bills
that had been drafted and presented to the earlier Congresses. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG.
2466, 2467 (1851) (references to the fact that the bill being debated by the Fifth Congress,
which was enacted by the Sixth Congress, had been before Congress for several years
(remarks of Mr. Harper) and "served up constantly almost every session" (remarks of Mr. S.
Smith)).
246. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
247. Id. § 36, 2 Stat. at 31.
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creditors, 10% (not to exceed $800) for a 75% payout, and a discretionary
amount not to exceed 3% or $300 for a payout of less than 50%.248
Although the act was to expire by its own terms in 1805,249 the Congress
repealed it in 1803 because it proved to be so unpopular. 5 °
In enacting the first bankruptcy act, Congress did not discuss the scope
of the Bankruptcy Clause. Because the act was modeled on the English
bankruptcy acts, there was no occasion to argue that the act was or was not
within the Bankruptcy Clause. Nevertheless, references by two representatives during the debate to the insolvency laws and bankruptcy laws enacted
by the states are relevant to the question. John A. Bayard, in asserting the
need for a national a bankruptcy act, stated:
In most of the States there are insolvent laws, which differ in nothing from
this [bill], except that they give all the advantages to the debtor, and none
to the creditor..
The operation of an insolvent law is to discharge a man from prison;
that of a bankrupt law only goes one step further, which is, to discharge
his property also. In some of the States, he was told their insolvent law
goes as far as this bankrupt law, by releasing both person and property.25

Abraham Baldwin, arguing against a single bankruptcy act for the entire
nation, remarked:
[Wlhat are the inducements for this Legislature to take up the subject? It
must be for the sake of making a uniform system of bankruptcy for the
whole country; the arguments to enforce the measure must be derived from
the importance of uniformity on this subject, rather than from the general
principles of bankrupt laws, on which the States have been in the habit of
judging and legislating at their pleasure.252
This general use of the term "bankruptcy" belies the notion that the early
Congress considered that the "subject of Bankruptcies" was necessarily
limited to the narrower English bankruptcy acts.
There were those who believed that the "subject of Bankruptcies" was
so limited. In Storey v. Adams,253 Justice Livingston described a "bankrupt" law as only an English styled bankruptcy act limited to involuntary
proceeding against merchants. 254 Two years later-three decades after the
248.
249.

Id.§§ 34-35, 2 Stat. at 31.
Id. § 64, 2 Stat. at 36.

250.

Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. See Vern Countryman, A History of

American BankruptcyLaw, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 228 (1976); Tabb, History,supra note 62, at
14-15.
251. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2661-62 (1851).

252.
253.

Id. at 2669.
1 F. Cas. 141 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1817) (No. 66).

254.

Id. at 142. This case involved a New York insolvency law discharging the pre-
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adoption of the Constitution and less than two decades after the first federal
bankruptcy act-the Supreme Court rejected this view in Sturges v.
Crowninshield.2"
In Sturges, a creditor holding two notes issued in New York, sued for
payment in Massachusetts. The debtor, maker of the notes, denied liability
on the notes on the ground that he had received a discharge of debts
pursuant to an 1811 New York statute. The creditor argued that the
constitutional grant to Congress to enact bankruptcy laws precluded the state
from enacting a "bankruptcy" law, that is, a law discharging debts.2 6 The
creditor also argued that the New York act impaired the obligation of
contract in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution.257 The
Court rejected the first argument and upheld the second." 8
The Court first examined the question of whether the then unexercised
power of Congress to pass bankruptcy legislation precluded the state from
enacting "bankruptcy" laws allowing the discharge of debts and therefore
restricted states to enacting "insolvency" laws that released debtors from
prison. Discussing the asserted distinction between bankruptcy laws and
insolvency laws, Chief Justice Marshall first noted: "[T]he line of partition
between them is not so distinctly marked as to enable any person to say,
with positive precision, what belongs exclusively to the one, and not to the
other class of laws."259 He then addressed three possible elements of
distinction-what is the relief (release from prison or a discharge of debts),
who may initiate proceedings, and what type of debtors are covered:
It is said, for example, that laws which merely liberate the person are
insolvent laws, and those which discharge the contract, are bankrupt laws.
existing debts contracted in Massachusetts and owed to a Boston creditor. Justice Livingston
also held that the law did not impair the obligation of contract in violation of Article I,
section 10 of the Constitution. Id. at 151.
255. 4 U.S. (17 Wheat) 122(1819). Justice Livingston did not dissent from the court's

holdings.
256. Id. at 124-31.
257. Id. at 131-34.
258. Id. This holding also contradicted Justice's Livingston's holding in Adams v.
Storey, I F. Cas. 141 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1817) (No. 66). Cf.Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542

(C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509). Justice Washington held that an 1812 Pennsylvania statute
for the relief of insolvent persons purporting to discharge a debt contracted before the

enactment of the law was not effective to discharge an existing bill of exchange. First, as
it applied to the specific debt, the act impaired the obligation of contract. Golden, 10 F. Cas.
at 544. Second, the act was unconstitutional because the power to pass bankruptcy legislation
rested solely in the federal government. Id. at 547. Curiously, although this law is part of
the American family of "insolvency" laws, the court stated "we do not mean to give any
opinion on the subject of insolvent laws, acts of limitation, and the like, because they are not
now before us .... Id. This statement makes sense only if Justice Washington thinks an
insolvent law only releases a debtor from prison.

259. 4 U.S. (17 Wheat) at 194.
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But if an act of congress should discharge the person of the bankrupt, and
leave his future acquisitions liable to his creditors, we should feel much
hesitation in saying, that this was an insolvent, not a bankrupt act; and
therefore, unconstitutional. Another distinction has been stated, and has
been uniformly observed. Insolvent laws operate at the instance of an
imprisoned debtor; bankrupt laws at the instance of a creditor. But should
an act of congress authorize a commission of bankruptcy to issue on the
application of a debtor, a court would scarcely be warranted in saying, that
the [act] was unconstitutional, and the commission a nullity.
When laws of each description may be passed by the same legislature,
it is unnecessary to draw a precise line between them. The difficulty can
arise only in our complex system, where the legislature of the Union
possesses the power of enacting bankrupt laws; and those of the states, the
power of enacting insolvent laws. If it be determined, that they are not
laws of the same character, but are as distinct as bankrupt laws and laws
which regulate the course of descents, a distinct line of separation must be
drawn, and the power of each government marked with precision. But all
perceive that this line must be, in a great degree, arbitrary. Although the
two systems have existed apart from each other, there is such a connection
between them, as to render it difficult to say how far they may be blended
together. The bankrupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of
commerce, and to be applicable solely to traders; but it is not easy to say,
who must be excluded from, or may be included within, this description.
It is, like every other part of the subject, one on which the legislature may
exercise an extensive discretion.
This difficulty of discriminating with any accuracy between insolvent
and bankrupt laws, would lead to the opinion, that a bankrupt law may
contain those regulations which are generally found in insolvent laws; and
that an insolvent law may contain those which are common to a bankrupt
law. 260
Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
published in 1833, echoed Justice Marshall's view in Sturges, adding only
a description of the American experience:
It is believed, that no laws ever were passed in America by the colonies or
states, which had the technical denomination of "bankrupt laws. ''26' But
insolvent laws, quite co-extensive with the English bankrupt system in their
operations and objects, have not been unfrequent in colonial and state
legislation. No distinction was ever practically, or even theoretically
attempted to be made between bankruptcies and insolvencies. And a
historical review of the colonial and state legislation will abundantly show,
that a bankrupt law may contain those regulations, which are generally

260. Id. at 194.
261. Actually, Pennsylvania in 1785 enacted "An Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcy." Ch. 683, 1785 Pa. Stat.,found in 12 PA. STAT. 1682-1801, supranote 165, at 70; see
also COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 151-52.
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found in insolvent laws; and that an insolvent law may contain those,
which are common to bankrupt laws.262
In a later and expanded version of his Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States,26 3 Story added more discussion on the insignificance of
the limitation of the English bankruptcy acts to merchants:
In the English system the bankrupt laws are limited to persons, who are
traders, or connected with matters of trade and commerce, as such persons
are peculiarly liable to accidental losses, and to an inability of paying their
debts without any fault of their own. But this is a mere matter of policy,
and by no means enters into the nature of such laws. There is nothing in
the nature or reason of such laws to prevent their being applied to any
other class of unfortunate and meritorious debtors. 2
Story also gave his own description of the subject of bankruptcies:
Perhaps as satisfactory a description of a bankrupt law, as can be framed,
is, that it is a law for the benefit and relief of creditors and their debtors,
in cases, in which the latter are unable, or unwilling to pay their debts.
And a law on the subject of bankruptcy, in the sense of the constitution,
is a law making provisions for cases of persons failing to pay their
debts.265
Congress addressed bankruptcy legislation on several, occasions during
the next three decades, but it did not enact a new bankruptcy law until 184 1.
Several members of Congress proposed bankruptcy legislation that allowed
non-merchants to file voluntary bankruptcy proceedings. These never
passed. One of the objections made was that a law including voluntary
proceedings for non-merchants was an insolvency law beyond Congress's
power. More importantly, however, there was great resistance for reasons
of policy among the legislators to allow petitioning non-merchants to avoid
their debts through a bankruptcy discharge. On the other hand, there was
also great resistance to limiting the benefits of a bankruptcy discharge to
merchants. 66
The second American bankruptcy act, passed in 1841, was broader than
the first. Although involuntary proceedings could only be brought against
262. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 543, at 390 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833). See also 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1111, at 50-51 (1851)

[hereinafter STORY (1851)].

263.

3 STORY (1851), supra note 262.
264. Id. § 1113, at 52-53 (footnote citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at *473-74
for the proposition in the first sentence omitted).
265. Id. § 1113, at 53 n.2.
266. CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-1864, at 138 (1974); WARREN, supra note 8.

STATES:
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merchants, all insolvent debtors could initiate proceedings to obtain a
discharge of their existing debts. 67 Insolvent debtors assigned all their
assets to assignees, who liquidated them and distributed the proceeds among
the creditors.2 6' The debtor received a discharge unless a majority by
number and value of creditors filed written objections.269 This act too
proved to be shortlived. It was repealed after eighteen months.7
Creditors challenged the constitutionality of the 1841 act as being
2
beyond the bankruptcy power. The district court in In re Klein agreed. 71
Relying on the distinction that Blackstone had made between a bankruptcy
law and an insolvency law, the court held that the subject of bankruptcy was
limited to an English style bankruptcy
act in which creditors initiated
272

proceedings against merchant debtors.

On appeal, Justice Catron sitting as the circuit justice reversed.273 In
doing so, he cited the American experience with different forms of
insolvency legislation, and held that the Bankruptcy Clause encompassed
those as well as the English acts. He concluded:
[A]nd the true inquiry is, to what limits is that jurisdiction [the Bankruptcy
Clause] restricted? I hold it extends to all cases where the law causes to
be distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its
least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts.
And all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tending
to further the great end of the subject-distribution and discharge-are in
the competency and discretion of congress.274
This formulation of the bankruptcy power has been cited or quoted with
approval by the Supreme Court on several occasions.275
Congress enacted a national bankruptcy act for the third time in
1867.276 It abolished the merchant and non-merchant distinction.277 All
debtors, including for the first time corporations, could initiate voluntary

267.

ActofAug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). See Countryman, supra

note 250, at 229 (1976); Tabb, History, supra note 62, at 116-18.
268. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843).
269. Id. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443.
270. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
271. 14 F. Cas. 719 (D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7866).
272. Ia. at 728.
273. In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716 (C.D.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7865).
274. Id. at 718.
275. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47 (1938); Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 n. 18 (1935); Continental I11.Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses,
186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902).
276. Act of Mar. 2, 1967, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). See Countryman,
supra note 250, at 229-30; Tabb, History, supra note 62, at 18-21.
277. Act ofMar. 2, 1967, ch. 176, §§ 11, 39, 14 Stat. 517, 521, 536 (repealed 1878).
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proceedings and be the subject of involuntary proceedings.27 For the first
year of its operation, no creditor consent was necessary for a discharge.2 79
After that, discharge required a majority of creditors by number and value
if the creditors received less than 50% of their debts. 8 ' A long list of
prescribed conduct would also bar a discharge.28 '
Congress added an important innovation in 1874.282 Debtors could
enter into composition agreements and extension agreements that would be
binding on all unsecured creditors if a majority in number and 75% in value
agreed. Congress, however, repealed the act in 1878.283
Creditors challenged the 1874 amendment allowing compositions
binding non-consenting minority creditors as beyond the bankruptcy power
in In re Reiman.284 In particular, the creditors complained that a composition agreement might provide that the debtor could retain its property.285
Judge (and later Supreme Court Justice) Blatchford286 rejected these
arguments. 28 7 In doing so, Judge Blatchford reviewed the development of
bankruptcy legislation under the Constitution, the 1851 edition of Story's
8 9 In re
2 8 Sturges v. Crowninshield,
Commentaries on the Constitution,
2
9
°
Klein, and other decisions. Discussing the constitutionality of the 1874
amendment, he addressed the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause: "What is the
'subject of bankruptcies'? It is not, properly, anything less than the subject

278. Id.
279. Id. §§ 29, 33, 14 Stat. at 531, 533.
280. Id. In 1874, this section was amended to provide that no consent was necessary
in involuntary proceedings, and that if less than 30% of the claims were paid, the voluntary
bankrupt was entitled to a discharge only if one-fourth of the creditors by number and onethird in value consented. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 9, 18 Stat. 178, 180 (repealed
1878).
281. Id.at 532 § 29. These included wilfully making a materially false affidavit
attached to the petition for bankruptcy, concealing or transferring assets to defraud his
creditors, destroying or falsifying his books and accounts, removing property from the district
to defraud creditors, fraudulently conveying his property or losing part of his property
through gaming, having made a preferential payment to creditors, paying money to obtain
consent of creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding, or being convicted of a misdemeanor
under the act.
282. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178, 182-83 (repealed 1878).
283. Act of Sept. 1, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
284. 20 F. Cas. 490, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673), affd,20 F. Cas. 500, 501
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 11,675).
285. Id.
286. In Memoriam, Samuel Blatchford, 150 U.S. 707, 707-08 (1983).
287. Inre Reiman, 20 F.Cas. at 492.
288. Id.at 493 (quoting STORY (1851), supra note 262, §§ 1111, 1113).
289. 4 U.S. (17 Wheat) 122 (1819).
290. 14 F.Cas. 716 (C.D.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7865).
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of the relations between an insolvent or non-paying or fraudulent debtor,
and his creditors, extending to his or their relief."2'9
In view of the provisions of the eighteenth century English bankruptcy
acts and the American statutes, the court's decision upholding the 1874
amendment is not a surprising result. The English bankruptcy acts bound
dissenting creditors to the discharge of the debtors' debts if 80% in number
and value agreed.2 92 Several of the American statutes, like the New York
statute of 1786, bound minority creditors to the discharge of all debts when
a specified percentage of creditors agreed.2 93 Others bound all creditors
to a discharge when no creditor agreed.294 In Delaware, creditors were
bound to accept service in repayment of debt. If they chose not to accept
the debtor's service, the debt was discharged.295 In many of the American
statutes of either type and in the English bankruptcy and insolvency statutes,
the debtor also was entitled to retain certain property, like tools and
clothing, to enable him or her to function in society.296 Other statutes
bound minority dissenting creditors to composition agreements to which a
majority of creditors had agreed.297 Although the composition provisions
of the 1874 amendments had a larger scale, since they could be applied to
large corporations with huge assets and huge debts, they were conceptually
no different from the various relief provisions of a simpler time.
Finally, after an eight year effort, Congress enacted the first permanent
bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.298 This law eliminated any
requirement for creditor consent to a discharge. 299 Although there were
some mild complaints about the liberal discharge provisions, 0 0 the act

291. In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. at 496. This statement of the bankruptcy power has
been cited or quoted with approval by the Supreme Court on several occasions. Wright v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 & n. 12 (1938); Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 n. 18 (1935); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 672-73 (1935); Hanover Nat'l Bank
v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187 (1902).
292. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., supra notes 71, 129, 182, 198, and accompanying text.
297. See Countryman, supra note 250, at 227; Israel Treiman, Majority Control in
Compositions: Its HistoricalOrigins and Development, 24 VA. L. REV. 507 (1938) (both
describing the early seventeenth century practice of the Privy Council to force dissenting
creditors to accept compositions and the shortlived 1697 English statute, 8-9 Will. 3, ch. 18
(1697) (Eng.), authorizing such enforced compositions); see also supra notes 80, 161.
298. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). See Countryman, supranote 250,
at 230-31; Tabb, History, supra note 62, at 23-26.
299. See Countryman, supra note 250, at 231.
300. See James M. Olmstead, BankruptcyaCommercialRegulation,15 HARV. L. REV.
829, 834-35 (1909).
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easily withstood challenges to its constitutionality as within the "subject of
Bankruptcies."' 0 '
In 1933, Congress broadened the 1898 Act to include reorganization
provisions for non-corporations, farmers, and railroads. °2 In 1935, the
Supreme Court on its own motion considered the constitutionality of the
03
1933 amendments authorizing the reorganization of insolvent railroads.
In ContinentalIllinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Railway Co., the railroad and its affiliates filed a petition for
reorganization alleging its inability to pay its debts as they matured.3°4
The petitioner then requested, and the bankruptcy court granted, an
injunction prohibiting several secured creditors holding mortgage bonds of
the railroad as collateral from selling the collateral to repay their debts. 0 5
The creditors challenged the injunction on several grounds, including that
the injunction deprived them of property in violation of the due process
guarantees of the Constitution.30 6
Although the parties did not raise the question, 0 7 Justice Sutherland
determined that the 1933 amendment was within Congress's power under
the Bankruptcy Clause.30 8 In doing so, the Court concluded that the
amendment allowing railroad reorganization "advances another step in the
direction of liberalizing the law on the subject of bankruptcies., 319 This
301. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187 (1902) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 against claims that it allowed for voluntary
petitions by non-merchants and that it was non-uniform because it allowed the debtor to
exempt property from the claims of creditors on the basis of state law exemptions).
302. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467, as amended by Act of Aug. 28,
1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942.

303. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island& Pac. Ry., 294
U.S. 648 (1935).
304.
305.

Id. at 656-57.
Id.

306.

Id. at 667.

307.

The creditors did not claim that the injunction authorized by Congress exceeded

the Bankruptcy Clause. Id. at 650-56, 677. As the creditors may have recognized, from
almost the beginning, bankruptcy laws interfered with creditor's remedies. Instead, the
creditors claimed that the injunction interfered with their state law rights to foreclose on
collateral securing their debt and therefore deprived them of property without due process in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 651-52, 680.

308. Id. at 671.
309. Id. The Court significantly misstated the history of the Bankruptcy Clause. It
stated that the 1800 bankruptcy act "so far ignored the English law, which was confined to
traders, as to include bankers, brokers, and underwriters as well. The act of 1841 added merId.
I..."at 670. Actually, the English law of the eighteenth century included all
chants .
of the foregoing except underwriters. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The Court
then stated that "[t]he act of 1800, like the English law, was conceived in the view that the
bankrupt was dishonest; while the act of 1841 and the later acts proceeded upon the
assumption that he might be honest but unfortunate."

ContinentalIll.Nat'l Bank & Trust
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statement is ambiguous. It can be read to mean that the Congress's power
to legislate on the "subject of Bankruptcies" has expanded, as some have
suggested."' 0 Or it could simply be a recognition that Congress has
expanded
its legislative tools within the confines of its legislative pow31
er. 1
Nevertheless, the Court did imply that Congress's power was not
limitless, although it was difficult to define.1 2 The Court also repeated
with approval a state court description that the Bankruptcy Clause essentially
meant that Congress could pass laws 'on the subject of any person's
general inability to pay his debts."''" Finally, the Court stated that it
could not make a distinction between a reorganization under the 1933
amendment and the enforced compositions authorized by the 1874 amendment to the 1867 bankruptcy act.31 4 In doing so it cited with approval the
conclusion in In re Reiman that "the 'subject of bankruptcies' was nothing
less than 'the relations between an insolvent or non-paying or fraudulent
debtor, and his creditors, extending to his and their relief."' 3 5
The Court's indecisiveness about the limits of the Bankruptcy Clause
continued in Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance Co.31 6 This case
involved 1933 and 1935 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which
allowed insolvent farmers to seek a composition or extension of time to pay
debts.3 17 The 1935 amendment automatically extended all state law

Co., 294 U.S. at 670. In fact, the notion of the honest but unfortunate merchant or trader
was the eighteenth century rationale for limiting the English bankruptcy acts to merchants.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 10; see also Kennedy, supra note 11.

311.

Earlier, the court noted, "From the beginning, the tendency of legislation and of

judicial interpretation has been uniformly in the direction of progressive liberalization in
respect of the operationof the bankruptcy power." Continental lll. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
294 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added).
312. The Court stated:
But, while it is true that the power of Congress under the bankruptcy clause is not to be
limited by the English or Colonial law in force when the Constitution was adopted, it
does not follow that the power has no limitations. Those limitations have never been
explicitly defined, and any attempt to do so now would result in little more than a
paraphrase of the language of the Constitution without advancing far toward its full
meaning.
Id. at 669-70.
313. Id. at 670 (quoting Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill 317, 321 (N.Y. 1843), cited with
approvalin Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187 (1902)).
314. ContinentalIll. Bank & Trust Co., 294 U.S. at 672.
315. Id. at 673 (quoting In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No.
11,673)), affd, 20 F. Cas. 500 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 11,675).

316. 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
317. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467, as amended by Act of Aug. 28,
1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942.
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redemption periods upon the filing of a petition."' I A creditor which had
purchased its debtor's land pursuant to a foreclosure of a mortgage but
which had not, because of a one year statutory redemption right under state
law,3 19 obtained title to the property challenged the automatic extension.
The Court held that the automatic extension of state law redemption periods
was within Congress's bankruptcy power.
In doing so, the Court stated: "The subject of bankruptcy is incapable
of final definition. The concept changes. It has been noted that it is not
limited to the connotation of the phrase in England or the States, at the
formulation of the Constitution."3 2
These sentences represent sloppy
writing by the Court. Just two sentences later the Court gave the well
known and well cited32 definition of the bankruptcy power provided by
the district court in In re Reiman discussed above: "The subject of
bankruptcies is nothing less than 'the subject of the relations between the
insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor, and his creditors, extending to
his or their relief."'3 2 The automatic extension-an automatic stay-was
well within this formulation of the reach of the bankruptcy power and thus
within the "subject of Bankruptcies" as understood at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution.
The creditor in this case further argued that the automatic extension fell
outside of the subject of.bankruptcy because it affected not just creditors but
also purchasers at mortgage foreclosure sales. The Court rejected this
contention by saying that a
purchaser at a judicial sale does enter into the radius of the bankruptcy
power over debts. His purchase is in the liquidation of the indebtedness.
The debtor has a right of redemption of which the purchaser is advised,
and until that right of redemption expires the rights of the purchaser are
subject to the power of the Congress over the relationship of debtor and
creditor and its power to legislate for the rehabilitation of the debtor.323
The Court does not tell us why the bankruptcy power reaches this purchaser.
Broadly read, this "radial" thinking3 24 could support a law that included
third parties generally in the "radius" of the bankruptcy power if doing so

318. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942.
319. Under Indiana law, a purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale received a
certificate of sale. The mortgagor then had one year in which to redeem the land by paying
the mortgage debt plus interest and costs. The purchaser had a right to receive either the
redemption money during the year or a deed at the end of a year. 304 U.S. at 505, 516.
320. Id. at 513.
321. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
322.
323.

Wright, 304 U.S. at 513-14.
Id. at 514.

324.

Not to be confused with "penumbral reasoning."

See Glenn H. Reynolds,

PenumbralReasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1333 (1992).
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would help rehabilitate the debtor. The Court's language should not be read
so broadly, however, for a simple reason. As the Court later points out, a
purchaser at a foreclosure sale becomes a creditor of the debtor. Under the
applicable state law, this purchaser had the right either to get back the
redemption price from the debtor (plus presumably interest and costs) that
it paid at the foreclosure sale or to receive the deed.325
In sum, despite some loose language about the subject of bankruptcy
being incapable of final definition 32 6 and the liberalization of the subject
of bankruptcy, 327 the Supreme Court in the twentieth century has been
consistent in describing the "subject of Bankruptcies" as the relations
between the insolvent debtor and its creditors. As the Supreme Court and
other courts in the nineteenth century rejected creditor challenges to new
ways that Congress chose to adjust that relationship in light of changing
commercial conditions, they have not stepped beyond the boundaries of the
insolvent debtor-creditor relationship.
C. Meaning
Some scholars have assumed that the scope of Congress's power under
the Bankruptcy Clause has expanded as the scope of the laws themselves has
expanded.3 28 More particularly, some see the initial scope of the Bankruptcy Clause as being limited to an English-style system in which there can
be only involuntary proceedings against merchants. 329 This implies that,
as the needs of society became more complex, the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause expanded to meet those needs.
These views are historically and analytically incorrect. Certainly, as
commerce and business have developed in the United States over the last
two centuries, the tools that Congress may choose under its bankruptcy
power to help resolve the problems between insolvent debtors and their
creditors must change and adapt to new conditions. That is not to say,
however, that the scope of the bankruptcy power must change.

325. Id. at 516 ("The rights of the purchaser, who under the state law is entitled to the
redemption money or possession within a year, are not substantially different from those of
a mortgagee entitled, on the maturity of the obligation, to payment or sale of the property.").
326. Id. at 513.
327. ContinentalIll. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 294 U.S. at 671.
328. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10; Kennedy, supra note 11.
329. FRANK 0. LOVELAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PROCEED[NGS IN
BANKRUPTCY §§ 1-8 (4th ed. 1912); Tabb, History,supranote 62, at 6,44; Tabb, Discharge,
supra note 62, at 326, 340-41, 345; see also supra note 10. The Report of the 1973
Bankruptcy Commission, which lead to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, overemphasizes the
assumed distinction between "insolvency" legislation and "bankruptcy" legislation.
BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 64.
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"Bankruptcy" as understood at the time of the constitutional convention
covered a relatively discreet social problem: What to do about debtors who
cannot pay their creditors. It was not concerned about the larger questions
of how debtors and creditors entered into their relationship. It did not seek
to regulate contracts or property rights of creditors or debtors in general or
of those who had not extended credit to debtors.33 ° It did provide a
procedure that altered the rights of debtors and creditors when a debtor
became insolvent.
The alteration of the creditors rights will be nominal if the debtor has
no assets. A creditor cannot force a debtor who has no assets to pay a debt.
The alteration of creditors' rights may also be real, as in the case in which
the debtor has sufficient illiquid assets but insufficient liquid assets to pay
now. A forced liquidation may be inefficient for the debtor and for society.
In either event, stopping the wasteful pursuit of individual creditor remedies
against an insolvent debtor and providing the "best" form of relief for the
insolvent debtor and his creditors is the subject of bankruptcy.
Regardless of the extent of relief or the particular form of relief, the
subject of bankruptcy is adjusting the relationship between an insolvent
debtor and her creditors. This fact dictates two logical conclusions. First,
Congress's bankruptcy power extends only to insolvent debtors. Second,
bankruptcy laws must be for the benefit of insolvent debtors and their
creditors. They may not create benefits for third parties to the detriment of
those debtors and creditors or impair the rights of third parties for the
benefit of these debtors and creditors.
As I discuss in the following parts, we have started to cross the
Constitutional boundaries of bankruptcy in several places. Crossing the
boundaries of the Bankruptcy Clause erodes a principled interpretation of the
Constitution. To arrest this erosion, Congress's laws and courts' interpretations must adhere to the confines of the subject of bankruptcies: adjusting
the relationship between an insolvent debtor and her creditors.
V. INSOLVENCY OF THE DEBTOR

Congress's bankruptcy power extends only to insolvent debtors. This
limit implies two conclusions. First, insolvency is a jurisdictional requirement for invoking the Bankruptcy Code. Second, Congress may not rely on
the Bankruptcy Clause to regulate generally the relations between debtors
and their creditors.

330. Early bankruptcy legislation often contained provisions allowing the assigneesor
the trustees for the debtor's property to recover from a third party property fraudulently
conveyed to that party by the debtor. Although closely tied to bankruptcy legislation, this
possibility of recovery also existed as a separate creditor remedy outside of bankruptcy. See
infra note 467 and accompanying text.
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A. Insolvency A JurisdictionalRequirement
The first three American bankruptcy acts contained an insolvency
requirement for voluntary and involuntary proceedings.3 The Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, however, contained no insolvency requirement for voluntary
liquidation proceedings. 3 32 Curiously, the Supreme Court's official form
of the voluntary bankruptcy petition under the 1898 act originally included
an averment that the debtor "owes debts which he is unable to pay in
full. 33 3 In 1939, the Supreme Court's revision of the official form
omitted these words.33 4 In 1933 and 1934, Congress amended the 1898
Act to provide for the reorganization of noncorporate persons, farmers,
railroads, and corporations, and these provisions did contain an insolvency
requirement. 335 Pursuant to the 1938 Chandler Act, Congress revised the

331. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19, 20-21 (1800) (repealed 1803)
(involuntary proceedings only against merchants who committed certain acts of bankruptcy,
including being arrested for debt and remaining in prison for two months), supra note 244;
Act of Aug. 19, 184 1, ch. 9, § 1,5 Stat. 440, 441-42 (1841) (repealed 1843), supra note 267;
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11 (voluntary), § 39 (involuntary, based on acts of
bankruptcy), 14 Stat. 517, 521, 536 (1867) (repealed 1878), supra note 276.
332. Ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544, 547 (1898) (repealed 1978). Although the legislative
history for the Bankruptcy Code does not directly address a requirement for insolvency, the
House Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 implicitly recognized that insolvency
was an unstated element of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898:
When the Bankruptcy Act was adopted 80 years ago, the underlying premise was that
the money of the estate was essentially a trust for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors.
Consequently, the creditors themselves should be entitled to supervisethe collection and
liquidation of the estate....
The notion of creditor control, while still theoretically sound, has failed in practical
terms. Creditor control in bankruptcy cases is a myth. Creditors take little interest in
pursuing a bankrupt debtor. They are unwilling to throw good money after bad.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6053 (footnotes omitted). The House Report was addressing the fact that, because of
the lack of significant creditor involvement, the administrative burdens of controlling the
proceeding fell upon the bankruptcy judge. H.R. REP. No. 595, at 88-109, reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6049-70. The Bankruptcy Reform Act was designed to separate the
administrative andjudicial functions in the bankruptcy proceeding, take the bankruptcyjudge
out of the administrative functions and allow her to concentrate on the judicial function. Id.
333. General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy, 172 U.S. 653, 667 (1898) (Form No.
1).
334. General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy, 305 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1939) (Form
No. 1).
335. ActofMar. 3, 1933, ch. 204,47 Stat. 1467, 1467, 1471, 1474 (persons other than
corporations, farmers and railroads) (adding new §§ 73-77 to the 1898 Act; insolvency
requirement contained in new §§ 74(a), 75(c), 77(a)); Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat.
911, 912 (corporations) (adding new § 77B to the 1898 Act; insolvency requirement
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reorganization provisions for corporate and non-corporate persons and added
Chapter
XIII for wage earners, all of which contained an insolvency require33 6
ment.

The 1978 Code, which replaced the 1898 Act as amended, contains no
insolvency requirement for voluntary proceedings except for municipalities. 337 Generally, it is assumed that insolvency is not a jurisdictional
requirement for a voluntary proceeding.338
One argument against an explicit insolvency requirement is that it is
unnecessary. As a practical matter, the vast majority of bankruptcy cases
involve debtors who are insolvent.339 Solvent debtors do not want to give
up control over their property or suffer the stigma of bankruptcy.
Also, an insolvency requirement presents many practical problems. If
insolvency were a jurisdictional requirement, creditors who want to avoid
a bankruptcy proceeding would litigate as ajurisdictional matter many of the
issues that the entire bankruptcy proceeding is designed to resolve: what are
the assets of the debtor and what are the liabilities. Debtors could also
manipulate insolvency in bad faith, such as by refusing to pay debts that
they are fully capable of paying, and such manipulation would be difficult
to police.340

contained in new § 77B(a)).
336. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 130, 323, 423, 623, 52 Stat. 840, 896, 907,
923, 932 (1938) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. §§ 530, 723, 823, 1023 (1976)) (repealed
1978).
337. See I1U.S.C. § 109(1994). Under II U.S.C. § 303(h)(l)(1994),thebankruptcy
court may enter a contested order of relief on an involuntary petition only if "the debtor is
generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the
subject of a bona fide dispute."
338. See, e.g., In re Johns-ManvilleCorp., 36 B.R. 727, 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984);
1 WILLIAM COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 114.03, at 579-82 (James W. Moore ed., 14th ed. 1974)
(discussing cases under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act).
339. See, e.g., Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The IncreasingBankruptcy
Filing Rate: An HistoricalAnalysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1993) (finding a
statistically significant positive relationship between the amount of debt of individual and
corporate debtors and the rate of bankruptcy filings, and a statistically significant negative
relationship between income and profits on the one hand and the filing rate on the other);
Teresa Sullivan et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A FinancialComparison of
Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 140 (1994) ("While there
undoubtedly are individual debtors in the system who have misbehaved, these data [presented
and analyzed by the authors] demonstrate that, in general, the bankruptcy system is used by
the people for whom it was intended: those drowning in debt."); see also BANKRUPTCY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 19 (stating, in the context of the recommendation that insolvency of the debtor be presumed 90 days before bankruptcy in avoiding a
preferential transfer, that "common sense would indicate that a business is usually insolvent
for a number of months before filing a petition in bankruptcy.")
340. The difficulty in policing when a debtor is insolvent in a cash flow sense-unable
to pay current debts as they mature-mirrors the difficulty that Congress and the courts have
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Congress could ameliorate any difficulty of having insolvency as an
express jurisdictional requirement by creating a presumption of insolvency
and shifting the burden of proof on those who would contest the debtor's
insolvency. Congress did this in the case of preferences under section 547.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the trustee had the burden of proving
that the debtor was insolvent when she made the preferential transfer within
four months of bankruptcy.34' In enacting the Code, Congress recognized
that this requirement forced the trustee to prove a fact that was almost
always true. 342 Agreeing with the Bankruptcy Commission that it was
important to keep the insolvency requirement at the time of a preferential
transfer, 43 Congress created a presumption of insolvency. 44
Despite the difficulties of an express insolvency requirement, it is both
necessary as a constitutional matter and desirable as a matter of policy. The
absence of insolvency as a jurisdictional requirement has given some solvent
debtors an opportunity to use for strategic advantage the special rules
available only in bankruptcy.34 5 Courts faced with extreme examples of

had in curtailing a perceived abuse of the bankruptcy process by individuals with high current
incomes who receive discharge of debts that they would be able to pay. Pursuant to a 1984
amendment, the bankruptcy court, only on its own motion, may dismiss a petition filed by
an individual with mostly consumer debts if it finds that granting relief in a Chapter 7
liquidation would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)
(1994). In enacting this provision, Congress rejected proposals that would have limited a
discharge under Chapter 7 in various ways to those who demonstrated an inability to pay.
See generallyHallinan,supra note 85, at 74-75; Raymond T. Nimmer, ConsumerBankruptcy
Abuse, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 89, 94-99.
Still, an insolvency test would be less difficult to administer than an "ability to pay" test.
If a debtor's liabilities exceed her assets, which occurs in even many of the consumer
bankruptcy abuse cases, there is no need as a constitutional matter to address whether the
debtor is suffering a good faith cash flow insolvency. The court would only have to
determine the latter if her assets exceeded liabilities. In that case, the creditors in most cases
may not care whether there is a cash flow insolvency because in a liquidation of the assets
they would be paid in full. The principal problem with the lack of an insolvency test is the
ability of a solvent debtor to use the bankruptcy process to take advantage of a rule change
that is not available outside of bankruptcy.
341. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (repealed).
342. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138-39.
343. BANKRUPTCY COIvISSION REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 19.
344. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1994). The House Report states that this presumption shifts
to a challenger the burden of producing of evidence to the contrary, but does not shift the
ultimate burden of proof on the issue from the trustee. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 178-79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6139. The Bankruptcy
Commission would have shifted the burden of proof from the trustee. BANKRUPTCY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 19.
345. Creditors cannot use bankruptcy proceedings against solvent debtors for strategic
purposes because of the insolvency requirement for involuntary petitions. See supra notes
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549

this behavior have dismissed voluntary petitions on the grounds that the
bankruptcy filing was not filed in "good faith."
For example, in Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In Re Waldron),34 6 the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of a Chapter
13 bankruptcy petition filed by solvent debtors for the sole purpose of
rejecting an option purchase agreement. The bankruptcy court in In Re
Bandini34 7 dismissed the petition of a solvent debtor who filed a Chapter

32, 337. Involuntary bankruptcy proceedings should continue to be limited to insolvent
debtors. Indeed it is ironic that voluntary bankruptcy under the Code is not limited to
insolvent debtors, but that involuntary proceedings are. Initially, the English bankruptcy acts
gave creditors a remedy for certain fraudulent acts of the debtor. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text; seealso Countryman, supranote 250, at 226-27. Technically, insolvency
was not required. Nevertheless, by the eighteenth century, the focus of the English
bankruptcy acts and the definition of "acts of bankruptcy" evolved to passive acts that in fact
reflected the insolvency of the debtor. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text; see
also Andrew J. Duncan, From Dismemberment to Discharge: the Origins of Modern
American Bankruptcy Law, 100 CoM. L.J. 191, 203-04 (1995). Even the earlier acts of
bankruptcy reflect the effects of insolvency. The debtor who did not have sufficient liquid
assets to repay creditors fled to sanctuary or foreign parts or kept to his house. Against the
solvent debtor who wished to avoid repaying the creditor altogether, creditors' resort to
bankruptcy was not necessary if the creditors could find sufficient property to satisfy the
debts. From the creditors' perspective, a debtor committing an act of bankruptcy that
represented active fraud rendered himself insolvent in the sense of not paying his debts when
they become due.
346. 785 F.2d 936 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed,478 U.S. 1028 (1986). In 1965,
the Waldrons granted Shell Oil Company an option to purchase a parcel of land. Shell could
exercise the option between 1984 and 1993 for an option price of $40,000. In 1983, the
Waldron's filed a Chapter 13 petition, and they admitted that they did so for the sole purpose
of rejecting the unfavorable purchase option agreement. In 1984, an appraisal valued the
property at $145,000.00, and Shell valued the parcel at $195,000.00. Although the
bankruptcy court found that the Waldrons were completely solvent (they owed no debts,
owned a $125,000 home, and had an impressive investment portfolio), the bankruptcy court
concluded that the bankruptcy laws were to be widely used, even for a "trouble free debtor,"
id. at 938-39, and allowed the Waldrons to reject the contract. The district court affirmed,
but the court of appeals reversed. Citing the requirement of II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) that a
bankruptcy court may not approve a Chapter 13 plan unless the plan has been proposed in
good faith, the court of appeals held that the debtors did not satisfy the good faith
requirement in filing their petition and ordered the case dismissed. Id. at 939-41.
347. 165 B.R. 317 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994). Obtaining a divorce from his wife, the
debtor had agreed in 1989 to pay her $2,800 a month in alimony, which amount was
explicitly unmodifiable. After he became involved with his second wife in 1992, he failed
to meet his alimony obligations. In December 1993, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
petition and proposed a plan to repay his alimony arrearages of $33,000 over 60 months
without interest and to reduce his monthly alimony payments to $200.00 a month. The
debtor, who was living a lavish lifestyle, had $109,975 in liquid assets, a net worth of
$169,000, and an annual income of $107,880. Id. at 319-20. The debtor had also appealed
a state court's refusal to modify the marriage settlement agreement just before filing his
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13 petition for the purpose of modifying a marital settlement agreement with
his previous wife. In In Re Noco,348 the bankruptcy court dismissed the
Chapter 11 petition of a solvent debtor filed for the purpose of rejecting a
franchise agreement that contained a covenant not to compete. Finally, in
In re Ofty Corp.,3 49 the bankruptcy court dismissed a Chapter 11 petition
for bad faith because the officers and majority shareholders of a solvent
debtor caused the debtors to file solely to stop a state court ordered
liquidation of its corporate assets.
In re Moog35 presents a closer case on solvency as evidence of bad
faith. Moog filed a Chapter 11 petition to modify a divorce settlement
" ' to his former
agreement which required him to pay $8.5 million dollars35
wife. Although arguably such an obligation would render him insolvent in
a cash flow sense, he had entered into the agreement with the intention of

Chapter 13 petition. The bankruptcy court dismissed the case under I I U.S.C. § 1307 for
cause-lack of good faith-for several reasons, including the fact that the debtor's primary
purpose, if not the sole purpose, in filing for bankruptcy was to modify his marriage
settlement agreement. Id.
348. 76 B.R. 839 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987). In 1981, the debtors, Noco, Inc. and its
two shareholders, Neil and Carol Ottavi, entered into a franchise agreement to sell pool and
spa supplies and accessories which contained a covenant not to compete with the franchisor
in the State of Florida for five years after termination of the agreement. In October 1986,
near the end of the franchise agreement, the debtors formed the Paradise Pools and Spas of
Tallahassee, Inc., and transferred the inventory, equipment, and some accounts receivables
of Noco into the new corporation. Three days later, the debtors filed a Chapter II petition
seeking to reject the franchise agreement and to void the covenant not to compete. The
debtors candidly admitted that their primary purpose in filing the petition was to reject the
franchise agreement. The debtors were currently paying all creditors in a timely manner with
the exception of the franchisor, they owned real estate holdings valued at $1,070,000, they
had virtually no unsecured creditors, and they had sufficient cash flow to pay all trade and
secured creditors in a timely manner.
349. 44 B.R. 479 (Bankr. D. Del. 1984). The two majority shareholders of a closely
held corporation owning and operating real estate were enriching themselves by paying
themselves excessive expenses (39% of rents, as compared to a normal management fees of
6% of rents) at the expense of a third shareholder who had been declared mentally
incompetent. The committee for the third shareholder obtained appointment of the receiver
to liquidate the corporation's assets when he could not enter into a satisfactory settlement
with the two shareholders. The corporation then filed a Chapter I I petition in bankruptcy,
which returned control of the corporate assets to the debtor in possession, that is, to the two
miscreants. In dismissing the petition, the bankruptcy court found that the corporation was
not a financially troubled debtor in need of bankruptcy protection and that its assets greatly
exceed its liabilities. Id. at 482.
350. 159 B.R. 357 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
351. Moog also agreed to make subsequent annual payments totalling another $4.25
million over three years. Because Moog contemplated selling his corporation, this $4.25
million was to be held in trust and used to pay Mrs. Moog's share of the capital gains taxes
upon the sale of the stock. Id. at 359.
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selling his stock in his company valued at $25 million. After the settlement,
however, he changed his mind about selling the company and fought the
wife's efforts to collect (including her attempt to have a receiver appointed
for the company). Finally, he filed a Chapter 11 petition and proposed a
plan that restructured the divorce settlement by giving his former wife one
half of the stock with significant restrictions. The court dismissed the
petition on the grounds of bad faith.352
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that bad faith is
also "cause" for lifting the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(1). In
Barclays-American/BusinessCredit, Inc., v. Radio WBHP, Inc. (In re Dixie
Broadcasting,Inc.),353 a debtor who was not financially distressed filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to evade an impending specific performance
order of a state court to consummate an agreed sale of its property. The
court of appeals affirmed the bankruptcy's court's order lifting the automatic
stay to allow the continuation of the specific performance proceedings in the
state court.354
Lack of good faith is not the only basis upon which courts have refused
to allow solvent debtors to take advantage of the special bankruptcy rules.
In In re Meehan,3 5 a solvent debtor had filed a Chapter 13 petition to
avoid a state court judgment ordering specific performance of a contract to
sell her house. Instead of relying on a lack of good faith, the district court
affirmed a bankruptcy court's refusal to reject the contract under the
"business judgment test" for rejection under I1 U.S.C. § 365. Under this
test, the court must exercise its discretion to approve or disapprove rejection

352. The court found that Mr. Moog had no difficulties in paying his other creditors,
that he was taking substantial sums out of his corporation (including an annual salary of $2.4
million), and that he had been living a lavish lifestyle. Id. at 3362.
353. 871 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
354. The debtor, Dixie Broadcasting, agreed to sell an FM radio station to WBHP for
$925,000, but refused to consummate the sale when it received a $1,250,000 bid from
Colonial Broadcasting Company. WBHP sought specific performance of the sale agreement.
After two and one half years of state court litigation, and after the trial court announced that
it was prepared to rule in favor of WBHP, Dixie Broadcasting filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition during last minute settlement negotiations. WBHP sought to have the petition
dismissed for lack of good faith or in the alternative to have the automatic stay lifted for
cause under 11 U.S.C. § 36 !(d)(1). The bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay for cause
on the grounds that the filing was in bad faith. Id. at 1026. The district court upheld the
order to lift the automatic stay and also remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine if the
debtor's bad faith warranted dismissing the petition. Id. On further appeal, the court of
appeals held that the bankruptcy court was correct in lifting the automatic stay for bad faith,
citing several factors including the fact that the debtor was not in any financial distress. Id.
at 1026-27. It also noted that a decision to lift the automatic stay for bad faith did not
automatically warrant dismissing a petition for bad faith. It dismissed the debtor's appeal of
the district court's remand order because it was not a final, appealable order. Id. at 1028-29.
355. 59 B.R. 380 (E.D. N.Y. 1986).
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of an executory contract in the best interest of all the debtor's creditors. 56
The bankruptcy court had found that, because the debtor's assets would have
been sufficient to pay all her creditors, rejection would not have benefitted
her unsecured creditors." 7 Accordingly, it refused to approve the rejection
of the contract.
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Claughton
v. Mixson,358 affirmed a bankruptcy court's decision that the debtor's
solvency was sufficient cause for lifting the automatic stay under 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The debtor had filed a Chapter 11 petition to prevent
the enforcement of a state court decree regarding the distribution of the
marital assets. The bankruptcy court found that, after payment of the
distribution to the debtor's former wife of almost $4 million, the debtor's
assets were sufficient to pay all of his creditors in full.359 In In re Tinti
Construction Co., 360 a bankruptcy court refused to allow Tinti Construc-

tion Company, a single-family home builder that was not insolvent but that
would36have
become insolvent without relief, to reject a union wage agree1
ment.

356.

Id. at 385.

357. Id. In addition, upon the motion of the buyers, the bankruptcy court lifted the
automatic stay to allow the enforcement of the state court's judgment for specific
performance. Id. at 385-86.
358. 33 F.3d 4 (4th Cir. 1994).
359. In April 1991, after sixteen years of litigation following a divorce, a Florida state
court entered an order valuing and distributing the marital assets of Edward Claughton, the
debtor, and his former wife Beverly Mixson. In July 1991, however, the former wife moved
for an amendment of the order because of the debtor's fraudulent concealment of evidence
regarding the value of certain marital property. Before the state court could act, the debtor
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The parties agreed to allow the state court to enter
an amended order, and the court awarded Mixson $3,976,465. Mixson then sought relief
from the automatic stay to receive immediate distribution of the marital assets. The
bankruptcy court found that the debtor had sufficient assets (over $6 million) to pay Mixson
her $4 million and all of his other creditors (owed about $700,000) and that therefore the
debtor's solvency was sufficient cause for lifting the automatic stay. Id. at 5-6.
360. 29 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983).
361. In re Tinti Construction Co. presents a hard case. Tinti signed the wage labor
agreement in 1982. Unfortunately, the construction industry in the area went into a deep
recession. Id. at 971 The company, though solvent, began losing money and could not
compete with non-union contractors for construction contracts because of its agreement to pay
union wage scales. Id. at 972. Because it financed its activities with cash from the business
and the owners, however, it had very few creditors and no long term debt. Id. To solve its
dilemma, it filed for bankruptcy and as a debtor-in-possession proposed to reject the labor
union agreement under section 365 of the Code. Id. at 973. The court denied the rejection
of the union agreement. Id. at 975. Here, the court did not allow a solvent debtor, though
one in clear financial trouble, to use bankruptcy to obtain a result that it could not achieve
outside of bankruptcy. Id. at 974-75.
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On the other hand, a bankruptcy court declined to dismiss on the
grounds of bad faith a bankruptcy petition by a solvent corporation designed
to thwart a state liquidation proceeding brought by 50% of the shareholdOther solvent debtors have tried to use bankruptcy for
ers.362
nonbankruptcy purposes. In In re Krystal,363 now pending, a solvent
corporation filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition solely to force the
adjudication of overtime wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act
in a single forum. 64
In WE Financial,365 the partners of a solvent special purpose general
partnership caused the corporation to file for bankruptcy for the sole purpose
of accelerating the payment of thirty five high interest rate loans totalling
approximately $125 million that by agreement were not otherwise prepayable.366 If the debtor could accelerate the loans, it could sell the

362. In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775, 782 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990).
The board of directors consisted of the husbands and wives of two families. Id. at 777.
When one of the husbands died, the husband and wife of the other family elected their
attorney to the vacant position, gaining effective control of the corporation. Id.
363. No. 95-15306, Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995.
364. Exhibit A to the debtors voluntary petition lists total assets of $128,015,000 and
total liabilities of $88,471,000. Petition, Ex. A., 3, In re Krystal Co., No. 95-15306, Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1995 (filed December 15, 1995). The company announced that it was filing the
bankruptcy petition to resolve five lawsuits by employees. The Wall StreetJournalreported:
"This is not a 'typical' bankruptcy," Carl Long, Krystal's chairman and chief executive
officer, said in a prepared statement. "Krystal is not insolvent or going out of business.
We are simply utilizing Chapter 11 to resolve all valid claims."
Eleena de Lisser, Krystal to File for Bankruptcy to End Disputes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
1990, corrected, Dec. 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 9912170, at *1. A company
spokesman correctly noted also that the bankruptcy filing would force all claimants to present
their claims in the bankruptcy proceeding and therefore foreclose future periodic litigation.
Id. at *1-*2.
365. No. 92-01861-TUC-LO, Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992 (voluntary Chapter 11 petition filed
June 11, 1992).
366. The debtor was an indirect subsidiary of a home builder which the builder had
established to help finance its building activities. The sole purpose of the debtor was to
borrow money from another special purpose lender and pledge to the lender, American
Southwest Financial Corporation, as security for the borrowings GNMA certificates that the
home builder had acquired to finance the purchase of homes it had sold. The debtor entered
into thirty seven funding agreements with the lender and pledged such collateral to the lender
as security for these funding agreements. The special purpose lender then issued collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) to investors backed by the funding agreements and the
pledged collateral. The CMOs and the funding agreements were payable solely from the
pledged collateral and neither the CMOs nor the funding agreements could be prepaid if
interest rates declined. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 2-3, In re WE
Financial Co., No. 92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed February 23, 1993) [hereinafter,
Findings of Fact]; Amended Disclosure Statement of WE Financial Co., GWS, and WE 7,
Inc. Dated January 11, 1993, as Modified, at 10-21, In re We Financial Co., No. 92-01861-
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underlying collateral, Government National Mortgage Association mortgage
pass-through certificates, that had appreciated in value to an amount greater
than their face amount because of a decline in interest rates. The proceeds
of the sale of the collateral would pay off the loans at par, that is, 100 cents
on the dollar, and the debtor would retain the excess value of the collateral,
reported to be about $11,000,000, which would then be paid to the owners
of the debtor. The loans were also worth more than par because they bore
interest rates higher than the then current market rates, this otherwise
unplanned and unavailable prepayment of the loan would deprive the lender
of its appreciation in value.367 After strenuous objection by the lender,
this case was settled with a reinstatement of all but two of the loans.36

TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) (filed January 11, 1993, and approved by court January 29,
1993) [hereinafter, Disclosure Statement]; Settlement Agreement Dated as of September 1,
1992, at 1-3, In re We Financial Co., No. 92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (filed
November 10, 1992 and approved by court November 24, 1992) (also attached to Disclosure
Statement) [hereinafter, Settlement Agreement]; Bankruptcy Case Tests Builder Bonds, 7
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES LETTER, no. 32, Aug. 10, 1992, at 1, 9, availablein 1992
WL 2747060 [hereinafter MBS LETTER]; Ernie Heltsley, Estes Unit, in Chapter, Seeks
ControlofBonds, ARIz. DAILY STAR, June 17, 1992, at 5B, availablein 1992 WL 7629436
(containing some inaccuracy in describing the structure of the transaction) [hereinafter
Heltsley, ARz. DAILY 6/17]; Ernie Heltsley, Estes Firm'sChapter11 DisputeCalled Threat
to Bond Payments, ARiZ. DAILY STAR, June 18, 1992, at 5B, availablein 1992 WL 7629465
[hereinafter Heltsley, ARIz. DAILY 6/18]; Ernie Heltsley, Bondholders to Receive Timely
Payoff,ARIZ. DAILY STAR, July 1, 1992, at 9B, availablein 1992 WL 7629824 [hereinafter
Heltsley ARIZ. DAILY, 7/1] (referring to interim payment of interest on the funding
agreements); Fitch Puts Amer Southwest FinclAAA CMOs on Alert Neg., Dow Jones News
Service, June 19, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus, DINS, [hereinafter DJNS
6/19]; American Southwest Financial'AAA 'CMOs on FitchAlert Negative, PR News Wire,
June 19, 1992, availableinWESTLAW, Allnewsplus, PRWIRE, [hereinafter PRWIRE 6/19].
For a discussion of how these types of transactions are structured, see STEvEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION

(2d ed. 1993); Thomas E. Plank, The Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper Under the UCC
and the Effect of Violatinga FundamentalDraftingPrinciple,26 CONN. L. REv. 397, 456-57
(1994).
367. See MBS LETTER, supra note 366; Heltsley, ARIZ. DAILY 6/17, supranote 366;
Heltsley, ARIZ. DAILY 6/18, supra note 366; Heltsley, ARIz. DAILY 7/1, supra note 366;
DJNS 6/19, supra note 366; PRWIRE 6/19, supra note 366.
368. Findings of Fact, supra note 366, at 3-4; Disclosure Statement, supranote 366,
at 18-21; Settlement Agreement, supra note 366, at 1-3; see also American Southwest
FinancialEnds Disputewith WE FinancialCo., ARIZ. DAILY STAR, March 15, 1993, at 6D,
availablein 1993 WL 5743065; Abby Schultz, American Southwest Bondhldrs Safe After
Court Okays Plan, Dow Jones News Service, March 11, 1993, availablein WESTLAW,
Allnewsplus, DJNS; S&P Affirms Amer Southwest CMO Ratings; Off Watch, Dow Jones
News Service, March 25, 1993, availablein WESTLAW, Allnewsplus, DJNS. At the time
of the filing, 35 of the funding agreements were outstanding. Pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement, two funding agreements for loans totalling $15 million were prepaid. Findings
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The requirement of good faith, the ability to lift the automatic stay for
cause, and the discretion to disapprove rejection of contracts may be
sufficient to prevent solvent debtors from abusing the bankruptcy process.
This proposition, however, puts the horse behind the cart. That courts use
these tools to prevent abuse by solvent debtors reflects the basic point that
bankruptcy is designed to address the problems of insolvent debtors, not
solvent debtors. The special bankruptcy rules-such as the automatic stay,
the ability to reject executory contracts, the ability to force the estimation
of claims in one forum (the bankruptcy court), and the acceleration of
liabilities-are designed to help an insolvent debtor liquidate or reorganize.
If it were desirable to extend these special rules to assist solvent debtors,
they should be made available outside of bankruptcy.
Perhaps it is thought that the costs and the other features of a bankruptcy proceeding-the theoretical loss of control over one's assets, the
availability of greater creditor control of the debtor through a trustee, and
the requirement for approval of a bankruptcy court-serve as a sufficient
deterrent for those solvent debtors merely seeking a rule change. This
explanation, however, is tantamount to saying that the features of bankruptcy that would deter this forum shopping constitute a proxy for an insolvency
requirement, since these features were intended to assist the best liquidation
or reorganization of the insolvent debtor. Moreover, for solvent debtors
desperately seeking solutions to a particular problem, these features have not
been a sufficient deterrent even though such solvent debtors have generally
been unsuccessful in using bankruptcy to solve the nonbankruptcy problem.
An explicit insolvency requirement would provide a more direct deterrent
and probably a more cost effective one.369
Finally, regardless of whether it is desirable, insolvency of the debtor
is a constitutional requirement because it forms one of the outer borders of
the "subject of Bankruptcies." A unifying feature of the early bankruptcy
acts giving the debtor a right to initiate proceedings, usually entitled "Acts
for the relief of insolvent persons," was that the debtors be in prison as the
result of non-payment of a debt or be insolvent. 370 A debtor with a
positive net worth could be in prison for failure to pay debts if the debtor's
liquid assets were insufficient. But to obtain relief, the debtor had to swear
an oath that she did not have sufficient assets to repay her creditors, and she
had to agree to give up her property. These debtor relief acts were not

of Fact, supra note 366, at 2-4; Disclosure Statement, supra note 366, at 12, 19; Settlement
Agreement, supranote 366, Ex. A and Ex. B to Stipulation, Ex. B to Settlement Agreement.
369. This is an empirical question that may be hard to resolve. I expect, however, that
overcoming a presumption of either balance sheet or the more difficult cash flow insolvency,
see supranote 340 and accompanying text, would be easier than establishing the more elusive
concept of "bad faith."
370. See supra notes 128, 169, 172, 175, 1.77-78, 189, 190, 195-97.
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designed to relieve the Henry David Thoreaus37 of the world who insist
on staying in prison to make some philosophical or political point. The
insolvency of the debtor was the problem addressed by the early voluntary
bankruptcy acts. If a debtor is not insolvent, she should not be a debtor
entitled to relief under a bankruptcy law.
B. General Debtor-CreditorRegulation
The subject of bankruptcy does not extend beyond the insolvent debtor.
It does not extend to solvent debtors. Therefore, the bankruptcy power does
not authorize Congress to pass a more general debtor-creditor statute.
Nevertheless, one author has suggested that the Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to enact a federal personal property security law in lieu of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.372 To my knowledge,
Congress has not asserted such authority. In 1968, however, Congress relied
on both the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause in enacting two
titles of the Consumer Credit Protection Act that were directed at the
debtor-creditor relationship and were not limited to insolvent debtbroader
73
3

ors.

Title II of this Act made loan sharking a federal crime.374 In addition
to finding that loan sharking activities were carried on in interstate
commerce or directly affected interstate commerce, Congress declared:
"Extortionate credit transactions directly impair the effectiveness and
frustrate the purposes of the laws enacted by the Congress on the subject of
bankruptcies. 375 The managers for the conferees from the House of
Representatives explained:
It is obvious, however, that obligations as to which there is an understanding that they may be collected by extortionate means, or which are
actually so collected, are not susceptible of being "discharged"in bankruptcy in any meaningful sense. Such transactions thus deprive the debtor of
a Federal statutory right [the right to a discharge in bankruptcy], and at the
same time defeat one of the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Act [of
1898], which is to afford insolvent persons the opportunity to make a fresh
start. Thus, it seems clearly within the power of Congress to protect the
371. Henry David Thoreau spent one night in jail in 1846 for refusing as a matter of
principle to pay a poll tax, as had been suggested by the then largely unpopular abolitionists

who suggested that citizens should refuse to pay taxes as a protest to the continued toleration
of slavery. WALTER HARDING, THE DAYS OF HENRY THOREAU 199-206 (1966). This
experience was a catalyst for his essay Civil Disobedience. Id. at 206-08.
372. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 57.
373. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146.
374. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, § 202, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1994)).
375. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, § 202(l)(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82
Stat. 146.
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Federal statutory right, and to assure that the bankruptcy laws will be
by enacting legislation to prohibit extortionate credit
carried into execution,
37 6
transactions.

This explanation is unsatisfactory. First, it does not fit the statute. The
statute was not limited to extortionate credit transactions with insolvent
borrowers or with borrowers who became insolvent as a result of the
transactions.377 The problem that Congress was addressing was much
larger. The information upon which Congress relied in enacting this
legislation, and upon which the Supreme Court relied in holding that
Congress's Commerce Clause power authorized the statute,378 showed that
loan sharking funneled money to and from all kinds of borrowers, including
those engaged in illegal activities, and not just the poor.379
Second, the argument is illogical. A discharge in bankruptcy is nothing
other than legal relief from an obligation to pay a debt that otherwise would
be enforceable through legal means. Outlawing illegal means to collect a
debt does not interfere with this legal right. An insolvent victim of a loan
shark may still seek relief under the Code and discharge the debts owed to
the loan shark. Congress could certainly punish creditors who attempt to
use violence or threats to collect discharged debts. Congress could also
punish creditors who use such intimidation to prevent debtors from filing a
bankruptcy petition. This is not, however, what Congress did in this Act.

376. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 2025-26.

377. Several courts upheld challenges to Congress's authority to make loan sharking
a federal crime under the Bankruptcy Clause. None of these provided any analysis of the
Bankruptcy Clause. They merely recited Congress's findings. See United States v. Fiore,
434 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971) (assuming that the victim
of the loan shark was insolvent because he could not get conventional credit); United States
v. Biancofiori, 422 F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970); United
States v. Keresty, 323 F. Supp. 230, 232 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Curcio, 310 F.
Supp. 351, 355-56 (D. Conn. 1970); United States v. Calegro De Lutro, 309 F. Supp. 462,
464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
378. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). The Court did not address
Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause. It did not even cite the congressional
finding on bankruptcy quoted above, but instead cited the first three findings, two of which
relate to the Commerce Clause. Id. at 147 n.1.
379. Id. at 156. The Court stated that New York's Report, An Investigation of the
Loan Shark Racket (1965) found
that loan sharks serve as a source of funds to bookmakers, narcotics dealers, and other
racketeers; that victims of the racket include all classes, rich and poor, businessmen and
laborers; that the victims are often coerced into the commission of criminal acts in order
to repay the loans; that through loan sharking the organized underworld has obtained
control of legitimate businesses, including securities brokerages and banks which are
then exploited.
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It made loan sharking a federal crime in part on the vague notion that
somehow loan sharking affected a debtor's ability to seek relief under the
Code.
Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act imposed a federal limit
on the amount of an employee's wages that a creditor can garnish. 3 " To
justify its actions to limit wage garnishments under the Bankruptcy Clause,
Congress found: "The great disparities among the laws of the several States
relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the
bankruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the
country.""3 8 The concern about uniformity is nonsense. Under both the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, debtors could
exempt certain items of their property from the claims of creditors. These
exemptions are based on the law of the debtors' state.38 2 These state law
exemptions were and are wildly different. The Supreme Court directly
upheld this reference to state law as not violating the uniformity requirements of the Bankruptcy Clause. 83
The real Congressional concern seemed to be the apparent fact that
debtors in states that allowed substantial garnishment of wages filed
bankruptcy petitions at a much higher rate than debtors in states that
restricted wage garnishments. 384 This is not a worthy justification.3 85
If it were, any factor that affects the rate at which debtors file for bankruptcy becomes a subject of bankruptcy. For example, abolishing security
interests might reduce bankruptcy filings, since many filings are precipitated
by a foreclosure action. Restricting divorce might affect the rate of filings.
Imposing strict federal interest rate limits on borrowing might reduce filings,
since creditors would then extend credit only to the most credit worthy

380. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, §§ 301-307, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82
Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1994)).
15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(3) (1994).
381.
382. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994); ch. 541, § 6,30 Stat. 544, 548 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)) (repealed).
383. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188, 190 (1902). See also
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 148-61 (1974) (rejecting claims that
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act was unconstitutional as violating the Fifth Amendment
taking prohibition and the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause); Koffler, supra
note 12, at 104-05.
384. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1978. The report noted that in states like Pennsylvania and Texas that
prohibited garnishment of wages, the number of non-business bankruptcies were nine and
five, respectively, out of 100,000 population, while the number of such bankruptcies in states
with harsh garnishment laws ranged between 200-300 per 100,000 population.
385. It is ironic that one of the moving factors behind the Bankruptcy Code adopted
eight years later was the desire to make bankruptcy more available to consumer debtors, not
to discourage the filing of bankruptcy. See H.R. REP. No.595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-19
(1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6076-80.
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debtors. 8 6 Generous welfare or health insurance benefits for individuals
and generous grants or loans or regulatory relief for small businesses might
reduce the rate of filings. With analysis like this, a wide range of social and
economic programs become authorized by the Bankruptcy Clause. As
desirable and as tempting as these programs may be to legislators responding to their constituents, however, neither federal regulation of the debtorcreditor relationship nor these other types of federal legislation legitimately
fall within the realm of the "subject of Bankruptcies."
VI.

BENEFITS AND LIABILITIES FOR THIRD PARTIES

A. Limits on the Use of Bankruptcy
Limiting the reach of Congress's bankruptcy power to the creditors of
an insolvent debtor is less obvious than the point that the insolvency of the
debtor is an essential feature of the subject of bankruptcy. A simple
question will illustrate the point: Once a debtor is insolvent, does
Congress's bankruptcy power authorize a law distributing the debtor's
remaining assets for the benefit of the state or non-creditors? The English
parliament used this approach in 1570 in the first English fraudulent
conveyance act, which provided that a person transferring property to
defraud his creditors forfeited one-half of that property to the Crown.387
Too my knowledge, however, none of the pre-Constitutional English or
American bankruptcy or insolvency acts appropriated the debtor's property
for the benefit of the government or non-creditors. Of course, these acts
also did not contain an automatic stay or a power to reject executory
contracts, and I do not suggest that these are excluded from the subject of
bankruptcy. Still, asking directly whether Congress may appropriate the
debtor's remaining assets for itself or other non-creditors suggests an
answer: no.
We have bankruptcy laws because such laws may be beneficial to
society-individual debtors can make a fresh start and be more productive
members of society; reorganized companies can provide jobs to workers,
opportunities for others businesses, and taxes for governments. Indeed, one
of the primary justifications for the reorganization provisions of the Code,
along with the notion that reorganization will produce a higher return for
creditors than liquidation, is that allowing financially distressed businesses
to reorganize will save jobs.388

386. The credit risk of the borrower is an important component of the interest rate
charged for any loan. See Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of
Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 287, 336 & n.167 (1991).
387. 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 3 (1570) (Eng.).
388. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978
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The issue then is how far may the Congress go in the name of
legislating on "the subject of Bankruptcies"? The answer lies in the basic
thrust of bankruptcy law since the early 1700s. The subject of bankruptcy
is adjusting the relationship between an insolvent debtor and his creditors.
Legislation that benefits the debtor and the creditors, or that benefits an
insolvent creditor at the expense of the debtor, or that benefits a creditor at
the expense of the debtor or other creditors is within this subject. Whether
this legislation benefits others is irrelevant. Legislation that benefits others
at the expense of the debtor and her creditors is not legislation on the
"subject of Bankruptcies."
The temptation to use bankruptcy legislation to serve the interest of noncreditors at the expense of debtors and their creditors appears most
prominently, but not exclusively, in the context of corporate reorganizations.
It follows naturally from the economic interdependence of our society.389

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The
premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the
industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for
scrap .... It is more economically efficient to reorganized than to liquidate, because
it preserves jobs and assets.
Id. As is obvious, the House Report mixes the two rationales together and does not attempt
to distinguish them. Several important commentators emphasize the importance of using
bankruptcy reorganization to savejobs. See Bufford, supra note 34, at 838 (1994): "Chapter
I I protects vital businesses, protects jobs and communities, gives debtors an opportunity to
wait out an economic downturn, and avoids a catastrophic destruction of economic values.";
Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianismand the NormativeFoundationsof BankruptcyLaw,
71 TEx. L. REv. 541, 591 (1993); Warren, UntenableCaseforRepeal, supra note 46, at 470,
478; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 787-88 (1987)
[hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy].
389. Elizabeth Warren has argued that the larger benefits to society is a central policy
justification of bankruptcy. Warren, BankruptcyPolicy, supra note 388, at 785-89. In her
view, the goal of bankruptcy law is to determine the best way to distribute the losses among
those affected by the insolvency of the debtor. Id. at 777, 785, 789-93. Although much of
her focus is on redistribution among creditors, she suggests that bankruptcy law may properly
accommodate the needs of non-creditors:
But the revival of an otherwise failing business also serves the distributional interests
of many who are not technically "creditors" but who have an interest in a business's
continued existence. Older employees who could not have retrained for other jobs,
customers who would have to resort to less attractive, alternative suppliers of goods and
services, suppliers who would have lost current customers, nearby property owners who
would have suffered declining property values, and states or municipalities that would
have faced shrinking tax bases benefit from the reorganization's success.
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All debtors, whether individuals or artificial entities like a corporations,
engage in economic activity. This activity profits third parties to whom the
debtor is not indebted. These third parties may be employees expecting to
earn wages, suppliers of goods and services hoping to keep a customer, or
the taxing authorities who are looking for a continuing stream of tax
revenues. They would lose those benefits if the debtor ceased doing
business, whether as a result of a liquidation in bankruptcy or a winding up
of its affairs outside of bankruptcy or relocating to another country.39 °
... The older employee, the regular customer, the dependent supplier, and the local
community are important; and bankruptcy attends to many of their concerns, regardless
of whether they have rights recognized at state law.
Id. at 787-88; see also Korobkin, supra note 388, at 572-75.
As I discuss in this part, to the extent that Congress or the courts attend to the concerns
of these non-creditors at the expense of creditors (as they are broadly defined to include
anyone with a claim arising out of pre-bankruptcy actions of the debtor), they exceed the
constitutional bounds of bankruptcy. If it is truly, worthwhile to address these concerns,
Congress should do so under its other constitutional authority. Of course, trying to do so
may be more difficult politically than incorporating these goals in a "bankruptcy" law.
Warren's view of bankruptcy has been criticized, see, e.g., Barry Adler, A World Without
Debt, 72 WASH. U. L. REV. 811, 825-26 (1994); Barry Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk
Allocation, 77 CORNELL L.J. 439, 442 n.9 (1992); Douglas Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987) [hereinafter
Baird, Reply to Warren]; Bowers, supra note 46. Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy
RedistributivePolicies and the Limits of the JudicialProcess, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75 (1995),
suggests that the bankruptcy process is not capable of serving the redistributive interests of
non-creditors. See also Rasmussen, supra note 20. For a recent article supporting her view,
see Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is
It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995).
On the other hand, in my view, the constitutional limits of bankruptcy are broader than the
limits of bankruptcy under the creditor's bargain analysis of Tom Jackson, Doug Baird, and
Bob Scott, who argue that as a matter of policy bankruptcy law should not reorder the
nonbankruptcy entitlements of creditors unless doing so maximizes the return to all of the
creditors. See, e.g., Baird, Reply to Warren, supra;Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott,
On the Nature ofBankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors 'Bargain,
75 VA. L. REV. 155, 155-56 (1989); Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the
Creditors'sBargainHeuristic,53 U. CHI. L. REV. 690, 692, 694-95 (1986) (book review).
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, bankruptcy law may do so regardless of whether
as a matter of policy it should do so.
390. These concerns prompted Congress to pass the Chrysler Corporation Loan
Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1979) (codified at 15 U.S.C
§§ 1861-1875 (1976 & Supp III 1979)) (authority to make commitments to guarantee expired
at the end of 1983). The House Report for the legislation stated that Chrysler, as the nation's
then tenth largest corporation, employed 140,000 individuals, that its 4,700 dealers employed
150,000 individuals, and that its 19,000 suppliers employed 250,000. H.R. REP. No. 690,
96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 9 (1979), reprintedin 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2787, 2789. A Chrysler
collapse would, it reported, add $3 billion to a trade deficit, which in 1979 was a little less
than $10 billion, would produce at least a $2.75 billion loss of revenues for the federal
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If an insolvent debtor attempts to reorganize under Chapter 11, these
third parties may keep the benefits of their relationship with the debtor so
long as the debtor and the creditors believe that a reorganization is possible
and that there is greater value in keeping the business going than in
liquidating its assets.39 1 If reorganization proves unsuccessful, however,
the third parties will lose the benefits accruing from an operating business
to the same extent as a nonbankruptcy cessation of activities.
To the extent that saving jobs or providing other benefits for third
parties is a by-product of adjusting the relationship between an insolvent
debtor and her creditors in their best interests, there is no constitutional
infirmity. A bankruptcy law, however, may not provide benefits to third
parties who are neither debtors nor creditors except as a result of this
readjustment. 92
Accordingly, Congress may not use the Bankruptcy Clause to require
companies to continue to provide future employment for employees of a
debtor or future business for suppliers to the debtor, or give these third
parties a right to compensation for the loss of these benefits. Congress may,
under the Commerce Clause or other constitutional grant of power, create

government (and thereby increase the budget deficit), and would create a $1.1 billion claim
on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for unfunded pension liabilities. H.R. REP. No.
690 at 10, 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2790-91. Congress proposed a federal loan guaranty
because it believed that, given what it considered its unique circumstances, Chrysler would
not be able to reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code. H.R. REP. No. 690 at 14, 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2794-95. The Commerce Clause was presumably the constitutional basis
for this Act. The House Report contains no attempt to justify the Act as an exercise of
power under the Bankruptcy Clause.
Congress authorized a similar bailout for the Lockheed Corporation in 1971, pursuant
to the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (1971) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852 (1976 & Supp V 1981) (authority to make commitments to
guarantee expired at the end of 1973). It authorized $2 billion in loan guarantees, with a
maximum of $250 million for any one company, which was identified in the legislative
history as Lockheed. H.R. REP. No. 379, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1979), reprintedin 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1270, 1271. Again, the concern was to preserve jobs and small businesses,
among other things. Id. About 17,800 jobs at Lockheed and 16,000 jobs at Lockheed's
35,000 suppliers would be lost without the loan guarantee. Id. at 1290.
391. See Baird, Closely Held Firms, supra note 34, at 922-23. As Baird notes,
suppliers as creditors may be willing to extend trade credit to a firm in financial distress and
risk the loss of the value of the trade credit in exchange for the future benefits that accrues
to them if the firm continues in business.
392. Karen Gross has suggested that bankruptcy law should take into account the
interests of the broader community and not be concerned just with debtors and creditors.
Karen Gross, Taking Community InterestsInto Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1031 (1994). In my view, to the extent that the community interests are creditor
interests or that accommodating such interests are a by-product of readjusting the insolvent
debtor-creditors relationship, bankruptcy law may take them into account. Otherwise, they
may not be taken into account in a bankruptcy law.
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rights and obligations that apply generally-that is, in and outside of
bankruptcy. For example, Congress could provide that every employee of
a business involved in interstate commerce who is terminated without cause
is entitled to one year's severance pay. Such a law creates an obligation,
a debt, and this obligation would be treated as any other debt in a bankruptcy proceeding.393 Congress would not have the power, however, to
provide that in every bankruptcy case, employees would be entitled to one
year's severance pay. Congress could also mandate that certain businesses,
like railroads or nuclear power plants engaged in interstate commerce, must
continue to provide service to the public unless permitted to terminate
operations by a governmental agency. Congress simply may not do so
pursuant the Bankruptcy Clause.394
Conversely, that the subject of bankruptcy is limited to the insolvent
debtor-creditor relationship requires that Congress may not, in a bankruptcy
law, appropriate the property of or impair the rights of third parties for the
benefit of the insolvent debtor or his, her or its creditors. The impulse in
the Code and among bankruptcy courts to assist the rehabilitating debtor is
strong. As the debates on the desirability of Chapter 11 proceedings39 5 or

393. There are plenty of examples of Congressional grant of benefits to third parties
outside of bankruptcy that must be recognized in bankruptcy. These include minimum wage
standards enacted by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)
(recognized in Brock v. lRusco Indus. Inc., 842 F.2d 270. 273 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 889 (1988) (Secretary of Labor's action to enforce Act not subject to the automatic stay
of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988)); the denial of power to federal courts to enjoin strikes, under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994) (recognized in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters Local No. 886 v. Quick Charge, 168 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1948) (conflict
with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898)); and the requirement that larger employers must warn
employees of plant closings or mass layoff under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994), discussedin Daniel Keating, The Fruits
of Labor: Worker Prioritiesin Bankruptcy, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 905, 924 (1993)).
394. Theodore Eisenberg has suggestedthat the bankruptcy process offers to regulated
industries, such as the electric utility industry, an opportunity for increased and presumably
better representation of the interests of the customers of the utility, as a form of supplemental
regulation. Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the AdministrativeState, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1987, at 3, 25-31. The customers are not creditors because they do not have
"claims" against the utility. Id. at 25-26. Nevertheless, they will help finance the reorganization of an insolvent regulated industry because they pay the rates for service that are
approved by a regulatory body. This regulatory body may not fully recognize their interests
because it has been "captured" by the interests of the industry it is to regulate. Id. at 26.
Much of the advantages of this use of the bankruptcy power, however, relates not to the
subject of bankruptcies but to providing "better" supplemental regulation of the industry.
Bankruptcy may be better because the bankruptcy court system is already in place (in lieu
of creating another regulatory system), it is a national system more likely to produce uniform
results, and it is not likely to be captured by the regulated industry. Nevertheless, I consider
this use of the bankruptcy power beyond the constitutional authorization.
395. See supra notes 46, 389.
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on the generosity of the Code to individual debtors show,396 this impulse
may reduce the return to creditors in bankruptcy proceedings below some
theoretical optimal level. Selecting the optimal balance between creditor
protection and debtor relief has been a issue of bankruptcy law almost from
the very beginning. 39
To my knowledge, however, none of the pre-Constitutional English or
American bankruptcy or insolvency acts appropriated the property of third
parties for the benefit of the insolvent debtor. Any law that did so in effect
appropriates that property for the benefit of the creditors. An example
would be a law requiring every person living within one mile of an
insolvent debtor to contribute $100 to the debtor's rehabilitation. In
attempting to assist the rehabilitation of an insolvent debtor, Congress has
full power to alter the rights of creditors under the Bankruptcy Clause.
Congress and the courts should not, however, reach beyond creditors and
alter the rights of third parties, that is, those who are not creditors of the
insolvent debtor, even if doing so enhances the creditors' realizations of
their debts or the insolvent debtor's rehabilitation.
B. Specific Applications
For the most part, the Bankruptcy Code does not create any direct
benefits or liabilities for non-debtors and non-creditors that do not exist
outside of bankruptcy. As discussed below, however, Congress has been
tempted to create direct third party benefits in the Code and elsewhere.3 9

396. See supra note 85.
397. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
398. In an uncodified provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act, Congress mandated that any financial institution that acquires substantially
all of the assets or liabilities of an insolvent depository institution whose deposits are insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, such as a savings association or bank, for
which the FDIC has been appointed receiver, must continue to provide the same health
insurance benefits that the insolvent institution had provided. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 242, § 451, 105 Stat. 2236, 2382-83 (1991), also
found in 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821 note (West 1995 Supp.).
In II U.S.C. § 1114 (1994), Congress has mandated that a debtor attempting to
reorganize under Chapter 11 must follow a special procedure before it modifies or terminates
health care, life, or disability insurance benefits for retirees. The retiree benefits must be
those provided "under a plan, fund or program ... maintained or established in whole or in
part by the debtor prior to filing a petition commencing a case under this title."
Id. § 1114(a). To the extent that retirees have such benefits pursuant to a pre-petition
contract, they therefore have a claim and are creditors. Giving these creditors a type of
priority is constitutionally sound. If, however, Congress intended to give a special priority,
which will come from the assets available to the creditors or the debtor, to those retirees who
had no legally enforceable pre-petition right to them, it has crossed the boundary of the
bankruptcy power.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY

1996]

In addition, Congress has included in the Code a few provisions that directly
harm third parties. Faced with ambiguous language, courts have also interpreted the Code to provide direct benefits to or impose harms on these third
parties in the name of fostering the reorganization of an insolvent debtor.
When Congress and the courts create these benefits or impose these harms
in the name of the "subject of Bankruptcies," they exceed their constitutional authority.
1. Benefits for Future Employees and Suppliers
Congress legislated special benefits for the employees of a single bankrupt railroad, and the Supreme Court struck down that legislation in Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons.399 In this case, the trustee for the
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. concluded that reorganization
was not possible after four years of effort.40 0 After the Interstate Commerce Commission ruled that abandonment and dissolution of the railroad
was necessary, the court supervising the reorganization ordered its abandonment.40 ' The court also decided that existing law did not authorize any
payment of any claim for employment protection for the employees losing
their jobs.° 2
Congress responded to the demise of the railroad by enacting the Rock
Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act 40 3 (the RITA act).
The RITA act required the railroad and its unions to negotiate, or the
Interstate Commerce Commission to impose, an employee protection plan
for the employees who lost their jobs, which could have included relocation
incentive compensation, moving expenses, and separation allowances, the
total cost of which could not exceed $75,000,000. 40 4 The RITA act also
required that the trustee pay any claim arising out of the agreement as an
administrative expense. 405 This provision gave these expenses priority
over the claims of existing unsecured creditors.40 6
This act applied only to one railroad and its employees. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held that it violated the requirement that bankruptcy laws
399.

455 U.S. 457 (1982).

400.
401.

Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.

402.

Id.

403.
404.

45 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1018 (Supp. IV 1980).
45 U.S.C. §§ 1005, 1008(d) (Supp. IV 1980).

405.

45 U.S.C. § 1005(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).

406. 45 U.S.C. § 1008(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The reorganization court entered a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of this act on the grounds that it violated the fifth
amendment of the Constitution. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 463. Congress responded by
reenacting the operative provisions of the act with additional provisions suggesting that any
claimants deprived of property could seek compensation from the United States under
existing legislation. Id. at 463-64.
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be uniform throughout the United States.407 To avoid the uniformity
requirement the unions had argued that the RITA act was an exercise of
power under the Commerce Clause. 0 8 The court rejected this argument,
and concluded that the RITA act was a law on the "subject of Bankruptcies.
In a certain sense, this is true. The RITA act amended an existing
bankruptcy proceeding. It required the bankruptcy court to direct the trustee
to implement the employee protection arrangements and to pay any claims
out of the estate of the bankrupt railroad. 4 10 Noting that the subject of
bankruptcies is the "subject of the relations between an insolvent or
nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their
relief,""'1 the Court concluded that "the subject matter of the [RITA act]
is the relationship between a bankrupt railroad and its creditors."'4 2
The Court's analysis raises the question of whether a uniform law
containing provisions like those of the RITA act, but applicable to all
debtors who had filed a petition under the Code, would be within
Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause. The better answer is no.
Such RITA-like provisions would create claims for parties that have no
existing claims outside of bankruptcy and allocate to them the resources of
the debtor otherwise available to pay creditors. These kinds of provisions
were not included in the English or American bankruptcy or insolvency
laws. They would also exceed all of the Supreme Court's formulations of
the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause, including the ones cited by Gibbons.
Although they would represent a bankruptcy law in the sense that they affect
insolvent debtors and their creditors, they would nonetheless exceed
Congress's power to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies. One can
neither read the English and American bankruptcy and insolvency laws of
the eighteenth century nor analyze the basic problems that those laws
attempted to resolve and conclude that the Framers of the Constitution
intended that Congress could pass a uniform RITA-like law in the name of
legislating on the subject of bankruptcies.
Further, there is nothing in the problem that Congress was trying to
solve in the RITA act that represents a new development, unforeseeable to
the Framers. Merchants and non-merchants who engaged in business or
consumer transactions in the eighteenth century had employees, suppliers,
and revenue-hungry governments to contend with. To be sure, if a debtor
became bankrupt and received a discharge, the debtor might continue in

407.

Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 471.

408. Id. at 465.
409. Id. at 468-69.
410. 45 U.S.C. § 1005 (Supp. IV 1980).
411. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 466 (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S.
502, 513-14 (1938)).
412. Id. at 467.
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business, and therefore might hire the same employees or buy goods and
services from the same suppliers. An individual debtor released from jail
would presumably be better able to support his or her family. But the bankruptcy laws did not require that the debtor should do so. Discharge and
other bankruptcy relief may have helped insolvent debtors become
productive members of society, and therefore generate indirect benefits for
non-creditors, but they might not have.4" 3 Certainly, there was no attempt
to quantify the value of these future indirect benefits and allocate a portion
of the debtor's present property or future income to these future beneficiaries. Even the legislatively mandated composition agreement or stay of
arrest was designed to allow the debtor to generate moneys to pay existing
creditors, not to promote the interests of non-creditors.
This analysis forces us to look again at the argument made by the
unions in Gibbons that such a law could be upheld under the Commerce
Clause. Justice Rehnquist suggested in Gibbons that Congress does not have
the power to enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause." 4
If it is not a "bankruptcy law" then arguably it would qualify under the
Commerce Clause. If it were a law that applied generally to all individuals
or entities engaged in interstate commerce, without regard to whether they
were participating in a bankruptcy proceeding, it could so qualify. A law
that applies only to insolvent debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding but that
exceeds the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause should not, however, automatically qualify (assuming the requirement of interstate commerce) under the
Commerce Clause. Otherwise, Congress would be permitted to enact
"bankruptcy" legislation that is outside of its bankruptcy power.4 5 By
focusing on the lack of uniformity in the RITA act, the Court in Gibbons
missed an opportunity to clarify the reach of the Bankruptcy Clause.
2. Stays of Actions by Non-Debtors
The modem automatic stay of actions by creditors against the debtor did
not exist in early English or American bankruptcy law. The automatic stay
and its cousin, the discretionary injunction, however, are logical develop-

413. The House Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 recognized the
importance of allowing an individual debtor to be able to provide for her dependents. The.
report noted that, in deciding whether to approve a plan for repayment of debts under Chapter
13, the court must consider the debtor's primary ability to support her dependents, or
otherwise the plan will not succeed and the debtor or her dependents would become may
become public charges. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1978), reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6085.
414. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468-69.
415. There is no reason to suppose a perfect symmetry between the Bankruptcy Clause
and the Commerce Clause. In their operation, they may overlap, but each also applies to
problems that the other cannot address. See supra note 17.
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ments in legislation aimed at regulating how creditors may deal with their
insolvent debtor. Such limitations on creditor rights are within the "subject
of Bankruptcies."
A related issue is the extent to which courts may impose such limitations against a defendant who is not a debtor. One manifestation of this
issue which is of current significance is whether actual or potential
codefendants who are not debtors in bankruptcy are entitled to an automatic
stay or a discretionary injunction against actions by creditors, which is
available to the codefendant who is a debtor under the Code.
Courts have generally applied the automatic stay or discretionary injunction to non-debtors in a way that is constitutional. Under section 105 of the
Code, bankruptcy courts have, for example, stayed actions by a creditor to
collect a debt owed by a debtor in bankruptcy from another party who is
also obligated on the debt.4 16 This co-obligor could be a guarantor of the
underlying debt or a co-promisor on a note or agreement. In addition, if a
debtor files a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Code, which is
available to individual debtors with regular income, section 1301 of the
Code imposes an automatic stay on collection actions by a creditor against
a consumer debt of that debtor from any individual
who is liable on the debt
411
or who has provided security for the debt.
The justification for these non-debtor stays is that they are necessary to
permit the orderly reorganization or liquidation of the debtor. Nevertheless,
the availability of a stay against actions against non-debtors appears to
provide a benefit to the non-debtor to the detriment of a creditor. The
creditor may not assert her nonbankruptcy rights against a party who is not
a debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, this type of co-obligor
stay does not exceed the bankruptcy power for the simple reason that coobligors are by definition creditors. To the extent that a co-obligor were to
pay a debt owed by a debtor, the co-obligor would have a claim against the
debtor. The co-obligor who assumes liability on a contractual debt as
guarantor of or co-promisor with the debtor has a contingent right to
payment from the debtor that would mature if the co-obligor paid the
debtor's obligation. This obligation arises as a matter of nonbankruptcy law
either under a principal of reimbursement and subrogation, in the case of a
guarantor, or contribution, in the case of a co-maker of a note or a copromisor on a promise to pay or perform an obligation.4 8 In this case,

416. See, e.g., G.H. Ishii-Chang, Litigation and Bankruptcy: The Dilemma of the
Codefendant Stay, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 257, 266-69, 273-75 (1989); Joel C. Shapiro, NonDebtor Third Partiesand the Bankruptcy Code: Is ProtectionAvailable Without Actually
Filing?,95 CoM. L.J. 345, 346 (1990); Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 213-14 (1988).
417. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
418. See, e.g., 2 FREDERICK M. HART & WILLIAM WILLIER, COMMERCIAL PAPER § 5.05 (MB UCC Serv. 1996); 2A HART & WILLIER, supra, § 13.29; JAMES J. WHITE
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the co-obligor stay merely adjusts the relations of one creditor against
another, long a part of the subject of bankruptcy.
The courts have not relied upon any notion of the limits of bankruptcy
power in dealing with co-obligor stays under section 105 or section 1301.
With respect to section 105, courts have uniformly stated that section 105
does not authorize the bankruptcy court to create new substantive rights
under applicable law, including the Code. 419 With respect to section 1301,
Congress did address the constitutionality of section 1301 co-debtor stays.
The House Report on the bill stated: "The stay is not questionable on
constitutional grounds. It is not relief for an individual that is not a debtor
under the bankruptcy laws. It is designed only to protect the principal
debtor, not the codebtor. Any protection of the codebtor is incidental.' '40
This particular justification for section 1301 is weak. An analysis that
justifies a direct benefit for a third party on the grounds that it is "incidental" will produce much mischief. A more straightforward analysis recognizes that the co-debtor is a creditor. A bankruptcy law may protect one
creditor at expense of other creditors for the benefit of the insolvent debtor.
The non-debtor stay also arises under section 105 in another context that
is constitutionality sound: the stay of a cause of action by a creditor against
the non-debtor where the cause of action itself (or the rights underlying the
cause of action, such as a contract) is property of the estate. For example,
if the debtor has an insurance policy, the policy is property of the estate.421 If a creditor may proceed against the policy, payments to the
creditor would reduce the amount available to the bankruptcy estate of the
debtor. Courts have enjoined such creditors seeking such payment.422 A

& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-8, at 481-82 (4th ed. 1994).

419. In re Morristown & Erie Ry., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3rd Cir. 1989); NWFX, Inc. v.
Carl's Grocery Co. (In re NWFX, Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); Grassmueck v. Zamsky (In re EZ Feed Cube
Co.), 123 B.R. 69, 73-74 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991); In re First Republic Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 60
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 25 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1982).
420. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6084. The section 1301 co-debtor stay was also recommended in
Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 10, pt. I, at 166-67; id. pt. II, at 214.
421. 11 U.C.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994). See, e.g., A.H. RobbinsCo. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d
994, 1008 (4th Cir. 1986); Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Lipke (In re Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc.), 54 B.R. 905, 908-09 (Bankr. N.D. Iil. 1985).
422. See, e.g., A.H. Robbins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1008 (4th Cir. 1986). See
also S.I. Aquisitions, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv. (In re S.I. Acquisitions, Inc.), 817 F.2d
1142, 1151-52 (5th Cir. 1987) (under state law, alter ego action is the property of the debtor
corporation and therefor of the estate). The principal also applies to general partners of a
partnership. To the extent that the general partner is liable for the partnership debts, actions
against the general partner are asserting control over property that belongs to the estate. See
generally G.H. Ishii-Chang, supra note 416, at 261-63, 272-73, 275.
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stay of these causes of action may harm the creditor, but it does not benefit
the non-debtor. The bankruptcy trustee retains its rights against the nondebtor.
One application of the non-debtor stay, however, is questionable. This
is a stay of an action against an officer, director, or shareholder of the
debtor on the grounds that continuation of the action would jeopardize the
ability of these managers to devote sufficient time and effort to the
reorganization of the debtor. A troubling example is In re Original Wild
West Foods, Inc.423 In that case, the Internal Revenue Service assessed
a penalty under section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code against an officer
of the debtor corporation responsible for ensuring the payment of withholding tax because the officer had wilfully failed to pay those taxes.424 Under
the Internal Revenue Code, an officer who pays the penalty does not have
a right of reimbursement against the corporation.4 25 The officer is
therefore not a creditor of the debtor. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court
enjoined the collection of the penalty in this case because the officer had
threatened to abandon his attempts to reorganize the debtor if his house were
the
seized and sold to enforce the penalty. 2 6 The court also noted that 42
7
reorganization plan provided for the payment of the taxes with interest.
Although Congress seeks to encourage the rehabilitation of corporate
debtors, this goal should not allow officers, directors, or shareholders 42to
8
receive benefits that would not be available outside of bankruptcy.
Greater awareness of the constitutional limitations will ensure that these
types of stays are limited to the type of relief that any non-debtor could
achieve under nonbankruptcy law.429
Another example of using the bankruptcy process against non-debtors,
of historical interest, is a proposal that a trustee in bankruptcy be able to
assert claims against non-debtor defendants that some, but not all of the

423. 45 B.R. 202 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984).
424. Id. at 204-05.
425. See, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir.
1989); see also Ishii-Chang, supra note 416, at 269-72.
426. 45 B.R. at 205.
427. Id. at 208.
428. And of course, if the corporation is solvent, it does not belong in bankruptcy and

it is not entitle to an automatic stay either.
429. Other courts have refused to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from imposing
withholding penalties. See United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 46 B.R. 741,744-45 (M.D.
Ga. 1985), aJrd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11 th Cir. 1986) (reversing a bankruptcy court order

enjoining the enforcement of the penalties against the non-debtor because the enforcement
might jeopardize the success of the debtor's reorganization); Gennari v. United States (In re
Educators Investment Corp.), 59 B.R. 910,914 (Bankr. D.Nev. 1986). Ishii-Chang discusses
another type of codefendant stay that is not constitutionally suspect, the cause of action
against officers or directors that are in effect disguised actions against the debtor. See IshiiChang, supra note 416, at 270-71.
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*creditors could assert, for the benefit of those specific creditors. The
Supreme Court rejected this proposal under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act in
1972.430
The House of Representatives included this proposal in the reported
version of House Bill No. 8200. The bill conditioned the trustee's authority
on the non-debtor defendant not having any right of subrogation against the
bankruptcy estate.4 ' Therefore, the trustee could proceed only against
non-creditors. The report justified this change in the law on the grounds
that it would benefit the estate and that the culpable third parties often
escaped liability because classes of small creditors rarely bring class action
suits against indenture trustees.43 2 Although such suits by trustees may
have promoted a better use of judicial resources than individual suits by the
affected creditors, this laudable goal by itself is not a "subject of Bankruptcies." The final version of the bill deleted this proposal.433
3. Impairing Marital Rights in Property
Under section 363(f) of the Code, the trustee in bankruptcy may sell
property free and clear of the interest that any third party has in the property
if the trustee meets certain conditions that protect the rights of the third
party.434 A related provision goes too far, however. Under section

430. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416,423-35 (1972) (holding
that the trustee in bankruptcy could not bring an action against a trustee under a bond
indenture for negligence in carrying out its duties to the bondholders, even though those
bondholder could have brought such an action, since it was not a cause of action that the
debtor could have brought or that the trustee could have asserted as a representative of all of
the debtor's creditors).
431. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 370 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6326-27 (creating a subsection (c) in proposed 11 U.S.C. § 544). The
Bankruptcy Reform Commission had also included this proposal in its report to Congress in
1973. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 200; id. pt. I1, § 4604(b)(2), at 160; id. pt. II, at 161-62 n.6.
432. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 179-80 (1978), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6140.
433. 124 CONG. REc. H 11089 (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6140-41.
434. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1994):
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear
of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbanrkuptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such
interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater
than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
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363(h), the trustee may sell property in which the debtor has an undivided
interest with a third party as a tenant in common, joint tenancy, or tenant by
the entirety without regard to the protections of subsection 363(f), if certain
conditions are met."' One condition is that the sale of the entire property
would produce more for the bankruptcy estate than the sale of the debtor's
undivided interest. Another is that the benefit to the estate outweighs the
harm to the co-owner. Thus, the Code authorizes the trustee to harm a third
party for the benefit of the estate (and presumably the creditors) in a way
that is not permitted by nonbankruptcy law.
One bankruptcy case illustrates the economic significance of this power.
In In re Tsuni, 436 creditors brought an involuntary petition against the
debtor.4 37 The debtor moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that
the creditors did not meet the Code's then threshold requirement of having
in the aggregate $5,000 of unsecured debt under section 303(b)(1). 43 8 The
debtor owned a house with his wife as a tenant by the entirety subject to a
mortgage. 439 The debtor's one-half interest in the equity of the house
(conservatively estimated to be about $182,500) exceeded the amount of
debt that he owed to the petitioning creditors (in the amount of
$181,045). 440 In a bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee could sell this house
and make the equity available to the creditors. Under New York law,
however, the creditors, who had obtained liens on the house, could not force
the sale of the house to collect their debts. 44' They could only execute on

(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest.
435. Id. § 363(h):
Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell both the estate's
interest, under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the interest of any co-owner in
property in which the debtor had, at the time of the commencement of the case, an
undivided interest as a tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety, only
if(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners is
impracticable;
(2) sale of the state'sundivided interest in such property would realize significantly less
for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of the coowners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution, for sale,
of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power.
436. In re Tsunis, 29 B.R. 527 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), afd,39 B.R. 977 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
affd, 733 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1984).
437. Id. at 528.

438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 524.
441.

Id. at 528.
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the debtor's interest in the house, which was a right of survivorship if the
wife died before he did." 2 Testimony established that this interest was
worth only $20,000, substantially less than the aggregate debts owed to the
creditors." 3
The debtor, in seeking dismissal of the involuntary petition, argued that
the amount that could be realized under section 363(h) was the appropriate
amount."4 If the court used this amount, the creditors would not have
been undersecured, and they would not have met the jurisdictional
requirements to bring the involuntary petition. The court disagreed." 5 It
held that the amount available to the creditors under state law, $20,000, was
the appropriate amount
for purposes of meeting the standards for an
6
involuntary petition."
In many of the states in which tenancy by the entireties is recognized,
that form of ownership shields the assets of a borrower from the claims of
the creditors of the spouse." 7 In New York, Tsunis' wife had the right
to continue to live in the house so long as she paid the mortgage. She had
the right to receive sole ownership of the house if Tsunis died before she
did, without the costs of probating the husband's will.
If the wife in Tsunis were an insolvent debtor, creditors could file a
petition against both her and her husband and bring the property into a
consolidated bankruptcy estate. Under the facts in Tsunis, however, having
the wife brought into a consolidated case as a debtor under the Code would
have brought in the full value of their joint equity in the home. The full
value of the equity would have destroyed the creditor's jurisdictional basis
for an involuntary case in the first instance.
Moreover, if the wife in Tsunis is not an insolvent debtor, what is there
about adjusting the relations between an insolvent debtor and his creditors,
which after all are created by nonbankruptcy law, that permits the creditors
to deprive the debtor's wife, a third party, of her property interests? Of
course, it may be more convenient if the bankruptcy court and the creditors
need not respect the wife's property interest as a tenant by the entireties.
The creditors may realize a greater return. But simply enhancing the
insolvent debtor's bankruptcy estate to benefit his creditors or to improve
his chances of rehabilitation by eliminating the state law rights of third
parties is no reason to allow the appropriation of a third party's property.

442. Id. at 528-29.
443. Id. at 529.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 528-29.
447. See generallyROGER A CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5, at
205-06 (2d ed. 1993); Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties,25TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951); Janet
D. Ritsko, Note, Lien Times in Massachusetts: Tenancy by the Entirety After Coraccio v.
Lowell Five Cents Bank, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 85 (1995).
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Requiring everyone who lives within 100 miles of an insolvent debtor to
contribute $10 to her bankruptcy estate also would serve these lofty goals.
Such448a requirement is not and has never been a proper subject of "bankruptcy.,
4. "Rejecting" a Lessee's Interest in Personal Property
Under section 365 of the Code, the trustee may assume or reject
executory contracts and leases. 449 This power has engendered much
discussion, disagreement, confusion, and legislative tinkering. 4 0 It is also
of relatively modem origin. It originated under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
as a result of court decisions, and it was codified in 1938. 4 11 The basic
idea behind assumption or rejection is to empower the trustee to elect
whether to continue to perform an agreement made by the debtor, depending
upon whether continued performance would be beneficial or detrimental to
the estate and therefore the creditors.

448. The Code also allows the trustee to sell property "free and clear of any vested or
contingent right in the nature of dower or curtesy." 11 U.S.C. § 363(g) (1994). Dower and
curtesy no longer perform the function in society that they once did, and the states for the
most part have eliminated or so restricted them that the effect of this section is likely to be
small. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 447, § 2.14, at 75. Nevertheless, it is not the
constitutional province of bankruptcy to alter state law entitlements and liabilities for those
who are not part of the debtor-creditor relationship.
The 1973 Bankruptcy Commission Report recommended that the trustee in bankruptcy
have access to a debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust other than that necessary to support
the debtor and his dependents. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at
17; id. pt. 11, § 4-601(b), at 147-48; id. pt. II, at 151 n.10. Outside of bankruptcy, this
interest would not be available to creditors. The Commission'sproposal would have deprived
the settlors of spendthrift trusts of their expectations, enforceable under nonbankruptcy law,
for the benefit of creditors, and would have exceeded the bankruptcy power. The Code
enacted by Congress did not follow this recommendation, and restrictions enacted under
spendthrift trusts are respected in bankruptcy. See II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994).
449. II U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
450. See generally Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:
Understanding"Rejection, "59 U. COLO. L. REv. 845 (1988); Michael A. Bloom & Bryna
L. Singer, The Revised Section 365: Lessor's Panacea?,63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 199 (1989)
(discussing the 1984 amendments to the Code imposing limitations on the trustee's powers
to assume or reject nonresidential real property leases); Vern Countryman, Executory
Contractsin Bankruptcy, Part!, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439 (1973); Ven Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part II, 58 MINN. L. REv. 479 (1974); Don Fogel, Executory
Contracts and UnexpiredLeases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REv. 341 (1980);
Robert L. Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Licensee's Mine
Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295 (1988); Jay L. Westbrook, A FunctionalAnalysis of
Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1989).
451. See 4A WILLIAM COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.43, at 516-20 (James W. Moore
ed., 14th ed. 1974) (discussing the history of the trustee's power).
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In the main, this power is constitutional. If an insolvent debtor has
entered into a contract or lease that is burdensome, rejection by the trustee
creates no greater harm for the other party than the debtor's insolvency. An
insolvent debtor will be equally as unable to perform the rejected obligations
as she is to perform her other obligations. Such failure outside of bankruptcy would give the other party a cause of action for damages, and the
trustee's rejection does the same.45 2
On the other hand, assumption by the trustee does nothing more than
require the other party to perform to the same extent that it was obligated
to do had there been no bankruptcy. If there has been a default under the
contract or lease, the trustee must cure the default and provide adequate
assurance of performance.4 53 The trustee may not assume contracts when
applicable law would excuse the other party from accepting performance
from someone other than the debtor.45 4 If the trustee assigns the contract
or lease, the other party must receive adequate assurance of performance by
the assignee."' If the other party has concerns about the trustee's ability
to perform the contract, such as a concern about whether there are sufficient
assets to assure payments due, the other party retains its state law rights,
such as the right to suspend performance of a contract for the sale of goods
when reasonable grounds for insecurity exist, until the party receives
adequate assurances of performance.456
To be sure, the Code does limit the rights of the other party. Principally, the other party may not terminate the contract or lease solely by reason
of the debtor's insolvency.45 7 This does not actually affect the other
party's rights, since it may suspend its performance until it receives
adequate assurance of performance. Presumably, the other party initially
believed that the debtor could perform. Otherwise, it would not have
entered into the contract or lease.
Prohibiting the other party from terminating an executory contract or
lease solely because of the event of insolvency of the debtor is necessary to
prevent the other party from enjoying greater rights than it would otherwise
enjoy under the contract or lease. The trustee will assume a contract or
lease that is favorable to the debtor. This would include a lease of property
by the debtor that requires the debtor as lessee to pay a now below market
rent or a contract in which the debtor provides services for a now above
market compensation. Continued performance by the other party is a burden
to it. Outside of bankruptcy, the other party cannot avoid this burden. If

452. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1994).
453. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1994).
454. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1994).
455. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (1994).
456. See,e.g.,U.C.C. § 2-609(1994);RETATEMENT (SECOND)OFCONTRACTS
(1981).

457.

11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2), (e), (f)(1) (1994).
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it breaches the contract, the debtor would have an ability to obtain damages
that would make it whole. An "ipso facto" clause-that is, a clause
allowing termination in the event of bankruptcy-simply gives the other
party an excuse for getting out of a bad deal. So long as the other party
does get what it bargained for, a bankruptcy rule that prevents the other
party from benefitting from the debtor's insolvency does not violate the
constitutional limit on bankruptcy laws.
On the other hand, to the extent that Congress or the courts create
greater harms or benefits for the other party to the contract or lease than
exist outside of bankruptcy, they exceed Congress's constitutional authority.
One example of concern is the rejection of personal property leases when
the debtor is the lessor of the property. Assume that I am in the business
of renting computers, and I lease a computer to you for a term of three
years. You agree to pay me rent each month, and I agree to provide
maintenance services. After one year, I go bankrupt, and my trustee in
bankruptcy determines to reject the lease. What exactly does this mean?
Outside of bankruptcy, I have an obligation to provide services. You
have a possessory interest in the computer. As long as you pay your rent,
I have no right to "cancel" your possessory interest and get back the
computer. I could "cancel" my obligations under the lease and refuse to
provide the services. You may be a creditor with respect to the obligations
that I owe you and therefore could seek your remedies.
In bankruptcy, rejecting the lease means that I no longer have to provide
maintenance services to you; you will have a claim in bankruptcy for
damages (or an offset against rent) and therefore will be a "creditor" with
respect to my obligations to you. But your possessory interest is independent of whether you are a creditor. The trustee, whose job is to maximize
the estate for the benefit of creditors, may believe that I charged too little
rent for the computer, and may want to get it back so that she can rent it to
someone else at a higher rent. Despite this noble goal, as concerns your
possessory interest in the computer, the trustee should not be able to retrieve
the computer from you as long as you pay the rent. The Code does not
explicitly state that the trustee gets the computer back. Nevertheless, there
is some authority interpreting the ability to "reject" the lease as cancelling
the lease and giving the trustee a right to get the computer back.458
An interpretation that suggests the trustee may defeat a non-creditor's
property interest exceeds the scope of the bankruptcy power.5 9 So would

458. 2 WILLIAM COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 365.08, at 365-65 (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th ed. 1995) (citing In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 23 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982)).
459. The Code explicitly protects the property interests of a lessee of real property
under a lease or the purchaser of real property under a land installment sale contract if the
lessor or seller become a debtor. I I U.S.C. §§ 365(h)(l)(A)(ii), 3650)(1) (1994) (allowing
the lessee or purchaser to retain possession of the property).
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an express provision. If Congress wants to limit the property or other rights
of third parties, or impose obligations on third parties,460 then it must use
some other power, such as the Commerce Clause. Furthermore, it must do
so generally, not just for bankruptcy proceedings.
5. Limits on Bona Fide Purchasers in Fraudulent Conveyances
The trustee in bankruptcy has the power under section 548 to avoid

fraudulent conveyances. 46 ' This power in the Code mirrors nonbankruptcy
fraudulent conveyance law enacted in most states in the form of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act 462 or the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act.463 Even before enactment of the Code and the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, the ability of creditors to avoid fraudulent conveyances has been a
feature of English and American law since the sixteenth century, separate
from the law of bankruptcy. 4
Fraudulent conveyance law proscribes two types of behavior: actual
fraud, that is, a conveyance made with the actual intent to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors; and constructive fraud, in which a conveyance is made

460. An example would be a provision that requires third parties to renew contracts
with a debtor in bankruptcy so that the debtor can be rehabilitated. Courts have held that a
decision to cancel a contract pursuant to a contractual provision because a debtor files for
bankruptcy violates the automatic stay. E.g., In re Advent Corp., 24 B.R. 612, 614 (Bankr.
1st Cir. 1982); In re Cahokia Downs, Inc., 5 B.R. 529, 531-32 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1980).
However, courts have generally recognized that a decision not to enter into a new contract
does not violate the stay. E.g., In re Advent Corp., 24 B.R. 612, 614 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982);
In reNew England Marine Servs., Inc. 174 B.R. 391, 396-97 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re
Rives, 95 B.R. 946, 947 (Bankr. W. D. Ky. 1988); Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Insurance
Co. of North America (In re Gulf Tampa Drydock Co.), 49 B.R. 154 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985); Heaven Sent, Ltd. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (In re Heaven Sent, Ltd.), 37 B.R.
597, 598 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Douglas, 18 B.R. 813, 815 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1982).
461. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
462. 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985) (first promulgated in 1984).
463. 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) (first promulgated in 1918).
464. See 4 WILLIAM COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 548.01, at 365-65 (Lawrence P. King
ed., 15th ed. 1995). For discussions of the origins of and the policies behind fraudulent
conveyance law, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829 (1985); Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the
Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1977); Michael L. Cook,
Fraudulent Transfer Liability under the Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 263 (1980);
Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1984); Allen
J. Littman, MultipleIntent, Veil-Piercing, and Burdens and Benefits: Fraudulent Conveyance
Law and Multiparty Transactions, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 307, 308-12 (1985); John C.
McCoid II, ConstructivelyFraudulent Conveyances: Transfersfor Inadequate Consideration,
62 TEx. L. REV. 639 (1983); Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent
Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 55 (1991).
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without adequate consideration and the debtor is insolvent or is rendered
insolvent, left with unreasonably small capital or becomes unable to pay its
debts.465 Fraudulent conveyance law also provides that, if a transfer is
avoided because it was constructively fraudulent, the transferee retains a
security interest in the property transferred to the extent of any consideration
paid.466
Some aspects of fraudulent conveyance law have long been part of
bankruptcy law.4 67 This makes sense. To the extent that a third party has

465. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994):
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became ...

indebted; or

(2)(A) received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a
transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small
capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
See also Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 4(a)(1) (actual intent to defraud); id. § 4(b)
(without reasonably equivalent value/unreasonably small capital or unable to pay debts);
id. § 5 (insolvency/without "reasonably equivalent value"); 7A U.L.A. 639, 652-53, 657
(1985); Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act, § 4 (insolvency/without "fair consideration");
id. § 5(without fair consideration/unreasonably small capital); id. § 6 (without fair consideration/unable to pay debts); id. § 7 (actual intent to defraud); 7A U.L.A. 427, 474, 504, 507,

509 (1985).
466. II U.S.C. § 548(c) (1994):
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is
voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain
any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to
the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such
transfer or obligation.
See also Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 8(b), 7A U.L.A. 662 (1985); Unif. Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, § 9(2) 7A U.L.A. 578 (1985).
467. See, e.g., 13 Eliz., ch. 7, § 7 (1570) (Eng.) (providing for forfeiture by third
parties of double the value of debts, goods, lands and tenements that third parties possess or
claim, unless they possess or claim them as the result of just consideration and without fraud
or collusion); 1 Jam., ch. 15, § 5 (1604) (Eng.) (authorizing the commissioner of bankrupts
to convey any property previously conveyed by a bankrupt to a third party except property
transferred for the marriage of his or her children or for a valuable consideration); 4 Anne,
ch. 17, § 9 (1705) (Eng.) (recovery of a fine of £100 plus double the value of the estate
fraudulently concealed by third parties), continued in 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 21 (1732) (Eng.);
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received the debtor's property in collusion with the debtor to remove the
property from the reach of her creditors, bankruptcy law may extend to the
co-conspirator to the same extent that it extends to the insolvent debtor.
Further, the participant in the active fraud should not acquire any right to
the property that he receives. Similarly, to the extent that a third party
acquires a debtor's property for low enough consideration to be considered
inadequate 468 or not "reasonably equivalent value, 4 69 the third party's
interest in the property extends only to the extent of the consideration given.
There is one feature of the current Code, however, that exceeds the
scope of the subject of bankruptcies. Under both the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, creditors cannot
avoid a transfer of property made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors if the transferee took the property in good faith and for fair
consideration or reasonably equivalent value.470 Under section 548 of the
Code, however, the trustee may avoid such a fraudulent conveyance, and the
purchaser retains only a lien for the original purchase price.47 ' A trustee
in bankruptcy has an incentive to avoid such transfers if the value of the
property has risen.472 There will always be a lag between the time that the
trustee asserts her rights in the transferred property and the date of the
transfer.47 3 Thus, the trustee can deprive the good faith purchaser not only
of her possessory interest in the property but also the right to appreciation
in the value of that property. The ability of the trustee (for the benefit of
the debtor's unsecured creditors) to deprive the right of a non-debtor, noncreditor third party to the appreciation in value of property that she has
acquired in good faith and for reasonably equivalent value exceeds the
bankruptcy power.

1788 N.Y Laws 92, 13 (recovery of a fine of £100 plus double the value of the estate
fraudulently concealed by third parties); ch. 683, 1785 Pa. Stat., §§ 9, 10,found in 12 PA.
STAT. 1682-1801, supra note 165, at 70, 74 (recovery of double the value of the estate
fraudulently concealed by third parties; commissioner may avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers
except those for the marriage of the bankrupt's children or those for a valuable consideration).
468. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 467.
469. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
470. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, § 8(a), 7A U.L.A. 662 (1985); Unif. Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, § 9, 7A U.L.A. 577-78 (1985).
471. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a), (c) (1994)
472. Presumably, if the value of the property has decreased, the purchaser would
receive a lien only to the extent of the value of the property and retain an unsecured claim
for the balance. I I U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
473. Under II U.S.C. § 548(a), thetrusteemay avoid transfers that happen withinone
year before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.
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6. Servitudes
The relationship between being a creditor with a prepetition claim and
a third party with continuing, post petition rights, arises in servitudes.
David Gray Carlson has distinguished three types of servitudes, that is, three
types of personal obligations that may be enforced against successor owners
of assets solely because the successor owns those assets: (1) covenants
running with the land and equitable servitudes on land; (2) product liability
servitudes imposed on the buyer of assets from a seller who created a
liability; and (3) the toxic waste servitude."' He recommends that, on
policy grounds, the first category of servitudes not be foreclosable in bankruptcy but that the second category, product liability servitudes, be
foreclosable. The third category presents a more difficult problem.
Upholding servitudes of the finst type is constitutionally mandated. The
only way to foreclose in bankruptcy the rights of those benefitted by a
covenant running with the land or an equitable servitude is to destroy those
rights. These servitudes are intended to have continuing existence. Because
they create rights in favor of persons who are not existing creditors,
Congress may not foreclose them in bankruptcy. Of course, to the extent
that a current owner has incurred a monetary liability because of a breach
of the covenant running with the land, that liability may be discharged in
bankruptcy without destroying the continuing viability of the covenant.
The recommendation for the products liability servitude is constitutionally permissible. To the extent that the products liability servitude makes the
successor owner of property liable for a claim of a prior owner that arose
before the bankruptcy proceeding, Congress may (but need not) discharge
this claim and release the property from the servitude.
The toxic waste servitude is different. Fundamentally, the toxic-waste
servitude is not foreclosable outside of bankruptcy. First, current law
imposes the obligation to clean up the toxic wastes on whomever owns the
land.475 Second, even absent a statute on this issue, once land has been
contaminated with toxic wastes, its value will be diminished by the costs to
remove those wastes (which costs may even render the land a liability and
not an asset). The only way to discharge this servitude is to clean up the
toxic wastes. In a bankruptcy case of a debtor owning contaminated
property, costs incurred prepetition to clean up the land have already
discharged the servitude, and such costs can (but need not) be treated as
dischargeable debts. One can treat the costs of future clean up as an
administrative expense and foreclose the servitude if the clean up is

474. David G. Carlson, Successor Liabilityin Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of
Intertemporal CreditorPrioritiesCreated by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and
Toxic- Waste Cleanup, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 119.

475.

Comprehensive Environmental Remedial Compensation & Liability Act

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
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completed. Alternatively, one could constitutionally treat the unmatured
present liability of the debtor as a prepetition claim and discharge the debtor
from that liability, as in the case of Ohio v. Kovacs. 76 That treatment,
however, does not foreclose the toxic waste servitude.
On the other hand, abandoning the property to the debtor or otherwise
refusing to relieve her of present liability for future clean up costs will not
necessarily ensure that the toxic wastes will be removed. Where the costs
of clean up exceed the value of the decontaminated land, this result may
leave the debtor in a state of perpetual insolvency. Ultimately, for land for
which the cost of clean up exceeds the value after decontamination, the
government, as a representative of the public interest, must clean up the
land, or allow it to remain unproductive and potentially hazardous.
In any event, how one treats the present liability of the debtor for future
clean up costs may constitutionally be a bankruptcy issue.477 The existence and effect of the servitude, however, is a nonbankruptcy fact that
bankruptcy law cannot alter, and how to remove the servitude that survives
the bankruptcy case is a nonbankruptcy policy issue.
C. The Nature of the Creditor
Historically, bankruptcy law involved adjusting the relations between an
insolvent debtor and creditors with matured debts. Creditors with certain
types of unmatured claims could also participate.47 Resort to involuntary
or voluntary bankruptcy also depended in many cases on the amount of the
debts. Some jurisdictions required a minimum amount of debt for a debtor
or creditor to initiate proceedings. Others required that debts not exceed a
maximum amount. Finally, these laws drew distinctions between groups of
creditors for other purposes in the proceeding.4 79
Accordingly, the concept of bankruptcy that existed at the time of the
Constitution permitted flexibility for determining who was an eligible
creditor. As a corollary, those not deemed eligible creditors were also not
technically bound by the proceedings. They were, of course, affected. If
tort victims with unmatured claims were not included, they could not
participate in the distribution of the debtor's property. They were also not
bound by the debtor's discharge. Before the days of limited liability entities

476. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
477. See Carlson, supra note 474, at 167-71.
478. See, e.g., 7 Geo. 1, ch. 31, § 2 (1719) (Eng.) (creditors could get the present
value of unmatured debts); 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 22 (1732) (Eng.) (allowing creditors with
unmatured debts to file a petition for a commission of bankrupt, repealing the limitation
contained in the Statute of 7 George 1); 19 Geo. 2, ch. 32, §2 (1746) (Eng.). Tabb,
Discharge, supra note 62, at 340, 344 & n. 127; see also supra note 193.
479. E.g., 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 10 (1732) (Eng.) (requiring consent of 80% in number
and value of creditors owed more than £20 to discharge of debtor).
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that would shield individuals engaged in business from tort liability, this
may have been a good trade. After the advent of limited liability, and the
liquidation of a limited liability entity, good public policy may require that
unmatured tort claims be recognized in some way in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In any event, there is no constitutional infirmity in recognizing
unmatured tort claims in bankruptcy. To the extent that nonbankruptcy law
makes one a "creditor" then Congress is free to include that creditor in the
proceedings.48 This point gets stretched to its limit in the case of the
extremely contingent tort claim. Assume that a manufacturer produced a
substance that is later found to cause disease of some kind, such as cancer.
Assume that 100,000 people were exposed to this compound. As of today,
1,000 people have contracted the disease and sued the manufacturer.
Assume also that the best guess is that 9,000 more people who have yet to
be identified will contract the disease in the next 20 years. The manufacturer has long since stopped production of the substance, but because of the
suits from the 1,000 present tort claimants and estimates of future liability,
it has filed for reorganization in bankruptcy.
This problem presents difficult policy and legal issues, as the JohnsManville litigation has shown. Johns-Manville had manufactured asbestos. 48 1 Many who had contracted asbestosis and had sustained other
asbestos related injuries sued the company. 4 2 The company then filed for
a Chapter 11 reorganization. 483 In In re Johns-Manville Corp., a bankruptcy court denied motions filed by, among others, representatives of
individuals who had contracted the asbestos-related diseases to dismiss the
bankruptcy petition.484 The motions alleged that the company's filing was
in bad faith.485 Noting the substantial impact of the known and estimated
liability from the tort litigation, the court denied the motion.486 Later, the
parties crafted a reorganization plan that attempted to provide for the current
tort claimants and for those who may contract the diseases in the future,
without actually making a ruling that the48 7 future tort claimants were
"creditors" within the meaning of the Code.

480. The Senate Report on the bill that enacted the Bankruptcy Code noted that the
definition of "creditor" included "holders of prepetition claims against the debtor." It also
noted that the definition of "claim" was broad: "[T]he bill contemplates that all legal
obligations of the debtor, no mater how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with

in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court." S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5808.
481. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 734.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 78 B.R. 407
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At some point, the future tort claimants in our example, as in JohnsManville, will have a right to payment derived from the acts of the
manufacturer that caused their injury. This is a right recognized by state
law. States may differ on when the right "accrues" for purposes of the
statute of limitations, or for purposes of when a cause of action may be
brought. A future tort claimant may be unable to sue until injury is
manifested, and the statute of limitations may not begin until that time.48 8
Nevertheless, because the activity giving rise to the right of payment has
48 9
created a contingent liability that is recognized outside of bankruptcy,
it is (barely) enough of a "debt" to qualify the future tort claimants as
"creditors" in a constitutional sense entitled to participate in the proceeding.
This situation is different from attempting to qualify as a creditor
someone who asserts a right to payment that, as of the bankruptcy proceeding, has not yet arisen under any conception. This distinction may be hard
to draw in individual cases. It is also different from the situation in which
no right to payment is recognized under state or federal nonbankruptcy law.

(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). This problem also arises in the context of
a company that has sold goods that contain latent defects. The question is whether the buyers
of these goods who may assert a products liability claim against the seller in the future should
be recognized in a current bankruptcy case. See Epstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors, of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corporation (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d
1573 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that such future claimants do not hold claims under the Code
and therefore should not be so recognized because such claimants do not have any prebankruptcy relationship with the seller); see also Robert J. Scott, Note, When a Claim Arises
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 253 (1995). Constitutionally, recognizing
such future claims in bankruptcy could bejustified. At the time of the first sale of the goods,
the buyer of the goods obtains not only the goods themselves but also a contingent right to
damages for any latent defects that nonbankruptcy law recognizes. If initial buyer A then
sells the goods to buyer B and buyer B sells to buyer C, buyer C has acquired this contingent
right to damages. The seller cannot be liable to buyer C for a latent defect unless it exists
at the time of the initial sale. The fact that the seller may not know who buyer C is or will
be in the future is not relevant. The maker of a negotiable promissory note may not know
who may be the ultimate person entitled to enforce the note. This lack of privity does not
destroy the right to payment that exists under nonbankruptcy law.
488. See, e.g., In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
489. In Johns-Manville,the company estimated that it faced tort claims for damages
related to its manufacturing and selling asbestos in the amount of $1.9 billion. In re JohnsManville Corp., 36 B.R. at 734-35. Had Johns-Manville not filed for bankruptcy, the
company would have had to disclose this liability and would have had to book a reserve for
contingent liability in this amount under the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5. Id. at 734-35. Indeed, by May 1987, those with
asbestos related health claims filed approximately 11,850 proofs of claims for $32.4 billion
in damages. Harvey J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related Litigants as Holders of Statutory
Claims Under Chapter 1) of the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-Manville
Reorganization,62 Am. BANKR. L.J. 69, 73 n.14 (1988) (taken from company filings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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For example, if the law of a state did not recognize liability for a particular
act, Congress cannot create under the Bankruptcy Clause a debt arising out
of that act. The basic requirement is that a creditor must be a "creditor"
under nonbankruptcy law. Congress under its bankruptcy power may give
a broad reach to that term. Congress may not, however, give rights to noncreditors in a bankruptcy law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although bankruptcy law under the current Code pervades American
society more than ever before, it is still the province of specialists.
Fascinating as it is to some of us, it is not a subject on which our representatives in Congress pin their election hopes. It is a subject about which
most lawyers and business people know little. Bankruptcy legislation will
attract the attention of those interested in the subject, but it is not likely to
generate much attention of itself. In this regard, it is different from
legislation that Congress may enact under the Commerce Clause, be it
legislation to control consumer lending practices or to prohibit children from
carrying guns to school.
This is natural. Bankruptcy legislation in the past has generally dealt
with a discrete set of problems, and the Bankruptcy Clause commands that
bankruptcy legislation be limited to its proper domain. Legislators,
however, get their rewards by solving current problems, and not by
meticulously complying with what may seem to be only the technical
limitations imposed upon them by the Constitution. It may be easier
politically to achieve a partial solution of the problems of those who are
neither insolvent debtors nor their creditors through bankruptcy law. Fewer
people may be paying attention. Nevertheless, in the long run, for the
Constitution to have continued viability, Congress must respect what the
Framers intended in some sense in adopting the Bankruptcy Clause.
In the area of bankruptcy legislation, Congress and the courts have
reached the threshold question: Should legislation enacted under the
Bankruptcy Clause be confined to the "subject of Bankruptcies" as broadly
understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and interpreted
fairly consistently since? Congress has arrived at this threshold by
expanding the scope of the Bankruptcy Code without much attention to what
the Framers had in mind. Of course, Congress has legitimate concerns
about the way debtors and creditors relate to each other generally and about
the well being of workers, businesses, neighbors, local governments, and
local communities dependent upon consumers and businesses. It should not,
however, attempt to resolve those concerns in the name of the "subject of
Bankruptcies" in a way that gives solvent debtors rights that they do not
enjoy under nonbankruptcy law, that benefits entities that are not parties to
the insolvent debtor-creditor relationship at the expense of the insolvent
debtor or creditor, or that harms those third parties for the benefit of the
insolvent debtor or creditor.

